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Background Background Background Background
Investor behaviour and the relations between investors and management practice 
have acquired new significance because of the increased concentration of 
ownership, the rise of shareholder value as the measure of corporate performance, 
enforcement of higher standards of financial responsibility, and investors’ grievances 
about some aspects of management practices.
It is widely believed that investing institutions can have a considerable impact on the 
management behaviour of those companies in which they invest. This is because it 
is assumed that investors, in order to maximise their returns from their investment, 
will pay considerable attention to the strategic and human resource practices of the 
companies in which they invest. However, as Porter and Ketels (2003) note in their 
report on UK Competitiveness, “there is little systematic evidence on the impact of 
the UK financial market on UK companies’ strategy and investment choices.”  
This report (and the accompanying literature review on Investors and Management 
Practice (see www.dti.gov.uk/training_development/Investor_behaviour_lit_review.pdf)
was commissioned by DTI in an attempt to address the issue identified by Porter 
and Ketels and to examine the impact of UK financial institutions and markets on UK 
management practice, including strategy and investment in human capital. 
The report summarises the findings from the literature review and describes the key 
findings from a set of case studies.  
The Literature Review The Literature Review The Literature Review The Literature Review
The relationship between investor behaviour and company development has been 
the subject of a number of studies.I nvestor activism can be contrasted to a 
traditional ‘arms-length’ approach to investment relying mainly on the threat by the 
investor of ‘exit’ and executive incentive contracts to align the interests of investors 
or owners and managers. 
However, the literature suggests that other governance tools are necessary for the 
efficient control of agency costs and the management of risks. 
Investors can reduce problems of information asymmetry between managers and 
themselves by directly engaging with the company. Engagement therefore is a 
means of matching investor expectations and actual company practice.6
Institutional share ownership is much more concentrated in the UK than in other 
leading economies  (In the UK, 76.5 per cent of UK stock market capitalisation is 
held by institutionali nvestors , whilst in the US, institutionali nvestorso wn 47.4 per 
cent). This may facilitate closer ties between leading investors and corporate 
management, and the concentration of ownership potentially gives more powers to 
investors. 
The likelihood of engagement is determined by a number of factors such as fund 
size, investment time horizon, performance expectations, the proportion of funds 
invested in equity, legal restraints, active or passive investing and internal or external 
management. Pension funds and private equity firms have the highest propensity 
for engagement.
Private equity funds exercise control over the management of portfolio companies 
by several means, including making funds available in stages, with the availability of 
additional funding being contingent on company performance or other factors. 
Investors can engage with companies in a variety of ways. These include the threat 
of ‘going public’ or the use of proxy voting and may involve collaboration with other 
investors.
 The literature suggests that investors do not in general interfere with the day-to-day 
operations of the business. The areas they do influence include:
♦ Time Horizon 
♦ Investment in Intangibles 
♦ Economic Externalities 
♦ Innovation in Product Markets
♦ Corporate Leadership
Company managers may also influence investors in their investment strategy. 
Keeping investors informed through meetings is a means of boosting external 
confidence in the company and generating a better understanding of long-term 
company strategy. Indirectly, senior managers seek to cultivate investors through 
press relations, especially the business press.
The International Dimension The International Dimension The International Dimension The International Dimension
The literature review found that there were significant differences in business 
environment between the UK, the US and Germany, which could have substantial 
impact on investors’ propensity to engage. 
The UK and US have many similarities in their business environments. Legal norms 
and business practices are broadly similar. However, there are generally lower legal 
inhibitions on, and more general incentives towards investor engagement in the UK 
than in the US. Pension funds, in particular, are more assertive about shareholders’ 
rights in the UK than in the US. 7
In recent years, Germany has been moving closer to the Anglo-Saxon model of 
capitalism, with increasing emphasis on shareholders and the stock market rather 
than banks and ‘relational financing’ of companies. However, the traditional German 
model still applies across much of the economy, and where change has occurred, it 
has been an incremental process towards an Anglo-Saxon style system, rather than 
a wholesale change. In general, the influence of investors is less and the influence 
of managers is greater in Germany than in the UK or the US. More concentrated 
stock ownership in Germany would imply more potential for deep investor-investee 
relations, but lower levels of stock market capitalisation implies the opposite - that 
investors in Germany have lower levels of influence than in the UK or the US.
To summarise, the most important conclusion of the literature review is that the 
scope for institutional investor engagement is greater in the UK and the US than in 
Germany, whilst venture capital activity and engagement are much greater in the US 
and UK than in Germany.
The Case Studies The Case Studies The Case Studies The Case Studies
The case studies comprise eight venture fund case studies, eight case studies of 
portfolio companies funded by venture capital and five institutional investment fund 
case studies.
The case studies are based on interviews with companies and investors, 
supplemented by desk research that includes company literature and press reports. 
The degree of detail included in each study varies but the main areas covered are:
For investor companies:
♦ How they structure and approach the monitoring of, and interaction with, 
investee companies
♦ Their evaluation and reporting
♦ Their informal interaction with investee companies, and 
♦ Their influence over investee company management through all these means.
For investee companies:
♦ Strategy and performance - including overall strategy, strategy on acquisitions 
and disposals, new product development and operational performance
♦ Approach to general management issues such as employee recruitment, 
compensation, marketing activities, outsourcing etc, and
♦ Conventional corporate governance, such as compliance with the Combined 
Code, directors’ remuneration, board succession etc.8
The main findings from the case study work were:
♦ The scale of investor activism is greater than that suggested in the literature 
of even a few years ago
♦ VC partners and fund managers take different approaches to investor 
activism
♦ Many VC partners and managers retain corporate governance specialists, 
while integrating engagement into the investment process
♦ The majority of investors studied would not automatically support an investee 
company’s board. (This is significant because it is generally considered that 
corporate boards are captive, with company CEOs having too much influence 
upon board members)
♦ Progress critically depends on a constructive dialogue between VC partners 
and fund managers on the one hand and companies’ management on the 
other
♦ Organisational fit (i.e. investor capabilities to meet the specific needs of 
venture firms) is a key driver of engagement and that investors with closer 
strategic fit become more engaged with the companies they finance
♦ Venture capital funds that are independent and focused on venture capital 
alone become more involved with their companies
♦ The human capital of fund partners is another key driver of ‘active’ financial 
intermediation. Funds whose partners have prior business experience or a 
scientific education seem to provide more support and governance.
There are also institutional mechanisms that impact on management and skill 
development such as side funds and syndication and this report analyses their 
effects on the venture capital funds’ relationships with their portfolio companies. 
The report also identifies a number of portfolio company management practice areas
influenced by venture capital funds, including:
♦ Setting up new project teams – ventures bring together talent workers to 
form project teams
♦ Supply  chain  management –  v entures a ssist i n  introducing  value-driven 
supply chain management practices
♦ Recruitment of key personnel – ventures influence key recruitment decisions; 
♦ Involvement in marketing campaigns, and 
♦ Product development and innovation – ventures make funding decisions for 
new product development opportunities.9
International Perspective International Perspective International Perspective International Perspective
The case studies suggest that German, UK and US venture capital firms are all fairly 
activist, and if anything that order suggests an increasing order of activism. However, 
the case studies indicate the mechanisms involved in the relations between 
investors and management practices and cannot indicate the extent of specific 
practices. 
Overall Conclusions Overall Conclusions Overall Conclusions Overall Conclusions
This research suggests that investor activism is alive and well in the UK, both in the 
form of institutional shareholder activism and in the more direct and active form of 
venture capital fund engagement. 
The case studies further suggest that there are significant returns to investor 
activism, particularly when investors have considerable expertise in the areas in 
which they are investing. The research did not find evidence of a negative effect of 
investor activism through an overly short-termist approach on the part of venture 
capital funds. The business models vary from one venture capital firm to the next, 
but, at least in these case studies, it would probably be fair to characterise the 
investors’ time frame as medium-term. The time frame is related, inter alia, to 
investors' strategies for exit.
Although the evidence presented in this report is inappropriate for judging whether 
the UK is suffering because its investors are less (or more) activist in comparison to 
those in competitor nations, it does suggest that there are further benefits to be 
gleaned from investors being more activist where they have the expertise to give 
sound advice to portfolio companies.10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction 1. Introduction 1. Introduction
It is widely believed that investing institutions can have a considerable impact on 
management behaviour of those companies in which they invest. However, as Porter 
and Ketels (2003) note in their report on UK Competitiveness, “there is little systematic 
evidence on the impact of the UK financial market on UK companies’ strategy and 
investment choices.” The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has now funded a 
literature survey and primary case study research to examine the impact of the UK 
financial institutions and markets on UK management practice, including strategy and 
investment in human capital. The assumption behind this work is that investors, in 
order to maximise their returns from their investment, will pay considerable attention 
to the strategic and human resource practices. 
This report will make consistent reference to private equity firms and venture capital 
firms as pools of capital. Typically organised as a limited partnership, these firms invest 
in companies that represent the opportunity for a high rate of return within five to 
seven years. Investee companies are generally referred to as portfolio companies. 
Similarly, the report describes various types of institutional funds such as pension 
funds, mutual funds and insurance company funds as institutional investors.
This report summarises the findings from the literature review and describes the key 
findings from the case studies set out in full in Appendices 1 – 3. 
1.1. Findings from the Literature Review 1.1. Findings from the Literature Review 1.1. Findings from the Literature Review 1.1. Findings from the Literature Review
The relationship between investor behaviour and human development (involving 
different types of investors, including private trusts, private equity investors and 
institutional investors) has been the subject of a number of studies. Investor activism  is 
used in this literature as a term for the use of power by an investor to influence actively 
the management processes or outcomes of a given portfolio company. This can be 
contrasted to a traditional ‘arms-length’ approach to investment which relies mainly on 
the threat by the investor of ‘exit’ and executive incentive contracts to align the 
interests of investors or owners and managers. The literature suggests that other 
governance tools are necessary for the efficient control of agency costs and the 
management of risks. Investors can reduce problems of information asymmetry
between managers and themselves by directly engaging with the company. 
Engagement therefore is a means of matching investor expectations and actual 
company practice.
Institutional share ownership is much more concentrated in the UK than in other 
leading economies. This may facilitate closer ties between leading investors and 
corporate management, and the concentration of ownership potentially gives more 
powers to investors. In the UK, more than three-quarters (76.5 per cent) of UK stock 
market capitalisation is held by institutional investors. In the US,  institutional investors
owned 47.4 per cent of outstanding equity. The research evidence on the 
effectiveness of the activism of institutional investors is mixed. A study of CII (Council 
for Institutional Investors) in the US found that companies targeted by activist investors 
demonstrated share price increases 11.6 per cent greater than untargeted companies.11
Private equity funds exercise control over the management of portfolio companies by 
several means, including making funds available in stages, with the availability of 
additional funding being contingent on company performance or other factors. It was 
also found that pension funds and private equity firms have the highest propensity for 
engagement.
Investors can engage with companies in a variety of ways. These, which may involve 
collaboration with other investors, include the threat of ‘going public’ or the use of 
proxy voting. The literature suggests that investors do not in general interfere with the 
day-to-day operations of the business. The areas they influence include:
Time Horizon:  The research suggests that because pension funds, both private and 
public, have significantly predictable, long-term outflows to beneficiaries, they have 
a long-term perspective regarding their investments and mitigate any potential short 
term focus of company managers.
Investment in Intangibles :  Investors with a long-term outlook facilitate investments 
that create brand value, increase the customer base, enhance a firm’s information 
technology, or improve product and process design. Activist investors focus on both 
financial and non-financial performance in targeted companies
Economic Externalities:  Large pension funds (and the literature review quotes 
Hawley and Williams (2000)) become 'universal investors' and tend to have holdings 
in a broad cross-section of the economy and so have an interest in mitigating 
negative, and encouraging positive, externalities. 
Innovation in Product Markets:  Liquid equity markets may be conducive to radical 
product innovations by facilitating the flotation of high-growth firms, as in the 
information technology and bio-medical industries, but less effective in fostering 
incremental innovation. However, recent developments in private equity finance 
and long-term shareholding by major financial institutions in the UK and USA may 
shift the balance towards incremental innovation in production processes - a 
hallmark of Japanese and German capital markets and companies.
Corporate Leadership:  Investors exercise influence in matters of executive 
compensation through their representation in the membership and functioning of 
corporate boards. The impact of investor behaviour upon the wages and salaries of 
lower level employees is indirect, through concern with controlling labour costs. 
1.2. The Case Studies 1.2. The Case Studies 1.2. The Case Studies 1.2. The Case Studies
The extent of engagement by Venture Capital (VC) funds and institutional fund 
managers and their influence on management practice within UK companies was 
explored using primary case studies. This research covers eight venture fund case 
studies (see Appendix 1), eight case studies of portfolio companies funded by venture 
capital (Appendix 2) and five institutional investment fund case studies (Appendix 3). 
The case studies, each of which is designed to be read as a story in its own right, are 
based on interviews with companies and investors, supplemented by desk research 12
that includes company literature and press reports. The degree of detail included in 
each study varies but the main areas covered are:
For investor companies:
• How they structure and approach the monitoring of, and interaction with, 
investee companies
• Their evaluation and reporting
• Their informal interaction with investee companies, and 
• Their influence over investee company management through all these means.
For investee companies the influence of investors on:
• Strategy and performance - including overall strategy, strategy on acquisitions 
and disposals, new product development and operational performance;
• Approach to general management issues such as employee recruitment, 
compensation, marketing activities, outsourcing etc; and
• Conventional corporate governance, such as compliance with the Combined 
Code, directors’ remuneration, board succession etc.
The first stage literature survey report concluded that the role of venture capitalists and 
institutional investors extends beyond that of traditional financial intermediaries like 
banks (see ‘Propensity to Intervene’ section), and that investors can play a pivotal role 
in the development of the companies they finance. One of the central finding of the 
literature survey was that human capital is the key determinant of new company 
development and growth. This report uses case studies to examine the hypothesis that 
venture capital funds foster human resource capabilities in portfolio companies. In 
particular, the evidence that venture-capital-backed portfolio companies are different 
from other companies in the way that they develop their human capital base is 
examined (see discussion on professionalising the human capital under ‘The Role of 
Skill Development and Utilisation’ and ‘Investor Influence on Management Practice: 
General Management Practices’ sections).
Case studies are used to assess the assumption (reported in the literature review) that 
institutional shareholders: (a) use selective methods to engage with the companies in 
which they invest; and (b) have a significant impact on company performance when 
they do intervene. This is against the assumption that venture capital funds routinely 
provide valuable services to portfolio companies like advice, support and corporate 
governance. However, the form of intervention by institutions depends on an 
understanding of the full effect of such interventions on portfolio company 
management practices. In the case studies we also look at what drives investor 
activism.
1.3. Summary of Main Findings of the Case Studies 1.3. Summary of Main Findings of the Case Studies 1.3. Summary of Main Findings of the Case Studies 1.3. Summary of Main Findings of the Case Studies
The scale of investor activism is found to be greater than that suggested in the 
literature of only a few years ago. VC partners and fund managers take different 
approaches to investor activism. Many VC partners and managers retain corporate 
governance specialists, while integrating engagement into the investment process. A 
significant finding is that the majority of investors studied would not automatically 
support an investee company’s board. (This is significant because it is generally 13
considered that corporate boards are captive, with company CEOs having too much 
influence upon the board members). It is also evident that progress critically depends 
on a constructive dialogue between VC partners and fund managers on the one hand 
and companies’ management on the other.
The report also finds that organisational fit (i.e. investor capabilities to meet the specific 
needs of venture firms) is a key enabler of engagement and that investors with closer 
strategic fit become more engaged with the companies they finance. It finds that 
venture capital funds that are independent and focused on venture capital alone 
become more involved with their companies. The human capital of fund partners is 
another key driver of ‘active’ financial intermediation. Funds whose partners have prior 
business experience or a scientific education seem to provide more support and 
governance. 
There are also institutional mechanisms that impact on management and skill 
development such as side funds and syndication and this report analyses their effect 
on the venture capital funds’ relationships with their portfolio companies. We also 
identify a number of portfolio company management practice areas influenced by 
venture capital funds, including supply chain management, recruitment of key 
personnel, involvement in marketing campaigns, etc.
The main themes from the venture capital case studies were:
• Degree and method of engagement:  Degree and method of engagement:  Degree and method of engagement:  Degree and method of engagement: Table 1 in the case study analysis 
summarises this although each of the firms studied was structured slightly 
differently and was at a different stage in implementing its engagement 
approach. Much engagement was qualitative as well as quantitative and the 
level of record keeping varied. Some of the findings are as expected in that all 
venture capital companies nominated non-executive directors but we also 
found more extensive engagement with many cases of VCs being engaged in 
activities such as employee recruitment, marketing campaigns and product 
development. The degree of engagement was often related to the prior 
business or technology experience of the venture partner.
• RRRRole of Strategic fit: ole of Strategic fit: ole of Strategic fit: ole of Strategic fit: The organisation’s strategic fit is a key enabler of 
investor engagement. That is when an investor’s capabilities or skills match 
the needs of the investee company. This was especially true for venture capital 
firms that specialise in a particular technology or sector (e.g. bioscience or 
healthcare).
• Deal Structuring: Deal Structuring: Deal Structuring: Deal Structuring: The case studies show that venture capital investors insist 
on incorporating protective clauses into finance documents. These cover 
issues that used to be regarded as the sole perogative of company 
management. They include the approval of annual budgets, incurrence of new 
debt, licensing of intellectual property and even firing decisions. (These are 
summarised in Table 2 in the case study analysis). 
• Role of skills in in Role of skills in in Role of skills in in Role of skills in investor activism. vestor activism. vestor activism. vestor activism.  The case studies found that the skill mix 
of venture capital firms influenced the relationship with the portfolio company. 
In particular the more activist investors were those that:14
• Had worked for many years in the venture capital industry;
• Had run businesses so could understand the challenges faced by portfolio 
companies; and
• Have specialist or a technical background that is aligned with the investee 
company (e.g. bioscience or IT).
• Corporate Governance and reporting Corporate Governance and reporting Corporate Governance and reporting Corporate Governance and reporting. All VC firms appointed 
representatives to the board of their portfolio companies. All the firms 
monitored and interacted with investee companies. They monitored investee 
companies on an ongoing basis, interacted by different means (regular 
meetings, telephone calls, board meetings).  All met their investee company 
fortnightly or monthly. Their engagement related to three principal areas in an 
investee company: strategy and performance (e.g. new product development); 
general management practice; and conventional corporate governance, such as 
board structure and remuneration.
• Engagement was integrated with the investment process.  Engagement was integrated with the investment process.  Engagement was integrated with the investment process.  Engagement was integrated with the investment process. The majority 
of the firms integrated engagement with the investment process even if, due to 
the specialist knowledge required, particular individuals such as VC partners took 
responsibility for certain aspects, for example, for outsourcing activities 
and/or for corporate governance. The milestone funding approach practised by a 
large number of VCs studied is a clear example of this integration.  
Find Find Find Findings From Institutional Investor Case Studies ings From Institutional Investor Case Studies ings From Institutional Investor Case Studies ings From Institutional Investor Case Studies
This part of the study included five case studies of relations between institutional 
investors and investee companies. The picture that emerges is that UK institutional 
shareholders are active investors who engage in the companies in which they invest. 
Their engagement is both shaped and supported by an institutional framework that 
contains trade organisations, such as the ABI, the NAPF and the IMA, the ISC, and 
monitoring and proxy voting agencies. A major element of institutional shareholder 
activity has been in the area of corporate governance, both generally in the production 
of guidelines of best practice and specifically in engagement with companies whose 
standards of corporate governance practice fall short of best practice. In this, 
institutional investors are assisted by the greater transparency offered by application of 
the principles of the Combined Code and compliance with the provisions of the 
Directors Remuneration Report Regulations 2002.
2. Analy 2. Analy 2. Analy 2. Analysis of Case Study Findings  sis of Case Study Findings  sis of Case Study Findings  sis of Case Study Findings 
A central question for understanding investor behaviour is the extent to which 
investors play an active role in the companies they finance in addition to allocating 
funds. The literature survey report on private equity funds identified several dimensions 
of engagement, such as monitoring, corporate governance, as well as a number of 
information-based advice and support services.
Recent empirical evidence supports the notion that active investors are valuable to the 
companies they finance, providing monitoring and management support that results in 
better performance. Not only do portfolio companies need capital investment, but they 15
also value the expertise often brought by the venture capitalist. In seeking venture 
capital investment a company is anxious to acquire not only money but also the 
venture capital firm’s reputation and access to a network of relationships – with 
customers, suppliers, investments bankers and other important stakeholders. However, 
in the wake of the collapse of the new technology bubble of the 1990s, new trends in 
investor-investee contractual relations (e.g. term sheets) suggest that ventures have 
tended to include stringent conditions in the way they structure their financing 
arrangements with portfolio companies (see the case on 3i and section below on VC 
Financing and Deal Structuring). This is to ensure compliance with the venture firms’ 
safeguards on matters ranging from portfolio company recruitment to supplier deals (all 
portfolio company cases include information on the division of responsibility between 
investors and investees – see in particular tables on VC investment profile). It has 
inevitably left very little room for portfolio company managers to manoeuvre and 
diverge in any meaningful way from the conditions set by venture capital investors. 
This is not to say that portfolio company managers are always happy with the venture 
capitalists involvement or interference in their businesses. 
2.1. Active investors 2.1. Active investors 2.1. Active investors 2.1. Active investors
In this section we first ask what makes some investors more active and engaged with 
the companies they finance than others. We argue that organisation’s ‘strategic fit’ is a 
key enabler of investor engagement, that is investors’ capabilities/skills that match the 
needs of investees. 
Management research emphasises strategic fit as a key component of corporate 
strategy. For example, recent theories of investor behaviour and financial structure 
emphasise the role of organisational structure (e.g. investor focus in terms of its 
specialisation). In particular they show how organisational structure affects the 
processing of ‘soft’ information, which is at the core of financial intermediation. For 
example, venture capital is one important form of financial intermediation. Venture 
investors can choose how much to become involved with their portfolio companies. 
Active venture partners can help their portfolio companies in many ways, including 
helping with professionalising the management team, giving advice and support, 
creating strategic alliances, or exercising corporate governance.
How then does the strategic fit of a private equity firm - both in terms of organisational 
focus and human capital – affect its involvement with the companies it finances? 
Venture capital has become an important part of the financial system, having grown 
enormously both in the UK and globally. Central to our analysis is that venture capital is 
a form of financial intermediation where investors can choose how much to become 
involved with their portfolio companies. Indeed, prior research has already documented 
that there is considerable scope for active investing and engagement in venture capital.
There are two dimensions to strategic fit. Firstly, strategic fit at the level of the 
organisation and secondly, strategic fit at the level of human capital. Table 1 
summarises our results from our eight venture capital firms. (The table is about the 
way venture capital firms organise their engagement activities like side funds; portfolio 
companies (eight case studies) do not have affiliate/side funds or advisory boards).16
Table 1: VC Engagement Strategy Table 1: VC Engagement Strategy Table 1: VC Engagement Strategy Table 1: VC Engagement Strategy
Engagement Method Engagement Method Engagement Method Engagement MethodC omment Comment Comment Comment VC’s Practice(n=8) VC’s Practice(n=8) VC’s Practice(n=8) VC’s Practice(n=8)
Board membership Board membership Board membership Board membershipV enture nominates non-
executive director(s) on 
portfolio company’s 
board 
All VCs – 3i has recently 
adopted the practice.
Syndication Syndication Syndication Syndication Venture collaborates 
with other funds
6 VCs
Advisory Board Advisory Board Advisory Board Advisory BoardV enture has industry 
experts on its advisory 
board (e.g. IT luminaries 
in the IT sector)
All VCs
Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Specialist fund for 
experts / prominent 
people (to get their help 
for portfolio companies)
5 VCs
Partners have  Partners have  Partners have  Partners have 
background in  background in  background in  background in 
specialist areas specialist areas specialist areas specialist areas
Partners have education 
or experience in a 
specialist area such as 
science background or 
business experience
All VCs 
Particular management  Particular management  Particular management  Particular management 
areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern
Participated in
discussions with 
portfolio company over: 
Strategy (e.g. market 
share, product 
development, 
competition);
Frequent – 6 VCs
Strategic audit, including 
strategic alliances; 
Yes – 6 VCs
Employee recruitment; Yes – 7 VCs
Executive stock options;Y es – 5 VCs
Marketing or advertising 
campaigns;
Yes – 4 VCs
Outsourcing; andY es – 7 VCs
Any other value-added 
activity (e.g. product 
packaging)
Yes – 8 VCs
Two main results are strikingly consistent across our measures of engagement. First, 
the engagement style is strongly related to a Venture Capital (VC) firm’s organisational 
focus. Venture capital firms investing in one particular specialised area (e.g. biosciences) 
are significantly more likely to get involved with their companies. The same is true for 
firms that specialise their investment activities exclusively in venture capital deals (e.g. 
they do not carry out other investment activities such as buy-outs etc). The only 
exception seems to be the Carlyle Group and for firms which concentrate on relatively 
few deals per partner. Second, beyond strategic fit at the organisational level, we find 
that human capital is also associated with a more active engagement style. Venture 17
partners with prior business experience are significantly more involved with the 
companies they finance.
The recent literature suggests that the organisational structure of VCs matters. Our 
analysis not only empirically confirms the importance of organisational structure, but 
also confirms the importance of human capital (including skills) for the process of 
investor engagement. First and foremost, our case studies show that independent and 
more specialised VCs are much more involved with their companies than captives. This 
is true for all engagement measures used. Being a specialised venture firm strongly 
favours an active engagement style.  Merlin Biosciences and Sitka  specialise in health-
related businesses. Similarly, Kleiner Perkins , Sequioa and  TechnoStart  are more 
associated with high-technology firms. This means that firms that focus on one activity 
(i.e. venture capital in one particular sector) and firms that focus on financing relatively 
few companies per partner (most companies have a partner dealing at most with two 
or three portfolio companies), provide more governance and support to their companies.
Although older venture capital firms place less emphasis on frequent interactions or 
board seats, they are more active in hiring directors, recruiting management, and fund-
raising (e.g. Kleiner Perkins). This is consistent with older venture firms relying less on 
formal governance mechanisms and providing a higher level of support to their 
companies, with less need for frequent interaction. For example, Kleiner looks for 
entrepreneurs with interesting ideas for large, un-served markets, and they put those 
ideas into a framework of initiatives. In Kleiner's definition, an initiative is when several 
of its partners collaborate in an embryonic area. At any time, they have three or four 
initiatives that they are pursuing. These initiatives require intensive dialogue and 
coordination with portfolio company managers - providing advice and support in 
recruitment and any new deals with suppliers and other outside parties. Sometimes 
Kleiner succeeds, as with communications, telecommunications, fibre optics, and the 
importance of that for Netscape, Amazon, and Internet commerce. Other times Kleiner 
fails, as with pen computing. This sectoral emphasis - initiatives - is the key driver of 
Kleiner’s success in the venture industry.
2.2.  2.2.  2.2.  2.2. Engagement Approaches: Investor Networking Engagement Approaches: Investor Networking Engagement Approaches: Investor Networking Engagement Approaches: Investor Networking
This section discusses the key idea of ‘hands-on’ versus ‘hands-off’ investors. In 
traditional ‘value chain’ firms (e.g. mass production organisations such as Ford and 
General Motors), the main activity trade-off is between differentiation and low cost. 
Increasingly, however, firms are creating customer value through people and IT 
networks (e.g. AOL) or by providing knowledge-based solutions for customers (e.g. 
venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins : see also our discussion in Sequoia Capital case  ).
Investors seeking high levels of engagement can help their portfolio companies in 
many ways, including giving advice and support, helping with the team culture, creating 
strategic alliances, or exercising corporate governance. Venture funds can also spur 
their companies’ innovation. However, not all venture funds are alike. Using the 
industry’s language, some are “hands-on,” while others are “hands-off” investors.
One example of this “hands-on” approach is the funds’ emphasis on networking. 
Kleiner Perkins  subscribes to the idea of keiretsu , a Japanese concept referring to 
networks of companies bound together by mutual obligations and contacts. For Kleiner, 18
internet-based technologies have provided a major opportunity to forge such a network, 
with Netscape and Google at its centre. The Keiretsu reinforces the Fund’s ability to 
leverage the local insight of its investment professionals, collaborating across the firms’ 
investment disciplines from deal sourcing and due diligence through portfolio company 
development. The result is a broader view of potential investment opportunities and 
deeper level of expertise, creating value for portfolio companies that translates into 
superior returns for investors. For example, Kleiner Perkins claims to facilitate inter-
organisational cooperation among its network of portfolio companies by ‘brokering’ 
strategically important information among them. As evidence, the firm claims that 
there are over 100 strategic alliances among its portfolio companies.
Institutional Support Mechanisms
Another strategy is to appoint influential people on the advisory board. The Amadeus
network is extended through a heavyweight advisory board. As well as representatives 
of major fund investors such as Leendert van Driel of Gilde, Thomas Kuhr of T-Venture 
and Nathan Myhrvold, Microsoft's chief technical officer, its members include Frank 
Bonsai, founding partner of New Enterprise Associates; D Kirkwood Bowman, founding 
partner of Inman Bowman; and Elserino Piol, former deputy chairman of Olivetti turned 
venture capitalist. Funds can also benefit from syndication. Amadeus’s principals are 
strong believers in the virtue of syndication for its own sake: ‘having two or three 
heads round the table is more important than the money they bring,’ contends its CEO.
A more tangible example of investor networking and portfolio company support is the 
common practice of establishing ‘side-funds.’ .’ .’ .’ Amadeus raised a £2.5 million ‘invitation-
only’ side fund from IT luminaries in early 2002. The side fund incorporates these 
individuals into the extended Amadeus network and familiarises them with the portfolio 
companies. ‘And that means we get the phone answered,’ its CEO explains. ‘It’s very 
effective. Side funds like this are one of the classic features of US venture funds – it’s 
an idea we picked up in Silicon Valley.’ Similarly, the  3i network is formalised through 
its Advisory Board and Affiliates Fund.
CarlyleG roup often uses a ‘buy and build’ strategy to glean synergies (see its role in 
Blackboard and Edscha). For example, Boston Millennia has taken domestic portfolio
company executives to their meetings with European limited partners for the better 
part of a decade. ‘This year, we took five companies over, and we had 15 that wanted 
to go,’ Dana Callow said, managing general partner of Boston Millennia Partners. It is a 
differentiating factor if investors can take portfolio companies to 20 countries where 
they have relationships on the ground," said Callow. Such presentations and the 
personal introductions behind the scenes give PCs (Portfolio Companies) the 
opportunity to make direct follow-on investments, to consider acquisitions and to 
establish strategic partnerships.
2.3. VC Financing and Deal Structuring 2.3. VC Financing and Deal Structuring 2.3. VC Financing and Deal Structuring 2.3. VC Financing and Deal Structuring
The VCs examined in this study have typically concentrated their investing in two broad 
areas: technology and health care. During the enthusiasm of the bubble years, the term 
‘technology’ was stretched to include any dotcom, even if it aimed to sell pet-food or to 
deliver groceries in a white van. Venture investors have traditionally sought to include 
protective provisions in their contracts with portfolio companies, including the right to 19
approve major corporate decisions such as the payment of dividends, the sale of 
additional securities, or the sale or liquidation of the company. However, in the wake of 
the Internet bubble burst, the list of controls has been extensively revised in favour of 
investors (see Table 2 which summarises practices adopted by the eight VCs in this 
study). Investors now commonly insist on incorporating provisions into financing 
documents which used to be considered the sole prerogative of company 
management; examples include the approval of annual budgets, any incurrence of new 
debt, the licensing of a company's intellectual property rights and even hiring and firing 
decisions.
Table 2: VC Investment Profile Table 2: VC Investment Profile Table 2: VC Investment Profile Table 2: VC Investment Profile
Activity Activity Activity Activity Explanation Explanation Explanation Explanation VCs’ Approach (n=8) VCs’ Approach (n=8) VCs’ Approach (n=8) VCs’ Approach (n=8)
Investment Type Investment Type Investment Type Investment TypeM ilestone funding –
funding available in 
stages conditional upon 
investee company 
meeting certain 
performance targets
5 VCs
Full funding 6 VCs
Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions 
(the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet – –––
conditions are set in  conditions are set in  conditions are set in  conditions are set in 
the contract)  the contract)  the contract)  the contract) 
Capital structure (i.e. 
Liquidation preferred 
equity)
8 VCs
Composition of Board of 
Directors 
8 VCs
Recruitment of senior 
staff
4 VCs
Executive stock options 4 VCs
Approval for annual 
budget
5 VCs
Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit StrategyT rading 6 VCs
Flotation or IPO (Initial 
Public Offering)
5 VCs
These trends show that venture  investors are now more focused on establishing the 
very standards of corporate governance in the companies they finance. They are also 
beginning to expect management teams to both keep them informed of and solicit 
their approval when considering key management issues that had historically been 
considered the sole prerogative of company management. How these new contractual 
terms will alter the development and growth of the technology industry remains to be 
seen. Overall, most venture investors and lawyers agree that most of the tougher 
terms have been a necessary, if painful, response to market conditions. By rapidly 
weeding out many of the companies that probably should never have been funded in 
the first place, they have restored the focus on the industry’s fundamentals -
exceptional intellectual property, talented teams, viable exit strategies and a desire to 
innovate.20
Patient Capital
Our case studies illustrate the benefits of ventures embracing a long-term outlook in 
portfolio company investment. These case studies show that the built-to-last strategy 
can reward patient investors. Sequoia is still on the board of Cisco, 13 years after it first 
invested. Similarly, one of its partners, Arthur Rock, has been on Intel’s board since the 
early 1970’s. Sequoia has maintained a long-term commitment to building lasting 
companies that contribute not only to Silicon Valley, but also to the national and global 
economies. Cisco and Intel combined are currently worth nearly $900 billion in total 
market capitalisation.
As long as this built-to-last strategy, and these kinds of returns, are possible some 
venture capitalists will continue to show long-term commitments. Consequently, such 
patient capitalists still work to identify new products or technology applications with 
extremely large markets that provide opportunities to build major companies for the 
benefit of the founders, employees and public shareholders, whether in the US, 
Germany or the UK (see the international section).
Sequoia Capital is an interesting example of ‘new economy’ firms. They attempt to 
create value in ways that differ greatly from the manufacturing model.  Sequoia
illustrates how long-term strategic choices are strongly related to the type of value 
creation. Real choices reflect trade-offs. Knowledge firms, such as Sequoia Capital,
make trade-offs between the depth of specialisation in particular areas - which can only 
be acquired after a period of time - and the breadth of problems they can take on. For 
example, Sequoia has a policy of limiting its investment to a few specific areas such as 
the high technology sector.
Due Diligence
Good venture capital firms ensure that due diligence acts as a counter weight to the 
excitement that builds when managers begin to pursue a target. In the case of Ardana, 
Merlin Biosciences was very keen to establish the right business case for an 
acquisition. For Merlin, due diligence plays a critical role in imposing financial discipline 
on the benefits and costs of a deal. It ensures that the assessment of the target 
company translates into concrete benefits in revenue, cost and earnings and, ultimately, 
cash flow. 
Managers routinely overestimate the value of cost and revenue synergies and 
underestimate the difficulty of achieving them. Merlin therefore emphasises that due 
diligence is used to carefully distinguish between different kinds of synergies, and then 
estimate both their potential value and the probability that they can be realised. Similar 
approaches are taken by other major ventures studied. 
2.4. The Role of Skill Development and Utilisation  2.4. The Role of Skill Development and Utilisation  2.4. The Role of Skill Development and Utilisation  2.4. The Role of Skill Development and Utilisation 
Researchers have emphasised the importance of individuals acquiring knowledge 
about a relevant range of problems, thus developing their human capital and skills. Yet, 
the literature on financial behaviour essentially ignores human capital and skill utilisation 
strategies. To start to fill this gap, we have considered three distinct measures of 
human capital or skill development. First, we look at a partner’s experience in equity 21
fund and venture capital investment, as measured by the number of years that s/he has 
worked in the venture capital industry. The natural conjecture is that having more 
experience improves a partner’s ability to perform his/her tasks more skilfully. Second, 
we look at whether before becoming a venture capitalist, the individual had some
business experience, be it by working in industry, consulting, or as an entrepreneur. 
Prior business experience might help a partner to better understand the challenges of 
portfolio companies, providing a measure of the partner’s specialised experience in
handling business problems. Third, we look at whether a partner has an 
education/practical skill in science or technology. Science specialisation may give a 
partner a better and deeper knowledge which can facilitate the appreciation of the 
technological and operational challenges of the companies s/he is in charge of. 
We find that portfolio company managers judge the venture capitalists’ skills or human 
capital to be of central importance (see Primal Pictures) . When the business press 
reports on venture capital, it regularly comments on the importance of individual 
partners and the importance of having the right background. Also, the web pages of 
venture capital firms typically introduce their firm by talking about their partners’ 
backgrounds. 
The main result is that skills or human capital seems to be an important driver for how 
active private equity firms are. The most important human capital factor is prior 
business experience, which has a consistently significant effect on all the engagement 
practices (all our cases have partners/top managers with prior business experience). 
This confirms the notion that business expertise is important for practicing an active 
investment style. Having more experience in venture tends to also have a positive 
effect on engagement. Scientist partners get more involved in recruiting management 
and sitting on boards (see Merlin Biosciences). Venture capital firms like  Sequoia  out-
compete commercial and investment banks in funding successful innovation because 
their key people are better at assessing technologies and entrepreneurs. TechnoStart 
has devised its own search mechanism - Radar System - for identifying and supporting 
scientists in learning business skills.  
When companies obtain funding, they will typically interact with only one or a few of 
the venture capital firm’s partners. More venture experience by individual partners has 
a positive effect on the engagement variables.
Overall, our case studies provide consistent evidence that human capital is an 
important determinant of the behaviour of private equity funds. The following section 
provides examples of the effect of the investor interventions on the skill development 
and utilisation on the companies in which they invest.
2.5. Investor Influence on Management  2.5. Investor Influence on Management  2.5. Investor Influence on Management  2.5. Investor Influence on Management Practice: Corporate Governance  Practice: Corporate Governance  Practice: Corporate Governance  Practice: Corporate Governance 
How involved VCs (venture capitalist firms) should be with companies in their 
investment portfolios is an important issue for both VCs and PCs (portfolio companies). 
Traditional wisdom is that VCs should offer at least some level of non-monetary 
support to portfolio-company managers, perhaps by serving on the board of directors 
and providing financial guidance or advice on business policy decisions. Indeed, 
sometimes VCs may have a level of control and directional power that exceeds their 
minority stakeholder position. Nevertheless, key questions remain about what type and 22
degree of Private Equity Fund (PEF) involvement will most enhance the competitive 
position of companies in a PEF’s portfolio.
We explored how VC and PC firm characteristics, as well as environmental conditions, 
relate to aspects of management support. We find that the most popular way in which 
VCs support their PCs is through board membership. For example, Merlin normally has 
a seat on each company board and likes to play a leading role in financing and other 
strategic events. The Merlin team blends science, finance and commercial expertise in 
human healthcare. The same is true for other VCs studied in particular commercial 
niches. As conditions change, the VCs may move to the other primary means of 
involvement: advisorym anagement support.
Another critical driver of management support by VCs may be the rate of growth in the 
external environment. New ventures operating in fast-paced, dynamic, high-growth 
environments are more likely to need and benefit from advisory managerial support 
across functional areas (e.g. R&D, manufacturing, marketing, sales) than new ventures
operating in more stable, low-growth contexts. The type of VC involvement (i.e. board 
membership or management participation) may affect a PC’s overall performance. The 
intensity and frequency of such support may be positively associated with overall PC 
performance.
Our portfolio company cases support the idea that VCs engage in different types of 
involvement depending on PC life-cycle stage. In the early and late stages, they favour 
board membership; in the expansionary stage, they favour management support.
Ongoing monitoring
How investee companies are monitored requires considerable expertise and cost on 
the part of Venture Capital funds.T he information exchange procedures are likely to 
describe how the firm builds up an understanding of the businesses in which it invests 
and holds routine meetings with investee companies’ senior management. It may also 
address whether separate teams are responsible for particular issues such as corporate 
governance and general management problems such as outsourcing. The formal 
procedures are particularly useful in the following instances: 
Strategy on intervention: This includes details of different forms of interaction, 
including: additional meetings with management to discuss concerns; expressing 
concerns through the company's advisers; meeting with the Chairman, Senior 
Independent Director, or with all Independent Directors.
Circumstances when further action will be taken: This gives an indication of when 
further action will be taken. For example, expressing concerns through the company's 
advisers; meeting with the Chairman, Senior Independent Director or with all 
Independent Directors; and interacting with other institutions. They may attend 
company meetings where they may raise questions about investee companies' affairs. 
Also investee companies are monitored to determine when it is necessary to enter into 
an active dialogue with the investee company's Board and senior management.
All Ventures in the study undertook the desk-based monitoring involving PC company 
accounts and project reports. In addition, VC partners met with an investee companies’ 23
management at least once a year - some did this before they invested in a company as 
part of their general research function but for others it was part of the post results review 
meeting. Table 3 summarises these findings.
Table 3: Reporting Arrangements  Table 3: Reporting Arrangements  Table 3: Reporting Arrangements  Table 3: Reporting Arrangements 
Findings are reported for both Venture Capital firms and their portfolio companies 
(within brackets are portfolio company data).
Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Number of Companies  Number of Companies  Number of Companies  Number of Companies 
n=8 n=8 n=8 n=8
Telephone or write to 
express 
concerns/decisions
General issues of
concerns to Venture 
Capitalists (or reporting 
back to the VC)
Frequent interactions –
all VCs (all portfolio 
companies)
Meet with investee (VC) 
company managers
To provide (seek) advice 
on company 
management 
Fortnightly or Monthly 
meetings – all VCs (all 
portfolio companies) 
Investee corporate 
board meetings 
To discuss strategic 
issues
5 to 8 meetings in a 
year – all
Investee company 
reports
Formal accounts and 
project reports
Yearly – all companies
For the majority of companies studied, the resources deployed in engagement could not 
be isolated as engagement was integrated with the investment process even if, due to 
the specialist knowledge required, particular individuals took responsibility for 
certain aspects, such as outsourcing responsibility, and corporate governance.
Some companies such as TechnoStart involved themselves in detailed discussions 
about management and policy with the aim of influencing them. Other managers may 
have done this to a lesser extent when they had specialist funds that dealt with under-
performing companies. For example, Amadeus has set up such side funds and advisory 
boards (or the use of syndication) for this particular purpose. 
The firms that are concerned with under-performing companies met at a minimum six 
times a year. In Evotec, the engagement by the VC increased the value of the 
investment. 24
2.6. Investor Influence on Management Practice: General Management Practices 2.6. Investor Influence on Management Practice: General Management Practices 2.6. Investor Influence on Management Practice: General Management Practices 2.6. Investor Influence on Management Practice: General Management Practices
Most Ventures are committed to helping entrepreneurs build sustainable businesses. 
They are constantly on the lookout for ideas to invent new business categories or 
radically alter existing ones. Their focus is generally on new technologies and new 
applications of technology that will drive high-impact change. 
Successful VCs are built on the belief that it takes more than solid financial support to 
get a company off the ground. They have long recognised that collective strength and 
experience are essential to building a business. For example, Kleiner pioneered the 
idea 20 years ago of bringing the businesses they work with into an informal network, 
which they call a  Keiretsu. Entrepreneurs gain access to its portfolio of companies and 
associations with global business leaders. These relationships are the foundations for 
strategic alliances, partnership opportunities, and the sharing of insights to help build 
new ventures faster, broader and with less risk.
We have earlier noted that when venture capitalists support the professionalisation of 
their portfolio companies, they are not only concerned with recruiting chief executive 
officers (CEOs), but can also become involved more deeply with building an entire 
management team. As companies develop from being start-ups to becoming large 
complex organisations, attracting highly talented employees becomes a key challenge. 
The development of human resource functions, including skill development, thus 
becomes an important aspect of professionalisation, especially in high technology and 
health sectors where human capital is critical. In traditional financial arrangements, 
investors concern themselves mostly with the financial aspects of the firm, but leave 
matters of internal organisation to the entrepreneurs. The notion of venture 
capitalists being closely involved with investors suggests that they may even go as far 
as helping companies with their internal organisation, including helping make 
decisions about specific marketing plans. This may involve introducing a new array of 
management practices, for example, new inventory practices, more appropriate 
executive incentives and more targeted sales and marketing strategies. Carlyle 
implemented these practices when it acquired Empi in a public to private deal.
Our case studies also show various aspects of the internal organisation of companies. 
We find that private equity firms seem to influence developments further down the 
organisation, in terms of playing a role in the introduction of stock option/bonus plans, 
the hiring of specialists such as sales and marketing personnel, specific marketing 
campaigns and the formulation of human resource policies. We discuss in detail below 
the management areas of investor influence.
New Managerial Processes
Venture-funded start-up companies often operate as a loose organisational system. 
Temporary teams are set up for specific skills (like securing initial funding, 
developing the first product, or building a sales organisation), allowing different sets 
of skills to be brought in at each stage of a company’s development. One 
consequence of this structure is that people move frequently from job to job based 
on personal contacts and networking. Their tenure is therefore often limited to very 
short spells of stay with a particular company - ranging from a couple of years to only 
a few months. This type of fluid organisational structure presents opportunities as 25
well as dangers to the very existence of the project concerned. It is thus important 
that VC firms ensure stability and continuity of personnel and procedures to the 
extent it is desirable for a project’s fruition. 
We  find  that  venture  influence  is m ost  profound  in  the a rea  of  establishing  new 
portfolio  company  managerial  structures a nd p rocesses ( see  also t he s ection  on 
employee  recruitment f or  details a bout  venture  influence  in  professionalising  the 
skill/human  resource  base).  Amadeus a ssisted i ts p ortfolio  companies i n  adopting 
innovative management practices, as for example when it provided technical help to 
leatherXchange f or  instituting  a  proprietary  grading s ystem f or  hides.  TechnoStart 
provides support and expertise to develop academic projects as a start-up company. 
After finding that the technology works on a laboratory scale, further funding is used to 
support e xploring t he  full  commercial  potential o f  the n ow v alidated t echnology 
platform. For example, it set up workshops with patent lawyers for ItN Nanovation. 
Strategy
The literature survey highlights ‘strategy’ as a potential area of investor influence. Most 
of our case studies provide evidence to that effect. For example, skills and expertise of 
ventures can be useful in identifying business growth opportunities for investees (e.g. 
Vectura diversified its product portfolio with the aid of Sitka) or assembling investee 
staff with complementary skills (e.g. Sitka enabled MSL to form an experienced team 
of specialists). Kleiner supported a merger between Excite and  @home.
Sequoia’s experience shows that portfolio company problems may occur in any area 
related to its strategic direction, financing or staff recruitment. Ventures can provide 
expert advice in these areas and thus create value for all venture partners.  In the same 
vein, public to private deals involve a new array of management practices, for example, 
new inventory practices, more appropriate executive incentives and more targeted 
sales and marketing strategies. By focusing in these areas, Carlyle has successfully 
turned many failing businesses into profitable entities.
Ardana has used its venture funds to accelerate in-house research projects and to carry 
out a number of strategic initiatives for the acquisition, in-licensing and co-marketing of 
reproductive health products.C are UK’s venture, Sovereign Capital, has helped the 
company to create new business concepts in areas as diverse as home from hospital, 
rapid response schemes, intensive homecare, and extra care schemes. Sovereign 
generally ensures that all fundamentals are in place, a high-calibre entrepreneurial 
management team with a proven track record, a compelling pitch, a clear vision, and 
the determination to build a scaleable business that has the potential to emerge as a 
brand or market leader. This is how Sovereign was able to mould the management 
practice of Care UK into delivering an innovative range of services in the UK’s social 
services market.
Marketing or Advertising Campaigns
Investors may seek to influence those decisions which in traditional management view 
fall strictly within the company operational domain. Marketing or advertising decisions 
are a case in point. At Google.com,  Kleiner  convinced the private search engine not to 
embark on a large, expensive advertising campaign. Similarly, Kleiner encouraged 26
Roger Siboni (he was the head of KPMG's $3.6-billion-a-year consulting operation) to 
run enterprise-software start-up E.piphany Inc. and later provided marketing support.
Among the investment criteria of 3i are long-term investment period of 3 to 7 years and 
adding value in the investee companies by offering advice, assistance in developing 
new products and services, recruiting key personnel and introduction to potential 
customers, strategic partners, financiers and investment bankers. To get the attention 
of the 3i partners, the businesses must however show they can graduate to a higher 
level, such as capturing large global market share with a top quality product. Silver Bird 
Group Bhd, for example, has managed to repackage its bread and cakes in an 
innovative way to appeal to overseas customers. 3i Group was instrumental in the way 
Silver Bird re-designed its packaging to create value for both itself, its customers and 
the 3i Group.
Outsourcing
Venture capitalf irms are frequently involved in outsourcing decisions. Carlyle , for 
example, is understood to insist, as a condition of investment, that any company it 
invests in outsource its computer programming tasks to the greatest extent possible. 
Outsourcing has now moved up the so-called ‘value chain.’ The tasks being outsourced 
are increasingly sophisticated, and thus less subject to commoditisation down the road 
(see  Edscha). It has therefore become important for investors such as Carlyle to insist 
on outsourcing as part of the drive to maintain focus in investee companies. 
Innovation and Value Creation
The literature survey report developed many specific ideas about the nature and scope 
of innovation in the venture capital industry (e.g. the provision of seed capital or 
incremental or continuous innovation). A number of case studies document how VCs 
influence the innovation and R&D activities of their portfolio companies. For example, 
Plastic Logic is one of the innovative companies in Dow’s Venture Capital portfolio 
which is creating ‘game changing’ technology. Plastic Logic, which spun out of 
Cambridge University’s Cavendish Laboratory, has developed printable semiconductor 
polymer technology applicable to a variety of electronic products.
Other examples in our case studies include Primal Pictures, Ardana  and Evotec where 
venture funds are involved in one way or another in promoting new scientific or R&D 
activities. Merlin’s support of R&D activities in the biosciences sector is another 
example of VC influence. For example, in 1997, Merlin established its first investment 
partnership to provide seed capital for UK-based biotechnology companies. The 
companies have since matured into some of the leading private biotechnology firms in 
Europe.   
Sequoia was instrumental in helping assemble a flexible and experienced Yahoo! team 
in an industry where companies prosper or die in weeks. It demonstrated that a 
venture firm can help create great value by helping turn ideas into companies in a short 
time. In an early stage company Sequoia tends to be involved with key hiring decisions, 
major changes of strategic direction, company positioning and financings. Sequoia
holds a board seat with most of its companies, but not all. In some cases it has 
remained directors of companies for over ten years.27
iOra has established an information sharing mechanism that ensures that its ventures 
have full information and rationale for its development efforts. Companies need to 
maintain a variety of innovation efforts if they want to flourish over the long run. One 
component of this strategy is to constantly pursue incremental innovations - further 
developments in offline networking products as in the case of iOra. The active 
encouragement of iOra’s ventures for its innovation activities however requires that 
ventures fully understand the dynamics of its innovation strategy. 
Employee Recruitment and Retention
We asked for details about the role of venture capitalists in recruiting, specifically 
whether an investor was reported to have helped the company with recruiting the CEO, 
the chief financial officer (CFO), a vice-president of marketing, the head of R&D, or 
other executive. The process of building up the internal organisation and, in 
particular, the employee base of a company, begins with the recruitment process. 
To address the contribution of private equity funds more directly, we ask if investors (ven-
ture capitalists or other financiers) were influential in shaping the human resource 
policies of the company. We examine the relationship of this variable to obtaining 
venture capital.
Our conclusions on the importance of sector specialisation for senior personnel 
recruitment are echoed in findings on recruitment for lower level personnel. More 
focussed venture capitalists whose partners have more business experience are 
involved with recruiting irrespective of the particular position in the management team. 
Paul Wahl was the president of software giant SAP America Inc, and one of the most
respected technology executives in the US. Kleiner  and Benchmark Capital, who 
together were funding a new security start-up called TriStrata Security Inc, successfully 
recruited him for the new venture. This is an example of how Kleiner  performed the 
recruitment function for a portfolio company.
Together these results suggest that venture capital firms influence how firms recruit 
personnel, and that private equity fund-backed firms make greater use of business and 
professional contacts for recruiting. While private equity funds are part of that network, 
we would argue that the evidence should be interpreted conservatively, indicating an 
overall pattern of firm conduct, rather than a specific contribution of private equity funds.
We also look at the timing of certain milestone events that occur within the 
organisation. We examine if and when companies adopt stock option plans/bonus pay 
plan and we look at the first hiring of a vice president. Stock option/bonus plans are 
important for a variety of reasons, helping to attract talent to the firm, providing 
incentives for the employees within the firm, and they may help to retain employees. 
Obtaining venture capital is associated with a significant increase in the likelihood of 
adopting a stock option/bonus plan (see  Evotec and TechnoStart ), in addition to 
recruiting new staff.  Moreover, obtaining venture capital is associated with a significant 
increase in the likelihood of appointing a vice president (see Ardana) or new board 
members.28
The issue of compensation is a problem for private equity funds themselves, as well as 
for investee companies. Venture capital employees can easily assess the potential 
returns from VC investments, which vastly exceed corporate salaries. Some companies 
let their venture employees invest in a side fund, much to the chagrin of operations and 
technology employees, who are often paid fixed salaries. This disparity often results in 
discontent in operational departments.
Leadership’s Role in Portfolio Company Development
The evidence in the previous section shows that venture capitalists play a key role in 
building the internal organisation, and specifically the skill development, of the 
companies they finance – including building operational teams, introducing new 
management practices such as inventory systems or helping create new management 
capabilities such as patent systems. An important question is whether venture capital 
affects the leadership at the very top of the organisation.  The CEO has the central role 
in building up all aspects of the company. To begin with, the founders naturally take the 
leadership position in their own company. While founders may be very suited for the initial 
phases, not all founders can make the transition from entrepreneur to manager. Our 
case studies (e.g. Ardana and Plastic Logic) suggest that as companies develop, they 
benefit from bringing in an outsider for the position of CEO or CFO.
Leadership qualities are also demonstrated in the way top managers attempt to create 
efficiencies by introducing new organisational systems and procedures. Merlin ties 
portfolio company leadership development to the business drivers. First, it looks at the 
company’s strategy and finds out how executive development will get the portfolio 
company CEOs and other senior managers to the next stage of development faster. 
Second, it talks to the unit managers to learn what is working, what is not, and what is 
missing – helping learning by doing and learning by experimentation. Merlin also uses 
executive development as an engine of change. It discusses with its portfolio company 
managers current and future leadership capabilities and capacity. Merlin also helps the 
portfolio company articulate the focus and metrics for its executive development 
programmes. For example, in the case of merger activity, leadership development 
programme could focus on accelerating the integration of merged companies. Merlin 
believes that executive development can contribute to business success in many ways 
during a merger.
So far we have seen evidence that suggests that private equity firms get involved with 
the p rofessionalisation  of s tart-up f irms, a nd  that  there  can b e  different  facets t o this 
involvement. On the one hand, venture capitalists frequently concern themselves with 
providing leadership at the top of the organisation. On the other hand, they are 
involved in team building and professionalisation further down in the organisation. 29
Performance Measurement
Increasing number of companies have been measuring employee satisfaction, 
customer loyalty and other performance areas that are not financial but that they 
believe affect profitability. For instance, Care UK’s ventures have insisted on the 
company establishing better linkages between its strategy and performance 
measurement system to achieve a better allocation of resources, especially in its 
investment in training activities. Although a great deal of subjectivity is involved in 
measuring what is important to customers, employees, suppliers or other stakeholders, 
a better understanding of the underlying assumptions could fill the gap between 
subjective assessments and actual financial returns. These assumptions are primarily 
related to setting the right performance targets in terms of what is desirable on the 
part of investors or other stakeholders; for example, Care UK’s ventures value long 
term performance such as growth and stability more than short-run financial gains.
2.7. Institutional Shareholder Activism  2.7. Institutional Shareholder Activism  2.7. Institutional Shareholder Activism  2.7. Institutional Shareholder Activism 
Institutional shareholders are assumed to have an important role to play in corporate 
governance and yet the literature review suggested little association between 
institutional shareholder activism and corporate performance. It should be noted that 
most of the empirical research is of US institutional, rather than UK, shareholders and 
companies. Various explanations have been advanced for the failure to demonstrate a 
connection between institutional shareholder activism and company performance, 
measured using accounting numbers or shareholder returns. One type of explanation 
for this is that institutional shareholders do not engage, or engage very little, with the 
companies in which they invest. For example, Black (1998), in his review of the US 
literature, concludes that the level of shareholder activism is low, and that institutions 
do not spend much on overt activism. 
Alongside this explanation is the view that institutional shareholders may have conflicts 
of interests which inhibit their engagement. This may explain why shareholder activism 
in the US is associated with public sector pension funds. The other type of explanation 
is that institutional shareholders do engage with investee companies to successfully 
bring about change, but the changes are not reflected in improved company 
performance, as measured by accounting profits and share returns. Karpoff (2001), for 
example, notes that: ‘Both proposals and private negotiations have prompted some 
firms to make small changes in their governance rules (e.g. appointment of 
independent board members), but there is little evidence that either has increased 
target firms' earnings or had much effect on operations.’ 
Extending this argument, Romano (2002) suggests that investor activism does not lead 
to improved company performance because activists are focusing on corporate
governance issues, including board structure, restricting executive compensation, 
confidential voting, and takeover defences. Good corporate governance in itself may 
not necessarily be associated with superior company performance, and there is 
uncertainty about the effect of the adoption of takeover defences on shareholder 
wealth.
The case studies in this report of UK institutional shareholders are considered against 
the background of these general findings. Black and Coffee (1994) discuss the 30
differences between the engagement of US and UK institutional shareholders in 
investee companies. The general picture that emerges from the case studies is that UK 
institutional shareholders have been engaged with the companies in which they invest 
for some time. The case studies of Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS) and 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) show, as would be expected from the Combined Code, that 
institutional shareholders and the company managers talk to one another. This method 
of engagement has, however, existed in the UK long before the Combined Code was 
first published in 1998, and continues on a regular basis. 
The patterns of engagement can be divided into routine and extraordinary actions. 
Routine actions, as shown in the USS case study, include the analysis of information 
concerning companies and meetings and dialogue with their managers. It also includes 
voting on resolutions presented at companies’ AGMs. There are a number of problems, 
some of which are administrative, in voting shares at AGMs but the existence of voting 
proxy specialists helps to reduce these problems. Extraordinary actions are often 
triggered by share price performance, with either a company performing poorly relative 
to the sector or a sector performing poorly relative to the market. Institutional 
shareholders try to understand the reason for poor performance, and this may involve 
presentations by company managers and meetings between institutional shareholders 
and managers. A Good example of this can be found in the GSK case study.
Much of the institutional shareholder engagement with companies is routine. 
Institutional shareholders do not, for good reasons, usually publicise their concerns 
about an investee company. The fact that engagement is taking place generally only 
becomes known when there is a breakdown in talks. This happened in relation to 
executive remuneration at GSK, and the share bonus payments by Sainsbury plc to its 
executive chairman. The GSK and Sainsbury case studies reveal a number of important 
features about institutional shareholder engagement in the UK. 
First, much of the reported shareholder activity is focussed on the work of two of the 
trade associations, the ABI and the NAPF, and on the work of PIRC. Coordinated action 
through, for example trade associations, reduces free-rider problems by enabling the 
costs of monitoring and intervention to be shared amongst institutions. 
Second, increased transparency about executive remuneration enables institutional 
shareholders to effectively monitor the remuneration schemes of investee companies. 
The recommendations of the Greenbury Study Group, the Combined Code and, most 
importantly, the Directors Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 provide shareholders 
with information that enables them to assess the appropriateness, or otherwise, of 
awards made to directors. Transparency about executive remuneration, as shown by 
both the GSK and Sainsbury case studies, is key to shareholder activism. 
Third, the provisions of Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 make 
companies accountable to their shareholders through the mechanism of voting at an 
AGM. In the cases of both GSK and Sainsbury, the possibility of voting seems to have 
been sufficient to ensure the directors responded to the concerns of shareholders. 
Finally, the Sainsbury case study highlights the difficulty that institutional shareholders 
have where the company’s founder, or the founder’s family, hold a large block of the 
company’s shares. 31
The UK, as shown by the case studies of Sainsbury and GSK, has a complex structure 
that supports institutional shareholder activism. An important element of this structure 
is the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (ISC). The case study of the ISC shows 
how its pattern of activities has changed over its forty years history. Initially the activity 
of the ISC was focused on engagement, through case committees, in the affairs of 
investee companies. There are concerns amongst investee companies about the 
issues on which institutional shareholders intervene. These concerns are not new. For 
example, a quarter of a century ago the Wilson Committee expressed the view that 
institutional shareholders should not interfere with day-to-day management decisions, 
and should be cautious when considering major policy decisions. 
More recently, the Company Law Review Steering Group pointed out that institutional 
investors are not qualified to second-guess normal management decision-making. In 
the early 1990s the focus of the ISC’s activity was on the development of codes of 
best practice for companies, mainly in the area of corporate governance. Issues of 
corporate governance were also of concern to the ABI and the NAPF. However, the 
role of the ISC in promulgating codes of best practice on corporate governance was 
taken over by other organisations during the 1990s, culminating with the publication of 
the Combined Code. The provisions of the Combined Code importantly improve 
transparency by requiring companies, in their annual reports, to describe how they 
have applied the principles of the Code and are to confirm that they have complied with 
the Code’s provisions, or explain where they have not complied. More recently, the ISC 
has been concerned with the development of codes of best practice for institutional 
investors in their relationships with investee companies. 
The ISC published a revised Statement of Principles in 2003 as a response to 
Government pressure to increase shareholder activism. The revised Statement of 
Principles places considerable demands on institutional shareholders. In the same way 
that one of the principles underlying best practice on corporate governance is that of 
greater transparency, this code of best practice for institutional shareholders requires 
them to make public their policies and some of their actions, including how they vote 
their shares. By so doing institutional shareholders are themselves accountable to 
investors, members of occupational pension schemes and to the public at large.
The case study of USS highlights the activist stance of the universal owner. The 
universal owner, large financial institutions that hold diversified portfolios reflecting a 
cross-section of the economy who hold shares for the long term, is seen to have an 
interest in the long-term performance of the economy as a whole. The investment 
approach of the universal owner differs from the traditional one characterised by the 
selection of companies that make profit by shifting costs to other companies or to 
society at large in the form of negative externalities, and by avoiding companies that 
generate positive externalities. Instead the universal owner is an investor who 
considers the interactions between various elements of its portfolio, particularly the 
negative and positive externalities generated by portfolio companies. So in addition to 
normal monitoring and engagement with portfolio companies, universal investors have 
an interest in the policies and programmes that promote long-term superior economic 
performance.32
As a universal owner USS has an interest in the performance of the economy as a 
whole. Issues of corporate governance, ethical, social and environment performance 
therefore form a key to its investment and engagement policies. Second, as a universal 
owner, USS does not screen and filter out companies and sectors which have 
undesirable characteristics, but rather engages in activities to promote acceptable 
standards of corporate governance, and undertakes projects to promote acceptable 
ethical, social and environmental standards. Third, because the proportion of shares in 
a company owned by USS, as with other institutional shareholders, is usually small, 
USS engagement in Responsible Investment (RI) is through coalitions with other 
institutional shareholders. Some of the engagement activities are with companies, 
others are with policy makers who shape the environment in which businesses operate.
The picture that emerges from the case studies is that UK institutional shareholders are 
active investors who engage in the companies in which they invest. Their engagement 
is both shaped and supported by an institutional framework that contains trade 
organisations, such as the ABI, the NAPF and the IMA, the ISC, and monitoring and 
proxy voting agencies. A major element of institutional shareholder activity has been in 
the area of corporate governance, both generally in the production of guidelines of best 
practice and specifically in engagement with companies whose standards of corporate 
governance practice fall short of best practice. In this, institutional investors are 
assisted by the greater transparency offered by application of the principles of the 
Combined Code and compliance with the provisions on the Remuneration Report. 
There are, however, questions about the extent to which institutional shareholders 
should be involved in the day-to-day decision making of the companies in which they 
invest, although they may question the strategies of those companies. The concept of 
fiduciary capitalism, and the role of the universal investor, provides an underlying 
rationale for institutional shareholders engagement in ethical, social and environment 
issues.
Universal owners should, it is argued, monitor and engage with companies and sectors 
in order to reduce negative externalities and encourage positive ones. It is in this 
context that universal owners have an interest in investee companies adopting policies 
that improve the quality of the workforce. However, on the basis of evidence from 
activities to promote good corporate governance, effective monitoring and engagement 
in this area requires greater transparency and possibly mechanisms to support 
intervention. 
2.8. The International Dimension 2.8. The International Dimension 2.8. The International Dimension 2.8. The International Dimension
Findings from the literature review
The literature review found that there were significant differences in business 
environment between the UK, the US and Germany, which could have substantial 
impact on investors’ propensity to engage. 
The UK and US have many similarities in their business environments. Legal norms and 
business practices are broadly similar; for example the two countries enjoy common 
practices in accounting standards.  However, there are generally lower legal inhibitions 
on, and more general incentives towards investor engagement in the UK than in the US. 33
For example, stock market capitalisation relative to GDP is higher in the UK, implying 
greater investor influence and stock ownership. Shares in the UK are concentrated in 
London and in relatively few hands, which also increases the likelihood of deep 
investor-management relations relative to the US. Pension funds, in particular, are 
more assertive about shareholders’ rights in the UK than in the US. 
In recent years, Germany has been moving closer to the Anglo-Saxon model of 
capitalism, with increasing emphasis on shareholders and the stock market rather than 
banks and ‘relational financing’ of companies. However, the traditional German model 
still applies across much of the economy, and where change has occurred, it has been 
an incremental process towards an Anglo-Saxon style system, rather than a wholesale 
change. In general, the influence of investors is less and the influence of investee 
company managers is greater in Germany than in the UK or the US. Banks are 
themselves major shareholders. Representatives of capital providers, primarily banks, 
belong to corporate boards, so there is opportunity for investors to engage in investee 
companies if they wish, in the context of a long-term relationship (hence the phrase 
‘relational financing’). More concentrated stock ownership in Germany would imply 
more potential for deep investor-investee relations, but the lower levels of stock 
market capitalisation imply the opposite - that investors in Germany have lower levels 
of influence than in the UK or the US. Despite changes in the role of the German stock 
market, the role of venture capital funds remains much smaller in Germany than in the 
UK or the US, under half the size of the UK market in 2001.  
Differences in attitudes towards risk, political commitment to the social market, the 
role of banks, especially their lending role, and the reluctance of small and medium 
sized business to share control with external investors, continue to limit venture capital 
financing. The German venture capital boom of the late 1990s proved temporary.
To summarise, the most important conclusion from the literature review was that the 
scope for  institutional investor engagement is greater in the UK and the US than in 
Germany.  The role of venture capital is much greater in the US and the UK than in 
Germany. 
Findings from the case studies 
There were four UK, one UK/US, two US and one German venture capital fund case 
studies; five UK, one UK/US, one US and one German portfolio company case studies; 
and four UK and one German institutional investment case studies.
The case studies of the American venture capital firms of Kleiner Perkins and Sequoia 
show a very high degree of investor activism. Between them the firms have advised 
and influenced portfolio companies on general and specific strategies e.g. employee 
recruitment, employee stock options, executive stock options, outsourcing, marketing 
and advertising and both had representation on portfolio company boards. Neither were 
involved, however, in the recruitment of senior staff, or had approval for the annual 
budget, so they could have engaged to an even greater extent. 
The four UK venture capital firms studied also showed a high degree of activism, 
although perhaps slightly lower than that of Kleiner Perkins and Sequoia. Only Merlin, 
out of Amadeus, 3i, Merlin and Sitka, were involved in employee recruitment in 34
portfolio companies. Nevertheless, all four were involved with portfolio company 
strategy, marketing and other areas according to venture partner expertise and portfolio 
company context. They also all had representation on portfolio company boards, like 
the American case studies. The venture capital firm case studies indicate that UK 
venture capitalists are nearly, if not quite as activist as US venture capitalists. The US 
and UK portfolio company case studies tell a similar story about relative US/UK venture 
activism
TechnoStart was the case study venture capital firm studied from Germany. In terms of 
company strategy, make-up and philosophy, it appears to be broadly similar to those in 
the US and in the UK. They make use of milestone funding, sit on the Board of 
Directors and are involved in executive stock options and general management support, 
but the level of engagement does appear to be lower than that usually associated with 
the UK and US firms. 
Bayer provides an example of a German company with a significant backing from 
institutional investors: banks and insurance companies hold 55 per cent of Bayer’s 
stock. Bayer is likely to be more influenced by the Anglo-Saxon model than many other 
German companies, since a relatively high proportion (39 per cent) of its stock is in 
foreign hands.   Although its lower than average level of stock concentration would 
tend to offset this and reduce the likelihood of investor activism. The picture that 
emerges is one of investor activism alive and well within a German context. Investors 
criticised management for poor performance, and brought pressure to bear for a 
restructuring of the company. Management resisted this pressure to separate off its 
uncompetitive chemical and crop science operations for some time, but eventually had 
to accede to the shareholder demands. The German context is one where shareholder 
interests remain just one of multiple sets of stakeholders; in particular there remains a 
concern with preserving employment levels where possible. Stock options have been 
introduced but with little uptake and levels of remuneration remain low compared to 
the US and UK, so the Anglo-Saxon model’s influence has been limited thus far. This 
case study shows that institutional shareholder activism exists in Germany, where the 
literature review suggested it would be limited, but is likely to become publicly visible 
only in exceptional circumstances. 
One of the key issues that will affect how an investor engages with a portfolio 
company is their time horizon, or to put it another way, is it ‘patient capital’. The 
German venture capital firm, TechnoStart, tends to focus on seed and early-stage 
companies, and therefore will have a short-term investment timeframe. The UK and US 
venture capital firms’ time horizon seems in general to be slightly longer, although it 
varies by firm. For example, Merlin has a planned hold period of four to seven years, 3i 
of three to seven years and Sequoia is on the board of one company thirteen years 
after it first invested.
To summarise, the case studies suggest that German, UK and US venture capital firms 
are all fairly activist, and if anything that order represents an increasing order of 
activism. The case study of Bayer suggests that institutional investor activism exists in 
Germany, just as it does in the UK as witnessed in the four UK case studies. 35
It is recognised that although case studies are very useful to provide insight into 
specific companies, and themes can emerge, generalisation from a small number of 
case studies is not appropriate, especially on an international scale. 
3. Conclusions 3. Conclusions 3. Conclusions 3. Conclusions
In conclusion, the majority of investors studied integrated engagement with the 
investment process even if, due to the specialist knowledge or skill required, particular 
individuals took responsibility for certain aspects, for example, for outsourcing and 
corporate governance. All the firms undertook the desk based monitoring, some 
entering into detailed monitoring and negotiations. In addition, the companies met 
with an investee company’s management at least once, and up to as many as five to 
six times, a year. Some did this before they invested in a company as part of their 
general research function, for others it was part of the post results review meeting.
What makes venture funds more or less active investors? In this report we use case 
study information on private equity/institutional funds (and their portfolio companies) to 
examine investor heterogeneity, and how it affects investment styles. Our findings 
suggest a fundamental management strategy factor that has been largely ignored: 
strategic fit. Strategic fit matters at the level of firm: specialist venture funds and firms 
that are focussed purely on venture capital have more active investment styles. We 
also document the relevance of strategic fit at the level of human capital and skill 
development: venture firms whose partners have prior business experience and a 
scientific education (in the case of heavily science-based portfolio companies) are also 
more active investors.
Additionally, we assess skill utilisation and human capital along three different 
dimensions: a partner’s accumulated experience as venture capitalist, a partner’s 
previous business experience, and a partner’s scientific education. We thus suggest
the human capital profile of individual partners responsible for specific deals. All these 
three dimensions support our contention about the role of human capital in investor-
investee relations.
We also find examples of investor influence in the following areas of portfolio 
company management:
• Strategy and performance - including overall strategy, strategy on acquisitions 
and disposals, new product development and operational performance
• Approach to general management issues such as employee recruitment,
compensation, marketing activities, innovation, outsourcing etc, and
• Conventional corporate governance, such as compliance with the Combined 
Code, Directors' remuneration, board succession etc.
Venture capital firms directly influence the skill acquisition strategies of portfolio 
companies, mainly through recruitment (making sure the portfolio company has expert 
individuals in key positions) and retention strategies (employee share options schemes), 
rather than by influencing training policy. An exception to this is Sequoia. Sequoia 
works with the portfolio company leaders and operational teams in order to develop 
their problem-solving skills. The efforts of Sequoia are aimed not at making direct 
improvements but at helping to produce a cadre of excellent group leaders who learn 36
through continuous experimentation. Private institutions of venture skill support such 
as side funds and syndications are also aimed at providing technical and expert support 
for the skill requirements of portfolio companies. Individual VCs are also involved in 
discussions about the portfolio company strategies such as outsourcing, marketing 
plans, product development and specific human resource development initiatives. The 
VC influence in these areas underlines the increasing role of financial institutions in 
designing and shaping management outcomes in many significant areas of investee 
companies.   
The case study results have several important implications. For one, this research 
hopes to bring human capital (of investors) to the forefront of financial behaviour 
research. Theories of financial structure typically assume homogenous agents, 
effectively abstracting away from human capital. Yet, if we take economic researchers’ 
emphasis on the processing of soft information seriously, we recognise that 
differences in experience and ability are likely to be an important determinant of the 
process of financial activity and behaviour. We thus hope that our findings will provide 
a broader impetus for looking at the role of human capital in financial structure and 
behaviour.
This report focuses on private equity firms as one type of financial activity, but future 
research might want to extend this kind of analysis to other financial transactions too. 
In this report, we examine the hypothesis that private equity firms play a role beyond 
the traditional roles of financial intermediaries. We provide evidence for the role of 
private equity firms in the development of portfolio companies. Obtaining venture capital 
is in some cases related to a variety of organisational milestones, such as the 
formulation of human resource policies, the adoption of stock option plans, or the hiring 
of a vice president or chief financial officer. The effect of venture capital is also 
particularly pronounced in the early stages of a company's development.
We also make some suggestions for VC strategy. When costs appear to make direct 
advisory support inadvisable, we suggest that VCs consider less costly ways of 
providing management help (e.g, steering PCs to other sources of support, such as 
industry associations or universities e.g. Primal Pictures ). Over the long haul, direct and 
indirect help beyond board membership can reduce the risk of PC bankruptcy and 
improve returns.
In all the case studies VCs need to add to PC shareholder value by working on-site to 
help PCs with key business decisions that go beyond the scope of company financials. 
Unfortunately, the cost structure of many VCs prevents them from directly providing 
broad managerial support. However, these VCs can still help in specific areas that 
intersect with their own core competencies, such as financial decision-making. VCs can 
also show PCs how to overcome their internal managerial deficiencies (e.g. by 
purchasing external consulting expertise e.g.  leatherXchange or finding partners). 
Finally, VCs can find structural alternatives to traditional equity investments, such as 
silent partnerships. However, it is important to note that individual circumstances and 
market conditions should be the ultimate determinants of venture firm strategy.
The results of the literature review and the case study analysis together suggest that 
investor activism is alive and well in the UK, both in the form of shareholder activism 
and the more direct and active form of venture capital fund activism. The case studies 37
further suggest that there are significant returns to investor activism, particularly when 
investors have considerable expertise in the areas in which they are investing. The 
research did not find evidence of a negative effect of investor activism through an 
overly short-termist approach on the part of venture capital funds. The business models 
vary from one venture capital firm to the next, but in these case studies, it would 
probably be fair to characterise the investors’ time frame as medium-term. The 
evidence presented here is insufficient for judging whether the UK is suffering because 
its investors are less activist in comparison to those in competitor nations, but does 
suggest that there are further benefits to be gleaned from investors being more activist 
where they have the expertise to give sound advice to portfolio companies.38
Abbreviations and Explanations  Abbreviations and Explanations  Abbreviations and Explanations  Abbreviations and Explanations 
Agency costs and risks      The costs of preventing agents (e.g. managers) acting in 
their own interests rather than those of principals (e.g.        
shareholders).                                          
CARs                                  Cumulative abnormal returns (Sum of the differences  
between the expected return on a stock (systematic risk       
multiplied by the realised market return) and the actual 
return often used to evaluate the impact of news on a stock 
price).
CEO Chief executive officer
CFO Chief Financial Officer
CII                                       Council for Institutional Investors
CMEC o-ordinated market economy
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
ESRC Economic and Social Research Council
EU European Union
Externalities                        Negative or positive effects of actions which are not fully 
accounted for.
Fiduciary capitalism            A model of capitalism in which companies are influenced 
and guided by institutional shareholders who act on behalf 
of many smaller investors.
Free-rider problems            The problems that arise when the benefits of an action or 
good can be obtained by those who do not pay.
FTSE 100 An index of the share prices of the 100 largest companies 
(by market capitalisation) in the UK which is updated 
throughout the trading day in real time; the index was 
started in 1984 with a base of 1,000.
Homogenous agents          Agents (e.g. managers) having the same interests. 
IPOI nitial Public Offering
IIGCC Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change
Information asymmetry      One party to a relationship or negotiation does not have the 
same access to information as the other party.
IT Information technology
Keiretsu.                             Venture networking; a Japanese concept.  
LMEL iberal market economy
Long-term outflows to       Long-term benefits such as innovation and product 
beneficiaries  development 
MBOs                                 Management buy-outs
OECD                                 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEMO riginal Equipment Manufacturer
PC                                       Portfolio Company
PEFs                                   Private Equity Funds
R&DR esearch and development
S&P500                            An index of the share prices of the 500 largest US 
companies.
Side funds                          Venture funds specifically created for industry leaders.
Syndication                         Venture collaboration in financing and managing portfolio 
companies.39
TIAA-CREFT eachers Insurance Annuity Association-College 
Retirement Equities Fund
Universal owner                 An institutional investor that holds, for the long-term, a
diversified portfolio of shares that represent a broad cross
section of the economy.
VCs                                     Venture capital companies 
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Case Study 1: Amadeus Capital Partners Case Study 1: Amadeus Capital Partners Case Study 1: Amadeus Capital Partners Case Study 1: Amadeus Capital Partners
Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary
This case shows how Amadeus keeps abreast of worldwide best practice in venture 
capital. For example, side funds are one of the classic features of US venture funds. 
Similarly, establishing advisory boards and syndication practices – also first practiced in 
Silicon Valley – are a means by which ventures offer a full range of services so as to 
operate on a level playing field with US competitors. But, more significantly, these 
forms of support are also targeted at improving the skill base of portfolio companies. 
Amadeus has thus been able to institutionalise these processes of investor influence 
upon investee management practices by taking a lead in vigorously exploring the 
benefits of venture support mechanisms. This approach has also made it possible for 
Amadeus to assist its portfolio companies in adopting innovative management 
practices, as for example its technical help for leatherXchange in establishing a 
proprietary grading system for hides.
Venture-related management practices that were first invented and communicated in 
the USA are currently being emulated by industry leaders in other parts of the world. 
Because Amadeus’ strengths lie in its skills capital and management practices inspired 
by its creative leadership, no other fund is better placed to adopt these portfolio 
company management support practices. This case describes institutional mechanisms 
of management support such as side funds and syndication and analyses their effect 
on the Amadeus’s relationships with its portfolio companies. The case on TechnoStart 
discusses other related skill development and utilisation strategies.
Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile
Amadeus Capital Partners Limited is a venture capital company specialising in high-
technology investments in Europe. An independent fund management firm, Amadeus 
advises on the investment of £288 million, raised through three funds.
Amadeus Capital Partners Limited was established in 1997, raising its first fund, 
Amadeus I, in that year. This fund, which has invested £50 million in 24 companies, is 
now closed to new investments. A second fund, Amadeus II, was raised in 2000 and 
continues to invest in all stages of financings of high-technology companies. In 2001, 
Amadeus Capital Partners Limited established the Amadeus Mobile Seed Fund (AMSF) 
to invest in the mobile telecommunications sector. AMSF completed its first 
investment in 2002.
The firm is now migrating with the market from wired to wireless (as well as from 
semiconductors to photonics) and shortly expects to complete two investments in 
wireless broadband companies. The firm has also ventured into the ‘Bluetooth’ arena, 41
backing Cambridge Silicon Radio, which develops and produces single-chip radios for 
short-range connections between computing and telecoms devices. 
Its third major area of interest is e-infrastructure, comprising software or software 
components enabling Internet activity. Holdings in this sector include Mediasurface, a 
web content management and software company, and Altio, a recent investment, 
which is an Internet enabling company that speeds up web site viewing in a very 
sophisticated manner allowing the user to reach and view pages simultaneously rather 
than sequentially. Amadeus also invests in Internet enabled applications and e-
commerce. Amadeus investments in this area include Lastminute.com, NMTV, Think 
Natural and Worldpop.com. The company predicts that it may shift its focus in this 
segment from e-tail retail to business-to-business exchange - but the firm will always 
keep an open mind to see new ideas and see what the next phase will be.
Amadeus is committed to nurturing its companies with a combination of management 
support and a global network of other technology investors and leaders. As we discuss 
below, the management support takes the form of helping investees with their 
operational performance (e.g. assisted leatherXchange.com establish a proprietary 
grading system) or giving them market networking support through itsa dvisory or side 
funds. The Amadeus’s global network operates through its advisory boards and side 
funds. The Amadeus team is thus able to bring to its portfolio companies a track record 
of building superior technology companies.
Amadeus on the Continent
Amadeus had its first continental European investment in 2000, contributing   3 million 
of a  1 1.5 million early-stage funding round for leatherXchange.com. Its partners in the 
investment included existing backers Gilde, Banco de Santander Central Hispano 
(BSCH) and Latin Rim. Based in Barcelona, leatherXchange.com is a business-to-
business exchange, or e-hub, for the worldwide leather industry. The company is 
headed by founder and Managing Director Jose Suarez, who has ten years' experience 
of the leather industry. Before forming leatherXchange, Suarez was instrumental in the 
development of a hides business, TriCommerce, in the challenging Russian market.
Hitesh Mehta, the Amadeus director who handled the investment in leatherXchange, 
explains the business's attractions: "Leather is a worldwide industry that needs a 
central, neutral source of information and international standards. LeatherXchange's 
progress this year is indicative of the potential in this market". As he observed, 
“leatherXchange started with a good idea, but it lacked the skill needed to be 
successful in this kind of business line. This was the major area of concern for 
Amadeus. We had to work together to ensure that leatherXchange develop its 
capabilities in its target areas of operations. For example, we introduced them to 
consultants in product standardisation and measurement.”    
LeatherXchange, a first mover in its space, will advise on international standards and 
has established a proprietary grading system for hides that has been welcomed by 
many industry players. Amadeus’s technical support was crucial in developing this 
proprietary grading system. Through its secure platform, leatherXchange.com users 
can access a full range of services for the purchase production, quality control and sale 
of wholesale leather, hides, finished product, machinery and chemicals.42
LeatherXchange.com, which is already generating revenues, expects to move into 
profit during 2004.  The new financing round will fund the recruitment of a sales force, 
the establishment of customer support and training operations, and the addition of 
services such as worldwide quality inspection, transaction facilitation and direct or third 
party services. Amadeus has clearly specified all these potential areas of development 
in the term sheet (i.e. contract with leatherXchange.com) for the current funding round. 
Earlier this year, leatherXchange.com also raised a   10.5 million funding round from 
Gilde, BSCH and Latin Rim.
Investment Approach Investment Approach Investment Approach Investment Approach
In a world awash with information, insight is often in short supply. Amadeus’s edge is 
its ability to leverage the local insight of its investment professionals, collaborating 
across the firms’ investment disciplines from deal sourcing and due diligence through 
portfolio company development. The result is a broader view of potential investment 
opportunities and deeper level of expertise, creating value for Amadeus portfolio 
companies that translates into superior returns for Amadeus investors. This investment 
approach also translates into an improved skill base for companies in which Amadeus 
invests.
At one stage, the average holding in AmadeusI  was running at £1.2 million. Although
Amadeus had led two thirds of its deals in terms of structuring the transactions, 
securing board representation and so forth - the ‘lead’ position was not reflected in the 
percentage Amadeus was able to capture within its fund. A major concern of Amadeus 
in deal structuring was to put in place a viable management system so as portfolio 
companies are able to make it through the initial phases of fluctuating market demands. 
Anne Glover observes that latterly, Amadeus has "been doing much bigger deals but 
with less firepower" - hence the case for scaling up the new fund size but not 
increasing the target number of investments.
One of the most recent funds to benefit from changed investor attitudes in recent 
years is AmadeusC apitalP artners’ second fund, which reached a £100 million first 
close within six weeks of its launch. But even in 1997, when Anne Glover, Hermann 
Hauser and Peter Wynn joined forces to establish Amadeus, in a decidedly inclement 
venture capital climate, it took the firm a mere eight months to take its maiden vehicle 
£20 million over target to a £50 million final close. This is in part a reflection of the fact 
that the three principals constituted something of a venture capital 'dream team' –
having complementary skills both in raising funds and in providing supportive 
environments to portfolio companies - and in part a vindication of their decision to 
approach non-traditional sources. 
Anne Glover, the only one of the three with an institutional venture capital background, 
was an alumna of Apax, one of only a handful of 13,000 venture houses undertaking 
genuine early-stage high-tech investment at the time. During her period with Apax, she 
had acquired vast experience in advising early-stage high-tech companies with their 
skill development and utilisation. Hermann Hauser, a co-founder of Acorn Computer 
Group and former vice president of research at Olivetti, was a celebrated serial 
entrepreneur, with more than 20 technology companies to his credit. Hauser was a
leading proponent of the 'Silicon Fen' effect, and Amadeus set out with the intention of 43
emulating Silicon Valley venture practice through a closely collaborative approach – the 
approach emphasises the role of venture capitalists in building portfolio companies by 
means of advisory boards and side funds - and an extensive international network of 
contacts. Peter Wynn, whose connection with Hauser began during the five years he 
spent as Financial Director of Acorn, had subsequently worked with more than 30 
early-stage companies, providing financial and strategic input, especially in the area of 
forming portfolio company alliances and partnerships to upgrade their products and 
services. 
But first-time fund raising is notoriously tricky and Amadeus was the first independent 
venture group formed in the UK for a considerable time, in what was unquestionably a 
very difficult fund-raising environment. However, Anne Glover roundly dismisses 
suggestions that the partners’ decision to launch the first Amadeus vehicle was either 
brave or even foolhardy. ‘We didn't think so even at the time, because of what we 
were seeing at the deal level when we were investing our own money. Amadeus was 
born out of our understanding of what market conditions really were. It was so obvious 
that the quality of deals was improving - and the market was crying out for more 
professional venture capital because almost all the major players had deserted the 
sector.’ 
The company aims to identify early first movers across the technology, media and 
telecoms spectrum with a potential leading market position at the global level. While 
Amadeus potentially faced an uphill struggle, the partners had received strong votes of 
confidence in the form of promises of backing from Gilde and Microsoft. Both Gilde 
and Microsoft appreciated the expertise and skill that Amadeus partners could 
potentially bring to their portfolio companies. “They were the visionaries”, says Glover. 
“Essentially, Gilde and Microsoft said ‘we'll back you if you build something fundable’, 
so what we had to do was coalesce the interest we had encountered into a fundable 
proposition". 
Ultimately, Amadeus signed up groups including BankAmerica, The Bass Trust, the 
European Investment Fund, Global IT Fund, Cambridge's King's and Trinity Colleges, 
Dresdner Kleinwort Benson, Lazard, Reuters, T-Ventures and Westpool Investment 
Trust alongside Gilde and Microsoft in the first fund.  The firm also raised a £2.5 million 
'invitation-only' side fund from IT luminaries. The side fund incorporates these 
individuals into the extended Amadeus network and familiarises them with the portfolio 
companies. Because side funds normally consist of industry experts, they act as 
intermediaries between the start-ups and various sources of technical and 
management knowledge.      
More importantly, side funds members are often industry leaders. ‘And that means we 
get the phone answered,’ Glover explains. ‘It's very effective. Side funds like this are 
one of the classic features of US venture funds - it's an idea we picked up in Silicon 
Valley.’ She adds that Amadeusp rides itself on keeping very much abreast of 
worldwide best practice in venture capital ‘so as to be able to offer a full range of 
services and operate on a level playing field with our US competitors.’ 
The Amadeus network is further extended through a heavyweight advisory board. As 
well as representatives of major fund investors such as Leendert van Driel of Gilde, 
Thomas Kuhr of T-Venture and Nathan Myhrvold, Microsoft's chief technical officer, its 44
members include Frank Bonsai, founding partner of New Enterprise Associates; D 
Kirkwood Bowman, founding partner of Inman Bowman; and Elserino Piol, former 
deputy chairman of Olivetti turned venture capitalist. 
Amadeus, which specialises in high-tech investments, then launched a new source of 
financing for very early stage mobile-technology firms in Cambridge. The Amadeus
Mobile Seed fund raised £10m with the aim of making an initial investment of less than 
£1m, and an average of £2.5m per company after that. The launch of the Fund was 
seen as a way to stay in touch with the early stage technology market. The Fund was 
to invest in between five and eight companies but it also provided amounts of circa 
£50,000 for proof of concept/blue-sky projects.
Laurence John was recruited to lead the Mobile Seed Fund.  John previously spent six 
years with Motorola, where he was latterly global Director of mCommerce within the 
software-solutions group.  Once Amadeus decided to target its planned seed fund in 
the mobile space John was bought on board.  Amadeus’s principals are strong believers 
in the virtue of syndication for its own sake: ‘having two or three heads round the table 
is more important than the money they bring’, contends Anne Glover. Because 
different ventures tend to have different type skills, under the umbrella of a syndication 
set up, all their complementary skills can be brought to bear to the benefit of a portfolio 
company. For example, a fund may be specialist in financing or deal structuring but not 
good at delivering marketing support. This will be of no consequence if a fund with a 
vast experience in marketing joins in. Thus, a syndication practice may be more useful 
to a portfolio company than merely single venture acting on its own accord.
As before, the majority of Amadeus deals will still involve companies based in the UK 
or Ireland, but the firm recently made a policy decision to invest elsewhere in the EU 
region - but only alongside local partners. Bearing in mind the extensive network of 
contacts the firm has nurtured, Amadeus’s potential pool of local co-investment 
partners should be wide enough to ensure that the firm faces no geographic 
constraints on investment.
The general investment profile of Amadeus is presented in Table 1. The term sheets 
set out Amadeus’ portfolio company's valuation and capital structure, the composition 
of its board of directors, the vesting schedule for its management's stock options and 
the size of the employee stock option pool, as well as the registration rights for its 
investors if and when the company launches a public-offering. 45
Table 1: Amadeus’ Investment Profile Table 1: Amadeus’ Investment Profile Table 1: Amadeus’ Investment Profile Table 1: Amadeus’ Investment Profile
Activity Activity Activity Activity Explanation Explanation Explanation Explanation Amadeus’s Approach Amadeus’s Approach Amadeus’s Approach Amadeus’s Approach
Investment Type Investment Type Investment Type Investment TypeM ilestone funding –
funding available in 
stages conditional upon 
investee company 
meeting certain 
performance targets
Yes
Full funding Yes
Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions 
(the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet – –––
conditions are set in  conditions are set in  conditions are set in  conditions are set in 
the contract)  the contract)  the contract)  the contract) 
Capital structure (i.e. 
liquidation preferred 
equity)
Yes
Composition of Board of 
Directors 
Yes. Nominate one 
director
Recruitment of senior 
staff
No
Executive stock options No
Approval for annual 
budget
No
Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit StrategyT rading Sometime
Flotation or IPO (Initial 
Public Offering)
Preferred
The organisational arrangements between Amadeus and investee companies are 
reported in Table 2. Investees have some formal procedures for reporting important 
decisions to Amadeus (including submission of project reports, formal accounts etc) 
but certain types of interaction, for example additional communications with the 
Venture, are not always recorded and in a number of instances, investees interacts in 
this way but no record is kept. Thus the examples below reflect those activities that 
have been recorded and reported and may not reflect all interaction undertaken. For 
example, Amadeus is keen to establish proper internal control mechanisms within its 
portfolio companies to establish the principles of transparency and accountability.46
Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements
Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Comment Comment Comment Comment
Telephone or write to 
express 
concerns/decisions
General issues of 
concerns to the 
Ventures such as 
feedback on senior 
appointments
There were frequent 
interactions between 
Amadeus and its 
investees
Meet with investee 
company managers
To provide advice on 
investment in new 
operations or R&D etc
Fortnightly
Investee corporate 
board meetings 
To discuss strategic 
issues relating to 
product launch or 
company preparations 
for IPO 
5 to 6 meetings in a 
year
Investee company 
report
Formal accounts and 
project reports
Yearly
Amadeus has a policy and organisational structure in place which addresses how it 
views its responsibilities in relation to its investees and the broad topics covered. Most 
communications are as summarised in Table 3 and concern investees’ progress on
various aspects of company management.
Engagement Practice Engagement Practice Engagement Practice Engagement Practice
All venture capitalists pay lip service to the importance of their contact networks. As a 
small group with a small fund, however, Amadeusi s particularly reliant on its contacts 
(see Table 3) and has invested considerable effort in consolidating a wide set of 
networks in the US and European financial, technology and corporate communities. 
‘Bringing that network to bear on companies is an understood part of our role. 
Networking is a key strength and everyone at Amadeus really works it,’ says Glover.47
Table 3. Amadeus’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. Amadeus’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. Amadeus’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. Amadeus’s Engagement Strategy
Engagement Method Engagement Method Engagement Method Engagement MethodC omment Comment Comment Comment Amadeus’s Practice Amadeus’s Practice Amadeus’s Practice Amadeus’s Practice
Board membership Board membership Board membership Board membershipV enture nominates non-
executive director(s) on 
portfolio company’s 
board 
Yes
Syndication Syndication Syndication Syndication Venture collaborates 
with other funds
Yes
Advisory Board Advisory Board Advisory Board Advisory BoardV enture has industry 
experts on its advisory 
board (e.g. IT luminaries 
in the IT sector)
Yes
Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Specialist fund for 
experts / prominent 
people (to get their help 
for portfolio companies)
Yes
Partners have  Partners have  Partners have  Partners have 
background in  background in  background in  background in 
specialist areas specialist areas specialist areas specialist areas
Partners have education 
or experience in a 
specialist area such as 
science background or 
business experience
Yes
Particular management  Particular management  Particular management  Particular management 
areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern
Participated in 
discussions with 
portfolio company on: 
Strategy (e.g. market 
share, product 
development, 
competition);
Frequent; Discussed 
product launch strategy 
with Tera View and
Cambridge Silicon Radio
Strategic audit;Y es
Employee recruitment; No
Executive stock options;N o
Marketing or advertising 
campaigns;
Yes; Gave advice to 
PacketFront and
Lastminute.com
Outsourcing; Yes; Discussed with 
Southampton Photonics 
the outsourcing 
possibilities
Any other value-added 
activity (e.g. product 
packaging).
Yes; Helped 
leatherXchange
establish a proprietary 
grading system for 
hides
Amadeus has always been a very parochial partnership and makes no secret of the fact 
that while it invests in more mature companies in continental Europe; in Britain it goes 
for the very early stage companies, that are probably too small to even deserve the 48
name ‘company’ - sometimes only 3 or 4 people. 
Amadeus believes that its collaborative approach - in terms both of syndication and in 
its dealings with investees - is another of the firm's distinguishing features. ‘We tend 
to form a partnership with investees that is more collaborative than confrontational -
this is not to say that we can't be tough at times. But it is better to concentrate on 
making the entire pie bigger than on squabbling to the nearest millimetre about the size 
of your own particular slice,’ says Glover. 
And Amadeus is certainly interested in building big businesses. The firm's only cash 
exit so far is Entropic, which was sold to Microsoft last autumn, enabling Amadeus to 
return 20 per cent of the first fund to investors. It has subsequently seen two portfolio 
companies float, the first being Lastminute.com, in which Amadeus held a small stake. 
The second, Orchestream, had a June IPO that was nine times' oversubscribed, raising 
£49 million and valuing the company, which develops policy management software to 
ensure quality of service over IP networks, at £185 million. Red Herring recently named 
Orchestream as one of the 50 private companies 'most likely to change the world'. 
The sudden resurgence of interest in European early-stage high-technology venture 
capital, which has brought about both a dramatic increase in funds available for 
investment and prompted a raft of new entrants, has not, Amadeus maintains, 
adversely affected the firm's competitive position in its target sectors. This can be 
seen from its recent investments in the following two companies.
Example 1: PacketFront Example 1: PacketFront Example 1: PacketFront Example 1: PacketFront
One example of how Amadeus has helped its portfolio companies is its investment in 
PacketFront. The support has been in the area of providing specialist marketing 
expertise to the company. Amadeus led a   15 million financing for PacketFront, a 
Stockholm-based company that provides systems that manage the end-to-end delivery 
of multiple broadband services for telecom operators. EEP and TLcom, existing 
investors in the company, are also participating in this third institutional round. 
PacketFront was founded in 2001 by a team, led by Martin Thunman, who had 
previously worked together at Bredbandsbolaget (B2) and at Cisco Systems. Today, the 
company has over 20 customers in Europe and North America, and is now targeting 
telecom operators in Asia and the USA. This is being achieved with the help of 
Amadeus’s network of contacts in those countries. Amadeus Venture Partner, Simon
Cornwell, who joins PacketFront’s Board, says: ‘As more and more service providers 
and network owners understand the revenue potential in triple play services over high-
speed broadband networks, PacketFront has a major opportunity. We are delighted to 
be investing in the company at this stage and look forward to working closely with 
Martin and his team, alongside our co-investors, EEP and TLcom, to support the 
company’s growth’. Cornwell is currently coordinating marketing support for 
PacketFront in America. He is being assisted by the Amadeus’ US office in making 
contacts with different US telecom operators. The idea is to provide as much support 
as is possible to PacketFront through the Amadeus’ international network.49
Example 2: TeraView Example 2: TeraView Example 2: TeraView Example 2: TeraView
Amadeus Capital Partners also recently led a second round venture investment of £6 
million in TeraView Ltd, a Cambridge based imaging equipment company. First round 
investors, TTP Ventures, Cambridge Gateway, and Quester are also participating in this 
round. 
TeraView has developed a unique technology to emit and detect THz (Terahertz) light, 
which lies at frequencies between infrared and radio waves, specifically for a range of 
commercial and security applications. The company designs, manufactures and sells its 
equipment and has 34 patents granted or pending, making it the leading company in 
this field. TeraView was spun out of Toshiba Research Europe Laboratories in 
Cambridge in 2001 by Don Arnone, as Chief Executive, and Professor Mike Pepper, of 
Cambridge University’s Cavendish Laboratories, as Chief Scientist. The founding team 
worked together for many years prior to the spinout, and was joined last year by John 
Bradshaw, former Finance Director of Gyrus Group plc, as CFO. The team will be 
further augmented as the business grows. 
Amadeus backing for TeraView has been in the form of providing management support 
(e.g. training workshops) for gathering and analysing market intelligence for the 
company to take further its technology for full commercial exploitation. It is apparent 
that this kind of support is crucial if the company is to capitalise on its success in 
launching the world’s first Terahertz products to generate revenue in commercial 
applications using this unique part of the radio and light wave spectrum.
It is clear that Amadeus largely welcomes the venture capital renaissance of the last 
couple of years, although the firm was also somewhat relieved to see the recent 
market correction. ‘We are quite glad that fund raising, especially for the Internet 
sector has become more difficult for funds recently,’ Glover admits ‘and that the 
market correction seems to have stopped the momentum flight of capital to funds 
without experienced investment teams. But more spin-out fund creation is generally 
beneficial: Europe needs a healthy early stage venture industry to syndicate and partner 
with, and it is that density of activity that will create great companies.’ Amadeus,
meanwhile, intends to ensure that it is in at the ground floor of as many of those 
companies as possible.50
Appendix 1: Venture Capital Fund Case Studies: No. 2 Appendix 1: Venture Capital Fund Case Studies: No. 2 Appendix 1: Venture Capital Fund Case Studies: No. 2 Appendix 1: Venture Capital Fund Case Studies: No. 2
3i 3i 3i 3i
Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary
This case explores the contractual response of the venture capital industry in the wake 
of the high-tech market collapse in the late 1990s. Not surprisingly, venture capitalists 
like 3i now exert more leverage on financing terms to minimise their risks and 
maximise their returns wherever possible. Terms such as multiple or super liquidation 
preferences or uncapped participation rights are now commonly used in all ventures 
financings. Significantly, this has also altered the selection criteria with regard to the 
management practices of portfolio companies. 3i has a preference to nurture 
companies that promote good corporate governance, transparency and accountability, 
business acumen and good management skills. In particular, 3i is keen to back 
companies like Silver Bird Group Bhd, which are committed to adding value by using 
innovative management practices. The emphasis on these key management practices 
reflects also the company’s desire to avoid mistakes which led to the demise of a 
swathe of entrepreneurial initiatives during the late 1990s. 3i has recently set up a 
number of skill support institutions to provide skill development help to its portfolio 
companies.    
Raising capital has been difficult for many entrepreneurs in the wake of the high-tech 
meltdown. Venture capital firms such as 3i and other strategic investors have thus 
become much more selective with their money. They now insist on new and 
increasingly aggressive financing terms. For example, in some deals, late-stage 
investors have been given the right to receive as much as four or five times the 
amount invested in a company in a sale or merger, before any other shareholder gets a 
thing. They have even been securing the right to mandatory cumulative dividends, 
almost unheard of for technology companies.
The aim of this case study is to evaluate these practices in terms of their effect on the 
relationship between investors and portfolio companies. 3i provides an interesting 
backdrop to these developments because it is the only VC in the UK that is listed on 
the London Stock Exchange. Within this context, the case also discusses the 3i’s 
emphasis on portfolio companies finding creative managerial processes of value-adding 
activities.
Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile
3i is listed on the London Stock Exchange in 1994 and remains the only venture capital 
company in the FTSE 100 - a status that has its advantages in being able to raise 
money in the capital markets and its disadvantages in that analysts aren't quite sure 
what to make of it, says Michael Queen, the company's CFO. It manages over £6 
billion ($9.4 billion) of assets (as of 31 March 2004), comprising its own balance sheet 
of around £3.9 billion, private equity limited partnerships of £1.6 billion, invested 51
alongside 3i, and quoted funds of £0.5 billion. Since 1945, the company has invested 
over £15 billion in more than 13,900 businesses. 3i’s portfolio, as at 31 March 2004, 
consisted of investments in 2,162 businesses with a combined valuation of over £3.9 
billion.
3i invests in all financing stages - buyouts included - of industrial, consumer goods and 
financial companies. And unlike the more narrowly focused, assertive ten - to 20 -
person partnerships popular in Silicon Valley, 3i has 300 investment professionals 
(more than 900 employees in all) based in three dozen offices around the globe. Until 
recently, it rarely took board seats to push its views on portfolioc ompanies .  Although 
the 60 year old firm shares some characteristics with other international investors, 
such as Apax Partners, Carlyle Group and J.P. Morgan Partners, it is ultimately "a 
company unto itself," says a commentator. In the last five years alone, 3i has achieved 
more than 540 trade sales and has listed 70 companies via initial public offerings on 
over 15 international exchanges. Last year, it transacted 240 deals across the business. 
It invests mainly in start-up and early-stage businesses. Its investments normally lie in 
the range of £1.5 - £40 million.
3i makes early commitments to businesses with real growth potential and last year 
alone, it backed more than 150 entrepreneurs. Superior returns are not something 
many investors in private equity have been accustomed to lately. 3i suffered a valuation 
drop in its portfolio of £1.2 billion for the year 2003 and a negative return of £935 
million or 23.7 per cent of shareholders' funds. The company wrote £75 million off its 
early stage and its technology portfolio - a 25 per cent write down of value. Queen 
blames market movements for £800 million of the loss – 3i uses the public market as a 
benchmark to evaluate its portfolio companies. But he makes no apologies for 3is 
continued interest in technology businesses.
"We didn't invest in many traditional dotcom retail businesses but technology makes up 
15 per cent of our business. We are committed to technology and believe returns on 
our investments will be very good over the long-term. We are in a low growth, low 
inflation environment so to deliver superior returns on equity, a key part of any portfolio 
strategy should be to have a proportion of that portfolio in companies that either 
develop or exploit technology."
For all its global ambitions, 3ir emains firmly rooted in Britain. It maintains its 
headquarters at an unfashionable London address near Waterloo Station, south of the 
Thames. Nearly two thirds of its portfolio is invested in UK companies ,  with 27 percent 
in continental Europe and the remainder in the US and Asia. And long after its 
privatisation, it retains close ties to the Government. In January it appointed Baroness 
Sarah Hogg as non-executive Chairman. A former journalist and adviser to the then 
Prime Minister, John Major, Baroness Hogg is also a Governor of the BBC.
3i in the USA
3i opened its specialist technology investment offices in Boston and Silicon Valley in 
1999. Its expansion into the US underlined its ambition to create the first integrated 
global technology business. In fact, the firm launched a venture capital business there 
during the early 1980s but pulled out later to focus more closely on building its 
European business prior to its own IPO. Part of the earlier 3i business was effectively 52
privatised, becoming Aspen Ventures. 3i maintained a connection with Aspen, 
investing in two subsequent funds.  
The relaunch of a US technology business was clearly a logical step for 3i: ‘The market 
has told us that, to develop the first genuinely integrated technology investment 
business under the 3i brand, we need local presence and networks in the US,’ Queen 
explained. ‘US venture capitalists have developed great mechanisms for creating value 
in businesses from early-stage to IPO,’ he added. A local presence has enabled 3i to 
manage syndicates with US investors and to generate reciprocal deal flow between its 
European, Asian and US networks. The US technology team works closely with 3i's 
European and Asian offices to maximise the value that its international scope can add 
for investees.
3i argues that it is expansion-minded and that, with its vast network of portfolio
companies and investment professionals on three continents, the firm is unmatched in 
its ability to leverage customer lists and intellectual capital. A case in point is Intelliden 
Corp, a Colorado company that raised $15 million last Autumn in a funding round co-led 
by 3ia nd Waltham-based Matrix Partners. Dale Hecht, president and CEO of Intelliden, 
says that 3i was instrumental in bringing his company's network communications 
management systems to the attention of "C-level executives" - chief executive officers, 
chief operating officers and so on - at other portfolio companies that provided advice 
and sales.
3i’s New 3i’s New 3i’s New 3i’s New- ---Look Investment Strategies Look Investment Strategies Look Investment Strategies Look Investment Strategies
Even though 3i’s stock price has been devastated, the company's investment
philosophy is gaining currency in some quarters: ‘3i has a reputation for taking a long 
view and today that's not a bad thing,’ says a commentator. But can a complicated 
entity with a staggering 2,700 investments (some dating back to the 1940s), a 
multilayered management and a relatively conservative investment approach take full 
advantage of opportunities in many fast-changing market sectors around the globe? 
In the course of this research, some have expressed concern whether it is possible to 
get the degree of specialism when 3i has such a large and dispersed portfolio.
3i is also trying to confront organisational legacies stemming from its original regional 
approach to investing. Even though most of the firm's deal flow still comes from its far-
flung offices, the setup has not always contributed to teamwork. ‘If you go back ten 
years, there was an attitude that ‘this is my fiefdom, I will find the investment 
opportunities I want within my territory, and the contacts within it belong to me,’ says 
a commentator.
To ensure that new investments make sense for 3i ,  the company has designated 
sector specialists, or domain experts, to vet proposals regardless of location. ‘A deal is 
looked at from a global perspective,’ explains a 3i partner. ‘What looks like a very good 
deal at a local level can on an international basis look very poor.’ Professional staff 
anywhere can propose an investment, but it must be reviewed by a sector expert. For 
example, Ere Kariola, the head of 3i Finland, takes a look at many proposals relating to 
his specialty in telecommunications. But in a bow to internal political realities, the 
country team can veto an expert’s objection and proceed with the investment.53
Sector specialisation is becoming increasingly essential for private equity houses. The 
challenge for venture partners, if they want to develop a key role, is to understand 
more about a sector than anyone else and all the big firms, like 3i and Carlyle, are going 
that way. Sector specialisation means not only knowing the business issues prevalent 
in a particular sector but also getting to know the key people in that field. Increasingly, 
competitive advantage will be built on this expertise. There is no room any more for the 
arbitrage approach of buying cheap and selling high because these days to add value 
means understanding a business and its sector.
To this end the large private equity firms are building up specialisations in areas like 
biosciences, retailing and media so they can capitalise on new business ideas in those 
fields. ‘We've split our organisation along industry focus lines so we don't just have 
people who understand private equity as a market but can also deliver insight on 
individual sectors. Our strategy is to focus on sectors where there will be a real 
payback in corporate finance activity,’ says a commentator. 
Unfortunately, even a diversified portfolio has not provided much cushion from recent 
volatility. Successful early-stage investments tend to take longer to emerge than 
failures, and right now losers predominate. ‘For a volume investor such as 3i, this 
[weakness] will be accentuated, particularly after a number of years of strong 
investments in the early-stage arena,’ explains a commentator. This has led 3i to 
review its term sheet practices.
Venture Capital term sheets were not always so contentious. Intended as a quick 
outline of the business terms of the investment and of the preferred stock to be 
received, term sheets generally contain a fairly standard set of provisions. For example, 
depending on the stage of the company being financed, a term sheet will set out the 
company’s valuation and capital structure
1 . These contracts were designed to allow 
both the company and its investors to enjoy the benefits of a successful venture. 
Liquidation preferences, for example, were usually limited to the return of an investors 
original investment, as well as some pro rata participation in the sale or merger 
proceeds after the liquidation preferences of the other preferred shareholders were 
paid. Similarly, dividends were almost always non-mandatory and non-cumulative. And 
in the unlikely event of a down round, most anti-dilution mechanisms used what is 
known as a weighted average formula to compensate a company’s existing investors 
for the subsequent sale of cheaper stock. 
After the collapse of the high-tech market, however, venture capitalists like 3i began 
exerting much more leverage on financing terms. Terms usually seen only in very high-
risk or last-ditch financings began emerging across the board, as chastened investors 
looked to minimize their risks and maximize their returns wherever possible
2 . 3i also 
began insisting on mandatory, cumulative dividends and so-called drag-along rights, 
1 Term sheets also invariably set out what investors will receive if the company is bought or otherwise 
liquidated, known as a liquidation preference. A price protection or anti-dilution mechanism to cover 
investors in the event of a down round financing, where the company raises capital at a lower 
(sometimes much lower) valuation than it received from earlier investors is also generally included.
2  Multiple or super liquidation preferences, for example, guaranteeing investors a two-times to five-times 
return on their original investment in a sale or merger, plus uncapped participation rights in the remaining 
sale proceeds, began appearing in major ventures financings.54
allowing it even if it was a non-majority investor to force the sale of a company, 
irrespective of opposition from a company's management team or its earlier round 
investors. Arguably the most onerous trend, however, was the increased inclusion of 
full-ratchet anti-dilution mechanisms in financings, even for seed and start-up stage 
companies
3 . Needless to say that full ratchets can be a really punitive measure. In 
many cases, they can become counter-incentives for the management and strategy of 
these companies. Recent statistics, however, indicate that the venture climate is finally 
beginning to improve. Ratchets, therefore, are rapidly moving out of favour, used in 
only 8 per cent of the financings, down from 29 per cent in the first quarter of 2002.
3i’s term sheet sets out the portfolio company's valuation and capital structure, the 
composition of its Board of Directors, the vesting schedule for its management's stock 
options and the size of the employee stock option pool, as well as the registration 
rights for its investors if and when the company launches a public-offering (see Table 1 
below).
Table 1: 3i’s Investment Profile Table 1: 3i’s Investment Profile Table 1: 3i’s Investment Profile Table 1: 3i’s Investment Profile
Investment Type Investment Type Investment Type Investment TypeM ilestone funding –
funding available in 
stages
Yes
Full funding No
Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions 
(the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet – –––
conditions are set in  conditions are set in  conditions are set in  conditions are set in 
the contract)  the contract)  the contract)  the contract) 
Capital structure (i.e. 
liquidation preferred 
equity)
Yes
Composition of Board of 
Directors
Yes
Recruitment of senior 
staff
No
Executive stock options Yes
Approval for annual 
budget
No
Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit StrategyT rading
Flotation or IPO (Initial 
Public Offering)
Preferred
3  Full ratchets, in contrast to weighted average mechanisms, allow a company's existing investors to 
convert all of their preferred shares to the lower share price in the event of a down round, regardless of 
the total number of outstanding shares or even the number of lower-priced shares being issued.55
Exit Choices
The growth of Europe’s small-cap markets has provided private equity investors with 
new exit routes. Private equity investors are happy to have a choice, but there are too 
many exchanges to survive in the post-euro environment.
When MobilCom’s chairman, Gerhard Schmidt, announced his intention to float the 
German mobile telecommunications company on the Neuer Markt, the venture capital 
group 3i, which held a 12.5 per cent stake in the company, decided to back his 
judgement. 3i’s decision proved to be remarkably prescient. In its annual report, 
published in March 2004 and exactly a year since the IPO, the group revealed that it 
had made a return of Dm127.5 million ($70.8 million) through its gradual exits from the 
company. Not bad considering its original investment was Dm5.1 million. 
3i is not the only venture capitalist group to have realised returns on their investment 
through a flotation on a European small capitalisation market. Although trade sales 
remains a more popular means of exiting, the growth of markets such as Aim, Easdaq, 
Le Nouveau Marche and the Neuer Markt, has provided private equity investors with a 
viable alternative. And as these markets continue to perform well, companies and their 
stakeholders will look to list on them. The number of venture capital-backed companies 
on these four markets is 113 and rising.
The organisational arrangements between 3i and its portfolio companies are reported in 
Table 2. There are some formal procedures for reporting important decisions to 3i but 
certain types of interaction, for example additional communications with 3i Partners, 
are not always recorded and in a number of instances, portfolio companies interact in 
this way but no record is kept. Thus the examples below reflect those activities that 
have been recorded and reported and may not reflect all interaction undertaken. For 
example, as discussed later, 3i actively monitor the cash management practices of its 
portfolio companies. 
3i also supports and sometime participates in studies to justify project investment. For 
example, a portfolio company planned to re-develop a UK provincial town centre area. 
3i first wanted to establish the level of support from local business for the building of a 
new hotel. The town and its surrounding area has a limited supply of quality hotels and 
bed spaces and anecdotal evidence from local companies suggested that there was a 
requirement for a quality hotel serving the corporate market. The idea was to provide 
quantitative evidence to clarify the level of support from the local business community 
for any new hotel, to identify the facilities required in any new hotel, and to provide an 
estimate of the number of bed spaces required to satisfy any corporate demand. 
Additional research conducted by a marketing research company considered demands 
from the leisure market and the wider geographical area. 
3i’s analysis provided the portfolio company with a clear understanding of local 
demands for a business hotel, and the potential number of bed spaces that would be 
required in any new hotel. 3i’s recommendation was that the company should consider 
the development of a premium business hotel with at least 60 rooms to satisfy 
demand from the local community and other markets. The company is now acting on 
the research and moving forward with its hotel plans.56
Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements
Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Comment Comment Comment Comment
Telephone or write to 
express 
concerns/decisions
General issues of 
concerns to 3i such as 
changes in company 
management/new value 
added measures
There were frequent 
interactions between 
investees and 3i via this 
medium
Meet with 3i Partners To provide advice on 
new personnel 
appointments or 
investment in new 
operations
One or two meetings in 
a month
Corporate Board 
meetings 
To discuss strategic 
issues relating to 
product launch or 
company preparations 
for IPO 
5 to 6 meetings in a 
year
Company reportF ormal accounts and 
project reports
Yearly
3i has a policy and organisational structure in place which addresses how it discharges 
its responsibilities in relation to its investors and the broad topics covered. Most 
communications as are summarised in Table 3 are about investees’ progress on the 
adoption of value-added activities.
Engagement Practices Engagement Practices Engagement Practices Engagement Practices
VCs such as 3i not only give money but they also need to help build a successful 
partnership between entrepreneurs, investors and management. A successful 
partnership involves promoting and growing promising start-up businesses by taking 
calculated risks, nurturing managerial skills and business acumen. In a sense, ventures 
are themselves entrepreneurs first and financiers second. This is primarily because of 
their need to generate attractive returns for their own investors. As a result, ventures 
have a preference to nurture companies that promote good corporate governance, 
transparency and accountability, business acumen and good management skills. 
Among the investment criteria of 3i are long-term investment period of 3 to 7 years and 
adding value in the investee companies by offering advice, assistance in developing 
new products and services, recruit key personnel and introduction to potential 
customers, strategic partners, financiers and investment bankers.
The firm’s vision, as stated on its web site, is to be the leading international VC 
company. How close are they in achieving this vision? ‘We are passionate about 
expanding the impact of private equity and VC,’ says Queen, who has spent the last 
year as chairman of BVCA - the industry body representing private equity and VC firms. 
‘And 3i is the only firm in the world with the type of network that we have - the offices, 
the people, the relationships. If we invest in a business in the US we can help it grow 
in to Europe.’ It is this unique network that, says Queen, enables the company to 
generate superior returns for the company and its shareholders.57
3i is committed to nurturing its companies in many ways.  One of the most important is 
the access provided to the 3i’s global network of investors and advisors.  Thanks to its 
long history of investing in high-technology companies, the 3i team knows and has 
worked with many other technology investors and called on the intellectual capital of 
academics and industry specialists.  The 3i network is formalised through its Advisory 
Board and Affiliates Fund. It is maintained informally through events and provides all 3i 
companies with the connections needed to develop a global business.
Table 3. 3i’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. 3i’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. 3i’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. 3i’s Engagement Strategy
Engagement Method Engagement Method Engagement Method Engagement MethodC omment Comment Comment Comment 3i’s Practice 3i’s Practice 3i’s Practice 3i’s Practice
Board membership Board membership Board membership Board membershipV enture nominates non-
executive director(s) on 
portfolio company’s 
board 
Yes
Syndication Syndication Syndication Syndication Venture collaborates 
with other funds
No
Advisory Board Advisory Board Advisory Board Advisory BoardV enture has industry 
experts on its advisory 
board (e.g. IT luminary 
in the IT sector)
Yes
Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Specialist fund for 
experts / prominent 
people (to get their help 
for portfolio companies)
Yes
Partners have  Partners have  Partners have  Partners have 
background in  background in  background in  background in 
specialist areas specialist areas specialist areas specialist areas
Partners have education 
or experience in a 
specialist area such as 
science background or 
business experience
Yes
Particular management  Particular management  Particular management  Particular management 
areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern
Participated in 
discussions with 
portfolio company on: 
Strategy (e.g. market 
share, product 
development, 
competition);
Frequent; technical 
advice to MORI in its 
restructuring 
programme
Strategic audit;Y es; Paragon Software
Employee recruitment; Yes
Executive stock options;N o
Marketing or advertising 
campaigns;
No
Outsourcing; and Yes
Any other value-added 
activity (e.g. product 
packaging).
Yes; Gave advice to 
Silver Bird Group Bhd 
on product packaging
3i is active across all stages of funding. From early-stage venture capital to growth 
capital and buyouts, it invests £1.5bn a year in some of the most exciting and 58
ambitious companies in the world. 3i's international relationship network is unique. Its 
team of nearly 300 investment professionals spans three continents, linking it to a 
wealth of corporate contacts and industry experts. This gives it both a local and global 
view of industry trends. Its teams are further connected to a wealth of entrepreneurs, 
corporate contacts and industry experts, ensuring that it can bring together the right 
team for every opportunity. It also means that it has the scale, the agility and the talent 
needed to deliver even the most challenging deals.
3i that normally gives financial assistance to high-tech, high-growth and high-risk 
ventures, is willing to fund more traditional businesses that want to add value or 
undertake product innovation. To get the attention of 3i partners, the businesses must 
show they can graduate to a higher level, such as capturing large global market share 
with a top quality product. Silver Bird Group Bhd, for example, has managed to 
repackage its bread and cakes in an innovative way to appeal to overseas customers. 3i 
holds a stake in Silver Bird.
Value adding and product innovation are imperative to secure 3i funding. A simple way 
of doing so would be to transform the packaging style to one which is more 
contemporary. This will give tremendous boost to the branding effort instead of relying 
solely on OEM (original equipment manufacturer) business for survival. 
SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) may also look at how to improve their cash 
management. Generally, as the experience of 3i shows, they still need some guidance 
on how to control their cash flow, particularly in lowering production cost or finding the 
cheaper source of funding. SMEs also need to strive to polish up their sales and 
marketing skills.59
Appendix 1: Venture Capital Fund Case Studies: No. 3 Appendix 1: Venture Capital Fund Case Studies: No. 3 Appendix 1: Venture Capital Fund Case Studies: No. 3 Appendix 1: Venture Capital Fund Case Studies: No. 3
Merlin Biosciences Merlin Biosciences Merlin Biosciences Merlin Biosciences
Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary
This case shows how venture partners’ skills and specialist knowledge of a particular 
sector can be useful in adopting a long-term investment approach. As the literature 
survey has shown, managers in modern corporations tend to take a short-term view of 
their activities, primarily because of the employment constraints under which they 
normally work. However, it is also possible, as the experience of Merlin shows, to use 
the firm’s organisational capabilities in a way that managers have appropriate 
incentives to make investments with long-term yields. These organisational capabilities 
are primarily related to the specialist knowledge of a particular business sector, which 
can be effectively utilised to mitigate any risk while structuring particular transactions. 
Merlin’s support of R& D activities in the biosciences sector is a testimony to the 
viability of such an approach.   
Many successful venture capital funds are built on the specialist knowledge and 
business skills that their founders have brought to bear in the early stages of their 
development. Merlin Biosciences is one such example of a venture which has 
benefited from the foresightedness and energy of its founder Professor Sir Christopher 
Evans. This case demonstrates the role of a venture capital fund’s specialised skills and 
knowledge in creating entrepreneurial opportunities in a particular sector of the 
economy in which it operates.
Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile
Merlin was founded in 1996 as an advisory firm that specialised in equity investments 
in European life science companies. Merlin’s conceptual foundation was the 
combination of science and entrepreneurship in human medicines. The Firm’s principal 
founder, Professor Sir Christopher Evans, is the European biotechnology entrepreneur 
who founded Chiroscience (now merged with Celltech), Celsis, and Enzymatix. Sir 
Christopher’s companies returned hundreds of millions of pounds to the private equity 
investors who backed them.
Merlin’s engagement philosophy is to be an active investor in and supporter of its 
portfolio companies. In 1997, Merlin established its first investment partnership to 
provide seed capital for UK-based biotechnology companies. The companies have since 
matured into some of the leading private biotechnology firms in Europe. In 2000, 
Merlin began investing in more developed companies throughout Europe through its 
second fund. Today, Merlin advises three investment partnerships with total capital of 
 4 00 million. The Firm has made 27 equity investments. Merlin is one of the largest 
investors in the European bioscience market and has raised more than  5 00 million in 
syndicated equity finance for its portfolio companies.60
Merlin won the Investor Allstars award for ‘Venture Capital Fund of the Year’ in 2003. 
The award was given to Merlin in recognition of its outstanding commitment in the life 
sciences sector, not only in the UK, but also across Europe. The criteria that were 
judged included a track record for innovative fundraising, quality of investments and 
exits; a reputation for adding considerable value to portfolio companies, not just finance; 
and a reputation for working closely with the early-stage investment community. The 
awards were presented by GP Capital. ‘It is an honour to accept any award given by 
ones peers,’ stated Professor Sir Christopher Evans. ‘Merlin has always been hands-on
and passionate about guiding and helping its portfolio companies as they strive to 
develop their innovative products.’
Scale and agility
One differentiating factor in venture success is the scale and the ability to deliver both 
locally and internationally. In Merlin’s case, its financial muscle and its breadth of sector 
experience have enabled it to act swiftly and creatively when faced with the 
challenging deals. Further, the scale of its international network has given it a unique 
insight into trends across all of its key markets and sectors. It can therefore deliver 
flexibly in terms of:
• Deal size and funding structure 
• Stage of business development 
• Investment timescales.
Merlin has also stable access to funds for the long term, which means that it has the 
ability to follow its initial investments with further rounds of funding, even in the most 
turbulent markets. This is evidenced from further funding rounds for Graffinity, EpiCept 
and BioWisdom. Its scale also gives it the flexibility to accommodate a wide range of 
business risk. It can therefore pursue opportunities that lie beyond the reach of other 
private equity companies, including complex deals across international borders, 
operational turnarounds and large buy and build deals.
Merlin Biosciences strengthened its presence in Germany in 2001 and entered into a 
strategic collaboration with German life science advisory group, BioConnect AG, which 
is based in Frankfurt and Munich. Merlin acquired a significant stake in BioConnect, and 
also entered into an investment advisory agreement to support its investment activities 
in continental Europe, particularly in the German speaking nations. 
As part of the agreement, Merlin’s Managing Director Mark Clement was appointed 
Chairman of BioConnect. With this collaboration, Merlin secured a permanent presence 
in the strongest European life sciences countries, namely the UK and Germany. Both 
companies had already been working closely and were convinced that their approaches 
and capabilities were highly complementary. With Merlin’s UK base and this 
agreement in Germany, it now have a strong foothold on the biotech market as about 
70 per cent of biotech opportunity in Europe is spread between the UK and Germany.
Merlin Ventures became one of the largest dedicated bioscience development capital 
groups in the world in late 1990s. In its second phase of development, Jeremy Curnock 
Cook, a Director of Rothschild Asset Management and head of Rothschild Bioscience 
Unit (RBU), together with other key individuals from the RBU team, joined the group to 61
form Merlin Bioscience. The new group also took over the management contract for 
the £57 million International Biotechnology Trust plc (IBT), an investment trust 
investing in mid-stage biotechnology companies formerly managed by RBU. Merlin also 
assumed responsibility for the RBU's A$43 million (£18 million) Australian Bioscience 
Trust and its $40 million (£25 million) Canadian Bioscience Trust. Merlin already 
managed the £39 million Merlin Fund, an active incubator vehicle for seed-stage 
bioscience companies, and advised the £30 million Reabourne Merlin Life Sciences 
Investment Trust on unquoted UK investments.
Prior to the formation of Merlin Bioscience, Merlin Ventures was already working on 
plans for the Merlin Healthcare Fund, a £100 million vehicle for later-stage bioscience 
investments across Europe. The Merlin Healthcare Fund boosted Merlin Bioscience's 
funds under management to £250 million. By bringing together Merlin and the RBU 
funds and team, Merlin Bioscience had secured itself the uniquely advantageous 
position of a quoted and unquoted bioscience investment network covering Europe, 
North America and Australasia with the capacity to fund companies from test-tube 
stage to the quoted markets.
Inves Inves Inves Investment Strategy tment Strategy tment Strategy tment Strategy
Merlin Ventures has established a number of companies, including Cyclacel, Eurogene, 
KinderTec, Microscience, PanTherix, ReNeuron and Vectura, along with the Merlin 
Fund. The fund's typical candidates are companies that have successfully raised one or 
more rounds of early-stage funding and are seeking support to take their products 
through clinical trials. The fund has encountered strong interest from European 
investors, especially German banks, who recognise the importance of intermediate 
venture financing for biotechnology companies. As a result of high levels of start-up 
activity in Germany, fostered by various government grants and seed capital initiatives, 
there is now a plethora of young biotech companies seeking funding. Conventional 
venture capital sources tend to treat many of these firms with scepticism, because 
they do not have suitable management structures to sustain the company going 
forward. Merlin, which takes a hands-on approach and has particular strengths in 
creating appropriate management teams for investees, aims to tap into latent value in 
such companies through the planned fund. 
Due to its focus on mature companies, the Merlin Healthcare Fund exits investments 
within a two-to-three-year time frame. This shorter term to exit could serve to attract 
investors who are normally deterred by the typical investment-holding period of 
conventional venture funds. Recently, reproductive health specialist Ardana 
Biosciences, vaccines company BioVex and cancer specialist PIramed each closed 
financings of   29 (£20) million,   25 (£17) million and  1 2 (£8) million, respectively, from 
major international investors alongside Merlin.  In addition, Graffinity, EpiCept and 
BioWisdom signed major commercial deals in turn with Genentech, one of the world's 
largest biotech companies, Adolor (specialising in pain control) and GlaxoSmithKline.62
Merlin Fund L.P. (Fund I)
Merlin raised the   62 million Merlin Fund I in 1997. Fund I was the first major seed 
fund for UK biotechnology companies, with a planned hold period for each equity 
investment of five to seven years. The Merlin fund has attracted commitments from a 
range of Northern European investors. Pensions and life funds from the UK, Germany, 
Benelux and Scandinavia are the primary sources of capital for the fund. The Fund is 
also targeting private equity investors, particularly funds-of-funds that are looking for an 
allocation to life sciences but lack specific in-house bioscience capability. Merlin has 
purposely not targeted US investors for the fund which, with a final target of   200 
million, is small by most people's standards.
The Merlin Biosciences Fund is targeted on the bioscience equity gap that exists for 
mid-stage life sciences companies. Its typical investees are two to four years old and 
have reached ‘proof of principle’, with products in the late pre-clinical or clinical trial 
phases.  Merlin’s role is to deepen and broaden investees' business models and to 
supplement existing corporate relationships.
Merlin looks at life science companies in terms of business opportunities, management 
teams and the infrastructure for exits.  The recent resurgence in quoted bioscience 
company valuations is attracting investors back into unquoted funds since, as post-IPO 
valuations increase, people are looking for the opportunity to buy into good deal flow at 
an earlier stage. The opportunity to co-invest aggressively alongside the Merlin
Biosciences Fund in pre-IPO top-up rounds is a particular draw, because of the uplift 
potential in the relatively short term and the chance to secure a good position in the 
queue for allocations at the time of flotation.
Merlin Biosciences Fund L.P. (Fund II)
The  2 47 million Merlin Biosciences Fund is one of the largest dedicated healthcare 
venture capital funds in Europe. Its objective is pan-European investing in mid-stage 
and late-stage biotechnology companies, with a bias towards marketable drugs. Its 
intended hold period for each investment is four to five years. The fund has been set 
up with a view to investing in unquoted bioscience companies in Europe. The average 
investment size is between  7  million and  1 0 million per company; because the fund 
is investing in life sciences, there normally is more than one round of financing per 
company, and so the fund invests in smaller chunks where appropriate. 
In early stage companies, the average investment size is a minimum of around   3 
million. Merlin Biosciences boasts an experienced team of 16 multidisciplinary 
professionals. Members of the Merlin team have founded 14 bioscience companies 
and floated two - Chiroscience and Celsis International - on the London Stock Exchange.
"Merlin's portfolio companies are delivering value to business partners and 
shareholders alike. This performance is evidenced by their continued ability to raise 
significant sums from existing as well as new investors, at good valuations. Combined 
with this fundraising success, is the validation that companies such as Graffinity, 
EpiCept and BioWisdom are receiving through collaborations with major players in the 
biotech and pharma industries. Success in clinical trials is also being achieved, in 
particular, both Vectura and Onyvax have released positive results from phase II 63
programmes," stated Mark Clement, Chief Executive of Merlin Biosciences. “From 
Merlin's perspective, we have spent the last few months concentrating on 
strengthening our portfolio and assisting our senior managers meet the challenges that 
the market is presenting,” he said.
UK Cambridge Biotechnology Ltd: An Investment Example UK Cambridge Biotechnology Ltd: An Investment Example UK Cambridge Biotechnology Ltd: An Investment Example UK Cambridge Biotechnology Ltd: An Investment Example
UK Cambridge Biotechnology Ltd has recently raised an additional £3.8 million to 
facilitate clinical development of its two most advanced products, CBT1452, a leptin 
agonist for obesity and CBT1008 for post-operative pain. Existing investors, Merlin 
Biosciences, The Cambridge Gateway Fund, Northern Venture Managers Ltd and Avlar 
BioVentures, participated in the financing. To date, the company has raised £10.2 
million from leading venture capitalists, including Merlin. Merlin’s continued support of 
the company is in line with its philosophy of taking a long-term investment approach 
with regard to leading R&D based companies. This kind of approach is only made 
possible because of Merlin’s extensive experience in backing similar type projects in 
earlier rounds.
"This financing will allow Cambridge Biotechnology to drive our drug candidates 
through clinical development thereby creating significant value in the near term," CEO 
Tony Sedgwick said. “Over the past three years we have built a reputation for 
efficiently producing innovative drug candidates targeting obesity, pain and 
inflammatory disorders, large markets greatly underserved at present. The continued 
support of our investors allows us to significantly increase the inherent value of our 
clinical pipeline and position us for substantial future growth.” 
The general investment profile of Merlin is presented in Table 1. Merlin’s term sheets 
(contractual agreement with the investee) set out the portfolio company's valuation and 
capital structure, the composition of its Board of Directors, the vesting schedule for its 
management's stock options and the size of the employee stock option pool, as well 
as the registration rights for its investors if and when the company launches a public 
offering. 
Table 1: Merlin’s Investment Profile Table 1: Merlin’s Investment Profile Table 1: Merlin’s Investment Profile Table 1: Merlin’s Investment Profile
Activity Activity Activity Activity Explanation Explanation Explanation Explanation Merlin’s Approach Merlin’s Approach Merlin’s Approach Merlin’s Approach
Investment Type Investment Type Investment Type Investment TypeM ilestone funding –
funding available in 
stages conditional upon 
investee company 
meeting certain 
performance targets
Yes
Full funding Yes
Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions 
(the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet – –––
conditions are set in  conditions are set in  conditions are set in  conditions are set in 
the contract)  the contract)  the contract)  the contract) 
Capital structure (i.e. 
liquidation preferred 
equity)
Yes64
Composition of Board of 
Directors 
Yes. Merlin nominates 
one or two directors.
Recruitment of senior 
staff
Yes
Executive stock options No
Approval for annual 
budget
No
Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit StrategyT rading Sometime
Flotation or IPO (Initial 
Public Offering)
Preferred
The organisational arrangements between Merlin and investee companies are reported 
in Table 2. Merlin’s portfolio companies have some formal procedures for reporting 
important decisions to Merlin but certain types of interaction, for example additional 
communications with Merlin, are not always recorded and in a number of instances, 
investees interacts in this way but no record is kept. Thus the examples below reflect 
those activities that have been recorded and reported and may not reflect all interaction 
undertaken. For example, Merlin is very keen on being kept informed about a portfolio 
drug company’s progress on producing innovative drug candidates.   
Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements
Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Comment Comment Comment Comment
Telephone or write to 
express 
concerns/decisions
General issues of 
concerns to Merlin such 
as new senior 
appointments
There were frequent 
interactions between 
Merlin and its investees
Meet with investee 
company managers
To provide advice on the 
selection of new 
partners or investment 
in new products
Monthly
Investee corporate 
board meetings 
To discuss strategic 
issues relating to 
product launch or 
company preparations 
for IPO 
7 to 8 meetings in a 
year
Investee company 
report
Formal accounts and 
project reports
Yearly
Merlin has a policy and organisational structure in place which addresses how it views 
its responsibilities in relation to its investees and the broad topics covered. Most 
communications as summarised in Table 3 are about investees’ progress company 
management practices, including new product development.
Merlin partners offer an in-depth knowledge of the biosciences industry combined with 
extensive analytical skills adapted for analysis of the industry trends. The principal 
research methodologies used are data collection, data modelling and forecasting. Data 
obtained from portfolio companies and other organisations are reduced to a consistent 
format in order to establish a common base for forecasting product profiles from 65
existing trends. A portfolio company is then provided with a dossier and 
recommendations substantiated with forecasts and development plans of the best 
product prospects for its target customers.
Human Capital: Developing and Utilising Skills
Merlin Biosciences is a group of professionals with experience in private equity 
investing, pharmaceuticals and healthcare, mergers and acquisitions, corporate finance, 
accounting, and management consulting. The partners have worked together for 
several years and are investors in Merlin’s private equity funds.
Professor Sir Christopher Evans and Jeremy Curnock Cook are among the leading 
figures in the bioscience industry. Professor Sir Christopher Evans is the founder of 
bioscience companies currently valued at more than £500 million, including 
Chiroscience and Celsis, which have floated on the London Stock Exchange and 
Enzymatix, which was successfully sold. 
Merlin staffs each investment with a team of professionals responsible for and with a 
direct interest in its successful growth and completion. This team includes at least one 
partner who maintains day-to-day involvement in the investment. Merlin’s size is a key 
factor in ensuring that it can bring all of its resources to bear quickly and decisively on 
major matters affecting a transaction or portfolio company.
Leadership Development
Merlin ties portfolio company leadership development to the business drivers. First, it 
looks at the company’s strategy and find out how executive development will get the 
portfolio company CEOs and other senior managers to the next stage of development 
faster. Second, it talks to the unit managers to learn what is working, what is not, and 
what is missing. 
Merlin also uses executive development as an engine of change. It discusses with its 
portfolio company managers current and future leadership capabilities and capacity. 
Does the portfolio company have the most competitive team in its industry? Does it 
have a deeper leadership pool than its rivals? If not, why not? By the end of these 
discussions, Merlin is not just only the portfolio company’s financier but also its 
leadership development programme sponsor. Merlin helps the portfolio company 
articulate the focus and metrics for its development programmes. 
For example, in the case of a merger activity, leadership development programme 
could focus on accelerating the integration of merged companies. Merlin believes that 
executive development can contribute to business success in many ways during a 
merger.  The development programme can focus on accelerating the post merger 
integration of the management teams and implement a ‘fast start’ process. These ‘fast 
start’ can produce operating agreements that support the culture of the new company 
and allow them to meet or exceed their merger-savings goals.66
Engagement Approach Engagement Approach Engagement Approach Engagement Approach
Consistent with its entrepreneurial and scientific approach, Merlin is an active investor 
in and partner to its portfolio companies (see Table 3).  Merlin normally has a seat on 
each company board and likes to play a leading role in financing and other strategic 
events. The Merlin team blends science, finance and commercial expertise in human 
healthcare.
Table 3: Merlin’s Engagement Strategy Table 3: Merlin’s Engagement Strategy Table 3: Merlin’s Engagement Strategy Table 3: Merlin’s Engagement Strategy
Engagement Method Engagement Method Engagement Method Engagement MethodC omment Comment Comment Comment Merlin’s Practice Merlin’s Practice Merlin’s Practice Merlin’s Practice
Board membership Board membership Board membership Board membershipV enture nominates non-
executive director(s) on 
portfolio company’s 
board 
Yes
SSSSyndication yndication yndication yndication Venture collaborates 
with other funds
Yes
Advisory Board Advisory Board Advisory Board Advisory BoardV enture has industry 
experts on its advisory 
board (e.g. IT luminaries 
in the IT sector)
Yes
Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Specialist fund for 
experts / prominent 
people (to get their help 
for portfolio companies)
No
Partners have  Partners have  Partners have  Partners have 
background in  background in  background in  background in 
specialist areas specialist areas specialist areas specialist areas
Partners have education 
or experience in a 
specialist area such as 
science background or 
business experience
Yes
Particular management  Particular management  Particular management  Particular management 
areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern
Participated in 
discussions with 
portfolio company on: 
Strategy (e.g. market 
share, product 
development, 
competition);
Frequent; provided 
management support to 
Eurogene, KinderTec, 
Microscience, 
PanTherix, ReNeuron 
and Vectura
Strategic audit, including 
strategic alliances; 
Yes; KinderTec and 
Microscience
Employee recruitment; Yes
Executive stock options;N o
Marketing or advertising 
campaigns;
No
Outsourcing; and No
Any other value-added 
activity (e.g. product 
packaging)
Yes; team building 
expertise to Cyclacel67
Partnership Model
Merlin believes in value creation through active partnership. Its people have worked 
successfully alongside businesses of all sizes, from multinational corporations to family 
run businesses, and it understands that every investment requires a tailored approach. 
Merlin works in partnership with: 
• Entrepreneurs to turn ideas in to businesses 
• Management teams to fuel ambition and drive results 
• Intermediaries and vendors to ensure that deals are delivered 
• Its investment partners and shareholders to create value.
Merlin takes an active role in the key decisions facing its portfolio companies. In every 
business it invests in, it works with the board to achieve its joint, long-term goal of 
building value for the company. This is what Merlin terms its ‘hands-on’ approach. For 
example, in the case of Vectura it has provided the company market intelligence 
information on a regular basis.
Merlin partners act as enablers.  They position themselves as coaches, not as 
technological specialists and put the portfolio company managers through experiences 
without explicitly stating what or how they are to learn. Even when specific skills are 
imparted, these purely to assist portfolio company managers’ experimentation. The 
emphasis is on finding opportunities for improvement. An important component of this 
strategy is to give portfolio company managers the resources they need to act quickly. 
The result of this unusual venture capital-portfolio company relationship is a high 
degree of sophisticated problem solving at all levels of the organisation. The basic 
partnership philosophy is that any entrepreneurial opportunity can be realised if people 
at every level are looking and experimenting closely enough.
The benefits of gaining access to the Merlin network are also of note. Because Merlin 
has people on the ground in different countries, it has over time accumulated market 
and industry knowledge. This enables it to actively contribute to the strategic decisions 
facing the companies it invests in. Its international relationship network thus provides 
its investee companies with access to new corporate connections and industry 
expertise.
Merlin sits on the boards of the majority of companies that it invests in. Merlin 
Partners’ business connections often introduce new partners, customers and suppliers, 
and because its network is international, it can help young businesses to bridge the gap 
to new markets. On the other hand, despite its strong market position, Merlin seeks to 
influence rather than control - usually taking a minority shareholding - and it aims to 
align its ambitions with the ambitions of the management team and other stakeholders. 
Because Merlin offers a range of funding solutions to suit a wide range of business 
situations, it is not constrained by the fixed investment criteria of conventional funds 
and so it is able to offer exceptional flexibility by tailoring its approach to suit the 
ownership structure of the individual business.68
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Sitka Sitka Sitka Sitka
Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary
Sitka case shows that fund managers can make good returns in the long term by 
identifying deals at an earlier stage or by finding new ways of creating value in deals.
These are the foundations of Sitka’ New Deal Origination Model. Despite operating in a 
generally considered a high-risk area, Sitka is more than satisfied with its past record. 
This becomes apparent when it dismisses the label ‘high-risk’. Being ‘a specialist, we 
get to see the best stuff first, long before the companies approach generalist VCTs’. 
The essence of Sitka’s investment strategy is therefore its reliance on its partners’ 
knowledge and skill. Sitka’s case, in addition to the one on Merlin Biosciences’, shows 
that the critical factor in ensuring long-term investment is the knowledge and expertise 
that investors can bring to bear on investment transactions.
The skills and expertise of venture partners can also be useful in identifying business 
growth opportunities for investees (e.g. Vectura diversified its product portfolio with 
the aid of Sitka) or assembling investee staff with complementary skills (e.g. Sitka 
enabled MSL to form an experienced team of specialists). In this case therefore the 
management areas of investor influence can be gauged from Sitka’ direct role in 
portfolio company strategy and employee development.
Fast-growing, profitable companies are now usually found in the healthcare and biotech 
sectors. These markets cover the rich grounds of drugs, devices and diagnostics, from 
initial discovery all the way through to drug administering and patient care. Sitka Health 
is one such investment, focusing mainly on companies that get the drugs to patients.
This case is designed to delineate the conditions necessary for investment in long-term 
projects. It is shown that ventures with a profound knowledge of a specific set of 
business models are better placed in taking a long-term view of their investment 
profiles. Thus, venture partners’ skills and expertise have a major role to play in 
creating entrepreneurial opportunities, not least in the health sector in which Sitka 
specialises.
Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile
Sitka was set up in May 1999 as a specialist private equity and advisory company to 
focus on the health and life sciences sector throughout Europe. Sitka acts both as a 
fund manager and a corporate advisor to high growth European companies in the 
healthcare sector. Since its inception Sitka has supported a range of early-stage 
healthcare and technology companies in preparing themselves to come to the private 
equity market. Deals include Celtipharm, a European b2b portal for pharmacies, FA 
Technology, a French media company, BioAlliance, a biotech company and most 
recently, eCare, an online service, promoting well-being at work.69
Sitka Partners initially started its business by advising international fund managers on 
private equity finance for medium-sized investment opportunities in continental Europe. 
Sitka aimed to add value through sourcing and creating opportunities that were under-
appreciated or unknown in the funding market. It had a particular focus on the French 
and Italian markets. However now Sitka works both as an active investor and advisor. 
The venture believes that only by providing proactive management support, often with 
board representation, can the investor's and entrepreneur's mutual goals of maximised 
returns be achieved.
Sitka looks to invest in companies with high quality management which possess 
significant proprietary technology and intellectual property capable of addressing large 
markets. Therapeutics companies must encompass a diversified portfolio and a 
genuine drug development pipeline. Sitka's European team has a cumulative 
experience of over 60 years in the fields of venture capital, entrepreneurship, corporate 
advisory, financial control and major pharmaceutical company management. The team 
is supported by an industrial advisory panel of European entrepreneurs which makes 
Sitka ideally situated to advise investee companies on a range of issues from mergers, 
acquisitions and fundraising to strategic alliances and planning.
The Sitka Spruce tree, which originates from the island, is known for its strength and 
rapid rate of growth. Its height can reach 80 metres and legend says that ‘it transforms 
rain into gold.’ It has become the logo and a significant hallmark for the company.
Sitka on the Continent
In the private equity market, most fund managers only make good returns in the long 
term by identifying deals at an earlier stage or by finding new ways of creating value in 
deals (e.g. restructuring product portfolio), not by focusing on large, high-profile, 
auctioned deals. In both cases, this needs the involvement of senior, experienced 
people on the team much earlier in the process than before. This is happening in the 
UK and there are some examples on the Continent, but many teams in London simply 
do not have a body of experience of Europe or enough senior executives to devote to 
this new way of doing deals. Sitka aimed to fill this gap.
The primary focus on the French and Italian markets was because members of the 
Sitka team have long experience of private equity in both countries. More importantly 
though, these markets, and the other Latin’ markets, are underdeveloped for private 
equity, especially in the mid-market. The pace of change in the way business is done in 
both countries has accelerated beyond belief in the past few years - large bids and 
takeovers are but one aspect of this. A huge number of companies will need private 
equity investment over the next decade - although most of them do not even know 
what private equity is at the moment.
Investment Strategy Investment Strategy Investment Strategy Investment Strategy
In February 2001, Sitka launched its first fund, the Sitka Health Fund VCT (Venture 
Capital Trust). This is the first VCT to specialise in the healthcare sector in the UK. 
Managed by Sitka Ltd, the fund invests in UK-based companies who are looking for 
between £300,000 to £1m in investment, and potentially larger sums when co-
investing with major investors.70
Areas of particular interest to the fund are:
• Medical devices 
• Diagnostics 
• Pharmaceutical product portfolios 
• Drug discovery technologies 
• Instrumentation and reagents 
• Healthcare services 
• E-commerce health ventures 
The VCT invests in companies at various stages of their financing rounds, ranging from 
early stage through development funding to investments in companies which are 
undertaking a new share issue on Ofex or Aim. Sitka lists the attractions of the sector 
as: the growing demand for products and services from an ageing population; rising 
NHS spend; universities increasingly looking to exploit their intellectual property; 
scientific innovation; and the fact that health spending is always a priority – for 
governments and individuals. So its Health Fund VCT aims to create a balanced 
portfolio of growth companies in the health sector.
Of its current 11 investments, four are early-stage, five are at development stage and 
two are Aim-listed. The holdings are a mix of companies using technology to discover 
drugs, those producing diagnostics equipment and devices, as well as service 
providers. One company, Aim-listed Deltex, is developing and marketing a non-invasive 
cardiac function and therapy guidance device. Its sales grew by 72 per cent in the 
calendar year to 2003. 
Sitka Health Fund is relatively small – it raised £7.3m at launch in 2000 – but is in the 
process of raising a further £12m, and is managed by some experienced hands: Gerard 
Tardy and Louis Nisbet. Mr. Tardy has 20 years’ experience in venture capital, including 
a 10 year period at Schroeder Ventures, a life sciences-focused venture capitalist. He 
believes the benefits of investing in the health industry are grossly underestimated 
(see the case below on Vectura). ‘If you invest £100 into the sector, on average you 
can expect a return of around £160 after four to six years – and that’s before tax relief. 
With relief at 40 per cent, you could almost triple your money, which is equivalent to an 
annual return of 20 per cent.’
Hugh Rogers, VCT analyst at independent financial adviser Bestinvest, awards Sitka a 
‘three-star’ rating out of five stars. He recommends the fund to clients prepared to take 
on extra risk. ‘Sitka has a strong team with a wealth of knowledge, but all VCTs are 
high-risk because of the nature of the companies they are investing in and, because 
Sitka is heavily exposed to a single sector, that adds extra risk.’ But Mr. Tardy is 
dismissive of the label ‘high-risk’. ‘Investors who ‘play safe’ by pouring money into Aim 
and generalist VCTs are wasting a great opportunity. We’re not an Aim tracker fund, 
like some VCTs. We’re looking for much higher, proper venture capital returns,” he 
says. Also, as a specialist, “we get to see the best stuff first,” long before the 
companies approach generalist VCTs.
And he points out that in this industry, it is vital to invest early (see the case below on 
Molecular SkinCare Limited (MSL)). ‘The pricing at float stage is often not very 
attractive. I cannot see much upside on many Aim stocks,’ says Mr. Tardy. But Mr. 71
Rogers says that, if the healthcare sector faced a downturn in fortunes, Sitka’s VCT 
would remain tied to the sector. ‘They would not have the option of moving into 
another sector that would yield better results.’
Vectura: An Investment Example Vectura: An Investment Example Vectura: An Investment Example Vectura: An Investment Example
Private-equity firm Sitka has found good returns closer to home, on a smaller scale.
Pulmonary drug-delivery company Vectura Group plc raised £20 million, or about  3 0 
million, through an initial placement on AIM, the alternative investment market of the 
London Stock Exchange. Sitka first invested in Vectura in 2002, when the climate for 
raising funds was extremely difficult. Sitka’s confidence in its Vectura investment was 
partly based on its specialist knowledge of the drug industry. Sitka invested an initial 
£500,000, followed by £55,000 in an interim round and £55,000 in the float. The 
company expects an estimated 50 per cent gain on the price originally paid, based on 
the placement price at 56 pence a share. 
Vectura develops inhalant drugs for the treatment of lung diseases and where drug 
delivery via the lungs is more effective for the treatment of other conditions. As well as 
developing its own products, Vectura has a services unit that leverages its pulmonary 
technology by helping other companies with drugs in development, said Louis Nisbet, a 
fund manager at Sitka. Sitka’s role has been significant in this diversification as it 
helped identify the market need.
Molecular SkinCare: An Investment Example Molecular SkinCare: An Investment Example Molecular SkinCare: An Investment Example Molecular SkinCare: An Investment Example
University of Sheffield Medical School spin-out, Molecular SkinCare Limited (MSL), has 
combined the research capabilities of leading academic scientists with those of clinical 
researchers to create an innovative biotech company with a strong proprietary 
therapeutic pipeline and the opportunity to make a real difference to patients’ lives.
One of the things that sets MSL apart from other biotechs is the complementary mix 
of academic and clinical expertise. Prior to setting up the company, MSL’s founders 
had worked together for a number of years in the dermatology field, bringing the 
laboratory research of Drs Ward, Tazi-Ahnini (MSL’s Senior Science director) and 
Professor Gordon Duff (Board Chairman), together with the internationally renowned 
clinical dermatology expertise of Dr Cork (Medical Director). Sitka has been 
instrumental in bringing together these various MSL staff with complementary skills.
Currently sited at the University of Sheffield’s medical school, MSL raised £1.2 million 
in 2002, through a first round of venture capital financing led by Sitka Health Care 
Venture Capital Trust, and with additional investments by Cambridge Research and 
Innovation Limited and Catalyst Biomedica. During 2004 the company aims to attract 
investors for a second round of fundraising, which would enable the researchers to 
move into dedicated premises in the Sheffield area. 
Sitka’s term sheet (contract with the portfolio company) sets out the portfolio 
company's valuation and capital structure, the composition of its Board of Directors, 
the vesting schedule for its management's stock options and the size of the employee 72
stock option pool, as well as the registration rights for its investors if and when the 
company launches a public-offering (see Table 1 below).
Table 1: Sitka’s Investment Profile Table 1: Sitka’s Investment Profile Table 1: Sitka’s Investment Profile Table 1: Sitka’s Investment Profile
Investment Type Investment Type Investment Type Investment TypeM ilestone funding –
funding available in 
stages
Yes
Full funding Yes
Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions 
(the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet – –––
conditions are set in  conditions are set in  conditions are set in  conditions are set in 
the contract)  the contract)  the contract)  the contract) 
Capital structure (i.e. 
liquidation preferred 
equity)
Yes
Composition of Board of 
Directors
Yes
Recruitment of senior 
staff
No
Executive stock options No
Approval for annual 
budget
No
Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit StrategyT rading Preferred
Flotation or IPO (Initial 
Public Offering)
Milestone Funding
A larger group of ventures investors, including Sitka, is now experimenting with 
milestone funding for protecting their investments. Milestones are currently practised 
in a much larger percentage of venture deals, across all types of industries. This type of 
financing, once seen almost exclusively in the biotechnology sector, links at least part 
of an investment in a company to the achievement of defined objectives. For example, 
instead of giving a software company £6 million all in one shot, the investor will divide 
the money into two tranches, releasing £3 million to the company at the outset and the 
remaining £3 million when the company reaches a specified milestone, such as the 
release of the beta version of its software, hitting certain revenue targets or signing a 
relationship agreement with a larger vendor.
The organisational arrangements between Sitka and its investees are reported in Table 
2. There are some formal procedures for reporting important decisions to Sitka but 
certain types of interaction, for example additional communications with Sitka Partners, 
are not always recorded. Thus the examples below reflect those activities that have 
been recorded and reported and may not reflect all interaction undertaken. In particular, 
Sitka’s information exchange functions are designed to obtain maximum information 
about the staffing needs of its portfolio companies. 73
Table 2: Reporting Ar Table 2: Reporting Ar Table 2: Reporting Ar Table 2: Reporting Arrangements rangements rangements rangements
Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Comment Comment Comment Comment
Telephone or write to 
express 
concerns/decisions
General issues of 
concerns to Sitka such 
as feedback on product 
development
There were frequent 
interactions between 
investees and Sitka via 
this medium
Meet with investee 
company managers
To provide advice on 
new personnel 
appointments or 
investment in new 
operations
Monthly
Corporate Board 
meetings 
To discuss strategic 
issues relating to 
product launch or 
company preparations 
for IPO 
5 to 6 meetings in a 
year
Company reportF ormal accounts and 
projects
Yearly
Sitka has a policy and organisational structure in place which addresses how it 
discharges its responsibilities in relation to its investors and the broad topics covered. 
Most communications as summarised in Table 3 are about investees’ progress on 
product development and how they plan (including the timeframe) to commercialise its 
products.
For many companies, Sitka also wanted to know and understand all the parameters 
that were taken into account for new projects developed by its portfolio companies. 
For example, additional research and analysis on the expected efficiency of their 
production line and logistics system was crucial to make sure they were heading in the 
right direction for the preparation of the construction of their production facilities. Sitka 
was able to provide its portfolio companies a combination of skills necessary for 
venture support, plus a professional approach to commercially sensitive information. 
Often, Sitka presented data to its portfolio companies that enabled strategic decision 
making on certain aspects of the production or selling operations. Sitka reports also 
served as a useful tool for important decision making in the management of the 
company’s new operations. 
Engagement Practices Engagement Practices Engagement Practices Engagement Practices
Sitka In the Advisory Role
Sitka competes effectively with accountants' corporate finance networks and other 
intermediaries. This is because of its successful match between an investment 
proposal and its management team and the fund manager. The best fund managers in 
general will have a real understanding of a business, its products, markets, people, and 
how a strategy will or can be adapted to build value in that business for all stakeholders.74
Sitka competes first because it accesses and introduces deals before they come into 
the general market – it has established contacts in different market sectors; second, 
because it is from the private equity industry and therefore looks at deals and matches 
with a professional approach; third, because its success depends on long-term IRRs 
achieved on the deals it brings to fund managers. Its raison d'etre is not to get the 
highest price but to help fund managers obtain the best returns.
Table 3. Sitka’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. Sitka’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. Sitka’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. Sitka’s Engagement Strategy
Engagement M Engagement M Engagement M Engagement Method ethod ethod ethod Comment Comment Comment Comment Sitka’s Practice Sitka’s Practice Sitka’s Practice Sitka’s Practice
Board membership Board membership Board membership Board membershipV enture nominates non-
executive director(s) on 
portfolio company’s 
board 
Yes
Syndication Syndication Syndication Syndication Venture collaborates 
with other funds
No
Advisory Board Advisory Board Advisory Board Advisory BoardV enture has industry 
experts on its advisory 
board (e.g. IT luminaries 
in the IT sector)
Yes
Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Specialist fund for 
experts / prominent 
people (to get their help 
for portfolio companies)
No
Partners have  Partners have  Partners have  Partners have 
background in  background in  background in  background in 
specialist areas specialist areas specialist areas specialist areas
Partners have education 
or experience in a 
specialist area such as
science background or 
business experience
Yes
Particular management  Particular management  Particular management  Particular management 
areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern
Participated in 
discussions with 
portfolio company on: 
Strategy (e.g. market 
share, product 
development, 
competition);
Frequent; helped 
Vectura diversify its 
product portfolio. 
Discussed strategy with 
FA Technology, 
Celtipharm and 
BioAlliance their market 
strategy plans
Strategic audit;Y es; see above
Employee recruitment; Yes
Executive stock options;N o
Marketing or advertising 
campaigns;
Yes; eCare
Outsourcing; andN o
Any other value-added 
activity (e.g. product 
packaging
Yes; brought new 
skilled personnel into 
MSL75
Sitka Creates New Deal Origination Model
Although the Sitka model is highly innovative, the fundamental principles on which the 
venture is based are very simple. Tardy believes that while Anglo-Saxon investors have 
achieved a good level of penetration in the Northern European markets they have 
encountered less success in France, Italy and Spain, where they have difficulty 
accessing and negotiating mid-market deals. Similarly, mid-sized companies in these 
markets have few means of identifying appropriate UK-based private equity backers. 
Sitka, with offices in Paris and London, acts as a bridge between the two camps, 
introducing mid-sized companies seeking equity funding to London-based UK and US 
private equity providers. The company has also launched an investment programme, 
which co-invests on certain deals Sitka introduced to other houses and also make 
direct stand-alone investments.
Sitka’s business is based around the premise that the most important stage in terms of 
value creation is the initial assessment. Because competition has reached such levels 
that it is virtually essential to pay a premium to win a deal, finding the hidden value, as 
opposed to crunching the same numbers through the same spreadsheet models to 
come up with the same price, becomes more critical. ‘One of the ironies of the private 
equity industry in the late 1990s is that this key stage of the investment process is 
normally handled by a junior guy’, Gerard Tardy observes. 
Sitka capitalises on the local knowledge and contacts of its partners to source attractive 
investment candidates, but its particular strength lies in matching investment 
opportunities and fund providers. ‘We know the London-based private equity providers 
well enough to know the best investment case to build to attract a particular house's 
attention,’ Tardy explained. Normally, Sitka establishes an exclusivity agreement with 
the management team and/or vendor prior to introducing a deal - a feature that should 
prove particularly refreshing for private equity houses weary of the auction circuit. 
Sitka's approach has thus benefits for the potential investee company houses as well 
as for its private equity constituency. 
Sitka targets the substantial population of companies in the  5 0 million to   200 million 
(£33 million to £130 million) enterprise value range, where market drift towards larger 
transactions has created a widening funding gap. After sourcing a deal and building an 
investment case, Sitka steps back, leaving the execution of the transaction to the 
private equity provider, although Sitka seeks to invest four times its success fee for 
each transaction in the investee. This policy enhances Sitka's credibility, giving it 
investor, rather than intermediary status.  76
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Kleiner Kleiner Kleiner Kleiner Perkins Perkins Perkins Perkins
Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary
In the venture industry, investor engagement is best exemplified by the Keiretsu 
philosophy of Kleiner – a network of companies benefiting from synergies and pooled 
resources for higher growth and development. The professional respect and regard in 
which Kleiner is generally held and the influence that it enjoys with its own investors 
are a testimony to the success of Keiretsu. However, the present case also 
demonstrates the limits of such an approach as when Kleiner tried to bring together 
Excite and @home in a merger attempt. There is, nevertheless, an argument for 
promoting information sharing among a portfolio of companies but trying to submerge 
different business models without regard to their core capabilities carries also 
enormous risks.
Venture industry in the USA has played a leading role in establishing various innovation 
zones, a key factor in the comparative advantage of the USA technology industry over 
the years. Ventures in Silicon Valley have in particular led the way in creating new 
technology frontiers, but they have also been in the forefront of developing new 
investor engagement paradigms and approaches that are now finding their way in 
many other parts of the world. One such idea is  keiretsu , a network of companies 
bound together by complementary skills of interacting partners. This case aims to 
evaluate the principals of  keiretsu, and the extent to which it can be replicated in other 
venture environments.   
Company History/Profile Company History/Profile Company History/Profile Company History/Profile
In 1972, Kleiner was formed with the goal of providing operating advice and resources 
to entrepreneurs in addition to capital investment. It has, over time, created enormous 
value by identifying potentially successful technology start-ups and by helping these to 
commercialise their innovations. Eugene Kleiner, one of the famous ‘traitorous eight’ 
who left Shockley Labs to establish Fairchild Semiconductor in 1957, set up Kleiner
Perkins. The Fairchild group consisted of technology managers who would later 
become the founding management cadre for the US West Coast semiconductor 
industry. They also included the future founders of Intel (Gordon Moore and Robert 
Noyce) and of more than 30 other Silicon Valley companies. Over time, Kleiner helped 
launch such notable firms as Sun Microsystems, Genentech and Compaq. They 
nevertheless did not become "superstars" until the age of the Internet.
With its Headquarters in Silicon Valley, Kleiner is surrounded by many other top quality 
venture firms, including Mayfield Fund, Sequoia Capital, Accel Partners, Benchmark 
Capital, and New Enterprise Associates. But no other VC firm has quite the same 
magnetism and star power as Kleiner. It was said that a single phone call from John 
Doerr was enough to entice even the best business executives away from corporate 
America and into a Kleiner-backed start up. Moreover, Kleinerh elped put the optical 77
networking industry on the map in 1999 when two tiny companies it had championed -
Cerent Corp. and Siara Systems - were acquired for $8 billion and $4.3 billion, 
respectively. All told, Kleinerh as invested in ventures that have resulted in the creation 
of more than 250,000 new jobs, $100 billion in revenues, and $650 billion in market 
capitalisation, according to the firm's internal statistics.
Today, the same focus on technology, industry and entrepreneurial competencies is 
maintained in Kleiner. They hire only people who have proven technology company 
credentials, and who have excelled in innovative surroundings. For instance, John 
Doerr is now the most influential partner at Kleiner. He is behind start-ups such as 
Netscape, @Home, and Amazon.com, as well as several other companies. Doerr 
worked in sales at Intel and co-founded a chip company before he became a venture 
capitalist. Other general partners have had executive roles in other technology 
companies such as Sun Microsystems, Microsoft and Symantec.
However, not all of Kleiner’s ideas are winners. Kleiner Perkins was an early backer of 
hand-held computers that recognise handwriting, funding Go Corp. and other 
unsuccessful companies. Kleiner also backed 3DO Co, a game maker whose shares 
now sell for a fraction of the 1993 initial offering price. 
Investment Strategy Investment Strategy Investment Strategy Investment Strategy
With $1.5 billion in investment capital under management, Kleiner offers investment to 
ventures at various levels of maturity - seed through third stage financing. However, 
the company's stated specialty is early stage financing for technology companies. 
Specifically, the company's portfolio divides into two primary areas: information 
sciences and life sciences. Within information sciences, the company's portfolio breaks 
down into five subsections: Internet, enterprise software, consumer media, 
communications, and semiconductors. On the life sciences end, investment is geared 
toward companies in three groups: medical devices and diagnostics, drug discovery 
and therapeutics, and healthcare services and informatics.
Kleiner looks for entrepreneurs with interesting ideas for large, un-served markets, and 
they put those ideas into a framework of initiatives. In Kleiner's definition, an initiative 
is when several of its partners collaborate in an embryonic area. At any time, they have 
three or four initiatives that they are pursuing. Sometimes they nail it, as with 
communications, telecommunications, fibre optics, and the importance of that for 
Netscape, Amazon, and Internet commerce. Other times they get it wrong, as with 
pen computing. Kleiner is currently excited about personalised medicine and 
‘expression diagnostics’ — the ability to get the right drug delivered at the right time to 
the right patient at the right disease stage, using the map of the human genome as a 
guide. They have just backed their second company in this field. 
The general investment profile of Kleiner is presented in Table 1. Kleiner’s term sheets 
(contracts with the portfolio company) set out the portfolio company's valuation and 
capital structure, the composition of its Board of Directors, the vesting schedule for its 
management's stock options and the size of the employee stock option pool, as well 
as the registration rights for its investors if and when the company launches a public-
offering. 78
Tabl Tabl Tabl Table 1: Kleiner’s Investment Profile e 1: Kleiner’s Investment Profile e 1: Kleiner’s Investment Profile e 1: Kleiner’s Investment Profile
Activity Activity Activity Activity Explanation Explanation Explanation Explanation Kleiner’s Approach Kleiner’s Approach Kleiner’s Approach Kleiner’s Approach
Investment Type Investment Type Investment Type Investment TypeM ilestone funding –
funding available in 
stages conditional upon 
investee company 
meeting certain 
performance targets
Yes
Full funding Yes
Contractual Conditions Contractual Conditions Contractual Conditions Contractual Conditions
(the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet – –––
conditions are set in  conditions are set in  conditions are set in  conditions are set in 
the contract)  the contract)  the contract)  the contract) 
Capital structure (i.e. 
liquidation preferred 
equity)
Yes
Composition of Board of 
Directors 
Yes. Kleiner nominates 
one or two directors.
Recruitment of senior 
staff
Yes
Executive stock options Yes
Approval for annual 
budget
No
Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit StrategyT rading Sometime
Flotation or IPO (Initial 
Public Offering)
Preferred
The organisational arrangements between Kleiner and investee companies are reported 
in Table 2. Investees have some formal procedures for reporting important decisions to 
Kleiner but certain types of interaction, for example additional communications with 
Kleiner Partners, are not always recorded and in a number of instances, investees 
interacts in this way but no record has been kept. Thus the examples below reflect 
those activities that have been recorded and reported and may not reflect all interaction 
undertaken. Kleiner is very active at the initial stages of its involvement with the 
companies, so telephone or other means of informal communications are often 
employed at that level of involvement.79
Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements
Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Comment Comment Comment Comment
Telephone or write to 
express 
concerns/decisions
General issues of 
concerns to the 
Ventures such as 
feedback on senior 
appointments
There were frequent 
interactions between 
Kleiner and its investees
Meet with investee 
company managers
To provide advice on 
investment in new 
operations or R&D etc
Monthly
Investee corporate 
board meetings 
To discuss strategic 
issues relating to 
product launch or 
company preparations 
for IPO 
5 to 6 meetings in a 
year
Investee company 
report
Formal accounts and 
project reports
Yearly
Kleiner has a policy and organisational structure in place which addresses how it views 
its responsibilities in relation to its investees and the broad topics covered. Most 
communications as summarised in Table 3 are about investees’ progress on various 
aspects of company management.
Human Capital: Skill Utilisation Strategies 
Venture partners require a great deal of grit and experience in helping build their 
keiretsu members. Kleiner has a very special relationship with Sun Microsystems, the 
Palo Alto-based technology company that developed the Java programming language 
that runs across all types of computers and is prevalent on many web sites. Kleiner
partner, Vinod Khosla, is co-founder and former CEO at Sun Microsystems. Regarding 
his Sun experience, Khosla said, ‘a lot of guys have gotten into [the VC field] recently 
who have never started a company. They have no operating experience. And they think 
being on a board gives them the right to advise entrepreneurs. The fact is you've got to 
earn that right by getting into the nitty-gritty grime and dirty stuff yourself.’ Kleiner’s 
philosophy is that people with entrepreneurial aspirations ‘don’t need investors, they 
need coaches’. 
Ten partners comprise Kleiner's management team. Of the founding partners, Frank 
Caufield remains active in the firm. A graduate of the United States Military Academy
and Harvard Business School, Caufield came to KCPB from Oak Grove Ventures, 
another Menlo Park Firm. Caufield sits on the Board of Directors of companies such as 
Quantum, Wyse Technology, VeriFone, America Online, and Quickturn. Another major 
partner is John Doerr. Although he denies it, many regard Doerr as the firm's most 
influential partner.  A former Intel engineer and marketer, Doerr joined Kleiner in 1980, 
and helped the firm complete investments in Compaq, Netscape, Lotus, Sun, and other 
outstanding companies. Doerr is a graduate of Rice University and Harvard Business 
School. 80
For those interested in biotech and pharmaceuticals, a notable partner at the firm is 
Cynthia Healy. The Director of Life Science Research, Healy joined the firm after eleven 
years in the pharmaceutical industry. She holds a Ph.D. in pharmacology from New 
York Medical College . Of all the Kleiner partners, Vinod Khosla probably garnered the 
most press in last few years. In 1999, Khosla funded some major success stories in the 
optical networking sector - a sector that The New York Times labelled the "hottest new 
area in the technology sector." Khosla's companies include Cerant, Siara Systems and 
Juniper Networks. However, Khosla is known for more than his technical acumen. For 
example, Network World named him one of 25 most powerful people in networking. 
Engagement Approach Engagement Approach Engagement Approach Engagement Approach
Obtaining funding from Kleiner means that investees also become members of its 
famous network of companies (see Table 3 for Kleiner’s areas of concern). The firm in 
particular subscribes to the idea of keiretsu , a Japanese concept referring to networks 
of companies bound together by mutual obligations and contacts. For Kleiner, Internet-
based technologies have provided a fabulous opportunity to forge such a network, with 
Netscape and Google at its centre. One of the better examples of the Kleiner keiretsu 
is the alliance between Excite and Intuit, both Kleiner companies. As described in 
Fortune, Excite helped Intuit establish its beachhead on the Internet, and Intuit features 
Excite in its Quicken products. Intuit also helped Excite with cash: a $40 million 
investment, and a $50 million loan to help the search engine complete its deal with 
Kleiner-backed Netscape and @home, which purchased Excite in 1999.
Adopting the Keiretsu approach also means for Kleiner to act as the hands-on VC. At 
Google.com, for example, it convinced the private search engine not to embark on a 
large, expensive advertising campaign. "Kleiner saved us from making mistakes," says 
Google co-founder Sergey Brin. Not content to give a simple yes or no to 
entrepreneurs with an idea, Kleiner is among the most prominent exponents of the 
view that venture capitalists actually build, not just fund, technology companies. 
Sometimes, that strategy means Kleiner creates a company around its own idea. In the 
case of Cerent, the idea was to make the rings of fibre-optic cables that encircle most 
metropolitan areas more efficient for carrying both telephone calls and computer traffic. 
In other cases, it means tapping the full potential of other people's concepts.
An example of Keiretsu Networking
Paul Wahl was the president of software giant SAP America Inc, and one of the most 
respected technology executives on the continent. For years, hundreds of other
companies had tried to lure him away, but he always resisted - at least until he got a 
call from Kleinera nd Benchmark Capital, who together were funding a new security 
start-up called TriStrata Security Inc. They wanted Wahl as their CEO. Because of the 
dominant position that Kleiner enjoys in the technology industry, he was simply unable 
to turn down this offer.
Entrepreneurs like Gary Steele, CEO of Portera Systems Inc, a Kleiner investment 
since 1998, say they were attracted to Kleiner because of its vaunted, highly emulated 
keiretsu. “We use the phrase (sic) simply to describe bringing (together) companies 
and entrepreneurs to help them connect with each other,” Kleiner writes on its web 
site. In a perfect world, the keiretsu would allow start ups to cross-pollinate, form 81
strategic relationships and benefit from each other's services. In reality, however, the 
Kleiner keiretsu is coming under fire for being a sloppy practice in which loyalty to the 
group becomes more important than making sound business decisions.
Table 3.  Table 3.  Table 3.  Table 3. Kleiner Kleiner Kleiner Kleiner’s Engagement Practice ’s Engagement Practice ’s Engagement Practice ’s Engagement Practice
Engagement Method Engagement Method Engagement Method Engagement MethodC omment Comment Comment Comment Kleiner Kleiner Kleiner Kleiner’s Practice ’s Practice ’s Practice ’s Practice
Board membership Board membership Board membership Board membershipV enture nominates non-
executive director(s) on 
portfolio company’s 
board 
Yes
Syndication Syndication Syndication Syndication Venture collaborates 
with other funds
No
Advisor Advisor Advisor Advisory Board y Board y Board y BoardV enture has industry 
experts on its advisory 
board (e.g. IT luminaries 
in the IT sector)
No
Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Specialist fund for 
experts / prominent 
people (the aim is to get 
their help for portfolio 
companies)
Yes
Partners have  Partners have  Partners have  Partners have 
background in  background in  background in  background in 
speci speci speci specialist areas alist areas alist areas alist areas
Partners have education 
or experience in a 
specialist area such as 
science background or 
business experience
Yes. See case studies 
on John Doerr and 
Vinod Khosla
Particular management  Particular management  Particular management  Particular management 
areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern
Participated in 
discussions with 
portfolio company on: 
Strategy (e.g. market 
share, product 
development, 
competition);
Frequent - Examples 
include Portera Systems 
Inc, Netscape, and 
Amazon
Strategic audit;Y es
Employee recruitment; Yes
Executive stock options;Y es
Marketing or advertising 
campaigns;
Yes – Examples include 
Google.com
Outsourcing; andY es
Any other value-added 
activity (e.g. product 
packaging).
Yes; Conceptual models 
for Cerent82
The Limits of Keiretsu
The two sectors in which the firm invested most heavily are the Internet and 
communications, each of which in recent years grew tremendously, crested, and finally 
crashed. Kleiner Perkins put almost half - 46 per cent - of its money on these two 
sectors, according to Venture Economics, a research firm owned by Thomson Financial. 
Kleineri nvested $618 million in 75 Internet companies for an average of $8.2 million 
per company, and it invested $524 million in 57 communications companies for an 
average of $9.2 million per company. The Internet sector, specifically consumer web 
sites, was the first of Kleiner's two favourite sectors to bottom out. In the Internet bust, 
Kleinerl ost, among others, Kibu.com, a web site aimed at teenage girls, and 
Homegrocer.com, which was acquired by now-bankrupt Webvan Group Inc. in a $1.2 
billion, all-stock deal.
“Portfolio companies have less in common than we like to believe,” says Gary 
Rieschel, Executive Managing Director of Mobius Venture Partners (formerly Softbank 
Capital). ‘The idea that you can create some kind of entity where the sum is greater 
than its parts just doesn't make any sense.’ Rieschel, after embracing the concept for 
many years, now believes a keiretsu can cause more harm than good. Many others 
agree with him. Many pundits blame the whole Excite@Home debacle on the Kleiner
keiretsu. Before the two companies merged, Internet portal Excite.com and broadband 
access provider @Home were both in Kleiner's portfolio. Sources say Kleinerp layed an 
instrumental role in forcing the two firms together, even though they were 
incompatible from the start. ‘You had a third-rate portal company on one side and 
broadband service provider that was far from profitable on the other,’ says one 
observer. ‘It's not hard to see how that deal got screwed up.’ Cynthia Brumfield, 
president of research firm Broadband Intelligence Inc, concurs the merger was a 
terrible idea. ‘The value that Excite brought to the table was negligible,’ she says. ‘But 
Kleiner wanted the deal done, so it got done.’ According to reports, Kleiner envisioned 
the combined company as being a significant player.  Instead, it lost focus and 
alienated its customers and partners. Excite@Home is now auctioning off its remaining 
assets and is set to shut down soon. Meanwhile the Kleiner keiretsu, though 
weakened, lives on.
Many people still have faith in Kleiner.  Joseph Horowitz, former CEO of bankrupt 
Kleiner investment Geocast Network Systems Inc, says Kleiner provided his company 
with ‘world-class sponsorship and a platform of legitimacy that helped Geocast recruit 
bright employees.’ Horowitz believes that Kleiner'sr eputation and aura have not 
suffered, even though the firm has lost plenty of companies in the downturn. “Top VC 
firms are smart, know how to build companies, and had long-term success before the 
recession”, he says. “These firms will survive slumps in the start up market, even if a 
few of their portfolio companies don't.”83
Appendix 1: Venture Capital Fund Case Studies: No. 6 Appendix 1: Venture Capital Fund Case Studies: No. 6 Appendix 1: Venture Capital Fund Case Studies: No. 6 Appendix 1: Venture Capital Fund Case Studies: No. 6
Sequoia Capital Sequoia Capital Sequoia Capital Sequoia Capital
Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary
This case shows how venture capitalists can work to identify technology applications 
with large markets that provide opportunities for the benefit of the founders, 
employees and public shareholders. This is possible only if partners in the venture 
capital firms are considered as ‘product’. They own competencies that allow them to 
(1) separate potential winners from likely failures, and (2) increase the odds of success 
of the companies they pick. This requires deep knowledge of technology and markets, 
not of financing per se. Therefore, they succeed because they have competencies in 
technology and entrepreneurship that no other investor type could match. This is 
where they can also add value. Ventures’ skill utilisation strategies then need to 
provide a targeted approach to problem solving. Sequoia experience show that portfolio 
company problems may occur in any area related to its strategic direction, financing or 
staff recruitment. Ventures can provide expert advice in these areas and thus create 
value for all venture partners.
Adding value by solving problems require skills and knowledge on the part of investors. 
Sequoia Capital has a global reputation for providing technical advice and support. It has 
development projects in many sectors of the economy. Sequoia works with the 
portfolio company leaders and other operational teams in order to develop their 
problem-solving skills. The efforts of Sequoia are aimed not at making direct 
improvements but at helping produced a cadre of excellent group leaders who learn 
through continuous experimentation. The present case aims to evaluate different 
operational ways in which ventures add value to its portfolio companies.
Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile
Sequoia Capital has backed a who's who of past high-tech winners, including Apple 
Computer, Cisco Systems, Oracle and Yahoo! and produced impressive results. The 
fund it launched in 1992 returned 110 per cent over the life of the fund, while the 1995 
and 1998 funds have so far earned 175 per cent and 96 per cent respectively, 
according to data recently released by the University of Michigan, a Sequoia investor.
Sequoia Capital lost millions in now-defunct or hobbled web-based companies such as 
Webvan, eToys, and Scient. Among the most spectacular examples of bad judgment 
were Sequoia Capital’s seeming refusal to distribute any of its 8 million shares of etoys, 
the e-tailer that was going to drive Toys ‘R’ Us out of business. Once changing hands 
for as much as $84, the shares stopped trading in March 2000 - when the company 
announced it would liquidate. One promising fledgling, a Voice over Internet Protocol 
play called Veraz Networks, has gone through a foreclosure, a merger, three name 
changes and two business plans. But Sequoia Capital stuck it out rather than cut and 
run as many VCs are prone to do. Now Veraz is coming back. It has $60 million in 84
annual revenue and runs ten global networks, in Russia, India, Southeast Asia and 
elsewhere.
But some of the best VCs including Sequoia are operating differently this time around. 
They used to spend most of their time searching for obscure ideas that might someday 
become hot companies. Nine of ten ideas would fail, so they would readily abandon 
their flops to stoke another new hope. The boom and bust have turned this process 
upside down. Now instead of devoting all their efforts to new offspring, some VCs are 
taking out the defibrillator to revive the ideas and forgotten firms they or others backed 
once before, as the Sequoia’s interest in Veraz shows.
Sequoia’s term sheets (contracts with investees) reflect these developments. They set 
out in detail the portfolio company's valuation and capital structure, the composition of 
its Board of Directors, the vesting schedule for its management's stock options and the 
size of the employee stock option pool, as well as the registration rights for its 
investors if and when the company launches a public-offering (see Table 1 below).
Table 1: Sequoia’s Investment Profile Table 1: Sequoia’s Investment Profile Table 1: Sequoia’s Investment Profile Table 1: Sequoia’s Investment Profile
Investment Type Investment Type Investment Type Investment TypeM ilestone funding –
funding available in 
stages
Yes
Full funding Yes
Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions 
(the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet – –––
condi condi condi conditions are set in  tions are set in  tions are set in  tions are set in 
the contract)  the contract)  the contract)  the contract) 
Capital structure (i.e. 
liquidation preferred 
equity)
Yes
Composition of Board of 
Directors
Yes
Recruitment of senior 
staff
No
Executive stock options Yes
Approval for annual 
budget
No
Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit StrategyT rading
Flotation or IPO (Initial 
Public Offering)
Preferred
The organisational arrangements between Sequoia and its investees are reported in 
Table 2. There are some formal procedures for reporting important decisions to 
Sequoia but certain types of interaction, for example additional communications with 
Sequoia, are not always recorded and in a number of instances, investees interacts in 
this way but no record has been kept. Thus the examples below reflect those activities 
that have been recorded and reported and may not reflect all interaction undertaken. 
Because the company is dedicated to value creation, it tries to maintain a closer 
working relationship with its investees. Its preferred way to realise this value, both for 
itself and for its partners, is through trade sales and stock market listings. Its network 
provides more opportunities for exit - with the ultimate result that more value is 
created.85
Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements
Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Comment Comment Comment Comment
Telephone or write to 
express 
concerns/decisions
General issues of 
concerns to Sequoia 
such as feedback on 
product development
There were frequent 
interactions between 
investees and Sequoia 
via this medium
Meet with portfolio 
company managers
To provide advice on 
new personnel 
appointments or 
investment in new 
operations
One or two meetings in 
a month
Corporate Board 
meetings 
To discuss strategic 
issues relating to 
product launch or 
company preparations 
for IPO 
5 to 6 meetings in a 
year
Company reportF ormal accounts and 
project reports
Yearly
Sequoia has a policy and organisational structure in place which addresses how it 
discharges its responsibilities in relation to its investors and the broad topics covered. 
Most communications as are summarised in Table 3 are about investees’ progress on 
product development and how they plan (including the timeframe) to commercialise its 
products.
The favourite investment candidates for Sequoia are businesses operating in the 
electronic segments of the economy including components, systems, software and 
services companies. Sequoia likes to invest in new, rapidly growing markets where 
customers have enthusiasm for the company's products. Most of its investments are 
aimed at the very early stages of a company. Sequoia invests in post-beta stage 
companies around Boston and Dallas and nationwide USA in more mature companies. 
In Israel, Sequoia focuses on early stage companies in the Components, Systems and 
Software industries. There are 17 partners and each is a director of three portfolio 
companies.
Engagement Strategy Engagement Strategy Engagement Strategy Engagement Strategy
In the Internet space, Sequoia has a track record of not just doing an IPO and achieving 
a high valuation very quickly, but growing more solid and large companies. Sequoia’s 
track record, with companies like eToys and Google, and connections to companies like 
Yahoo! and Cisco Systems Inc. likely lead to marketing and strategic partnerships 
within the portfolio down the road. It is a target to go to an initial public offering as 
quickly as possible.
Sequoia does not look for ownership or control of a company. Not surprisingly, it 
believes that great investments usually occur when the founders and management of a 
company are the majority owners. All of Sequoia’s best investments have been in 
companies where it was minority shareholders. Sequoia’s post investment role can 86
range from intensive involvement to a far more detached role once the company is 
mature.  In an early stage company Sequoia tends to be involved with key hiring 
decisions, major changes of strategic direction, company positioning and financings. 
Sequoia holds a board seat with most of its companies, but not all. When the 
company's management asks Sequoia to stay involved, it does. In some cases it has 
remained directors of companies for over ten years. Sequoia provides assistance when 
requested or needed. Sequoia does not want to run companies.
Several companies have started in Sequoia’s office or used it as a base during their 
early existence. Electronic Arts, PMC-Sierra, Yahoo! and RedBack Networks are a few 
examples. Sequoia also houses entrepreneurs who are nursing interesting ideas or 
who can be of help to its investment programme. Yahoo! is a global Internet 
communications, commerce and media company that offers a comprehensive branded 
network of services to more than 120 million users each month worldwide. Sequoia 
Capital invested in Yahoo! when the company was composed of two people and two 
borrowed computers. Sequoia has been instrumental in helping assemble a flexible, 
experienced and very aggressive team in an industry where companies prosper or die 
in weeks. It demonstrated that a venture firm can help create great value by helping 
turn ideas into companies in a relatively short amount of time.
One way is to introduce new customers and new suppliers. Sequoia thus assists in the 
search for a new chairman or director. It sometimes helps its portfolio companies push 
into new geographical markets and thus open more channels to market. Sequoia works 
closely with each company that it invests in to create a route map to becoming a 
scalable, successful business. Its growth capital team invests in medium-sized 
businesses that want to build significant additional value for their shareholders by 
improving their performance. Sequoia also encourages ambitious companies that want
to accelerate their growth without necessarily increasing their debt burden; and with 
management teams who want to consolidate their company's shareholdings in order to 
move forward after a change in circumstances.
Sequoia thus supports a highly analytical in-depth portfolio company market strategy. It 
requires developing a strategic management report containing a detailed profile of the 
typical operation. For example, it supported a leading Internet job site in developing a 
market profile which helped it to:
- Understand who job site users are.
- Understand the difference between job seekers and non-job seekers.
- Understand what Internet users want or expect from a career/job site.
- Understand how job site users view and use current career/job sites.
- Understand the current levels of awareness of job sites.
It helped the company conduct a market survey, using a questionnaire designed by a 
consulting firm. The company was also given technical help to assess the 
characteristics of job sites users. The report provided invaluable information and 
recommendations for future product development and strategic marketing 
development. The company found that its ability to identify and resolve problems grew 
with the way Sequoia provided specific help in the management of its market 
positioning.87
Table 3. Sequoia’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. Sequoia’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. Sequoia’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. Sequoia’s Engagement Strategy
Engagement Method Engagement Method Engagement Method Engagement MethodC omment Comment Comment Comment 3i’s Practice 3i’s Practice 3i’s Practice 3i’s Practice
Board membership Board membership Board membership Board membershipV enture nominates non-
executive director(s) on 
portfolio company’s 
board 
Yes
Syndication Syndication Syndication Syndication Venture collaborates 
with other funds
No
Advisory Board Advisory Board Advisory Board Advisory BoardV enture has industry 
experts on its advisory 
board (e.g. IT luminaries 
in the IT sector)
Yes
Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Specialist fund for 
experts / prominent 
people (to get their help 
for portfolio companies)
Yes
Partners have  Partners have  Partners have  Partners have 
backgrou backgrou backgrou background in  nd in  nd in  nd in 
specialist areas specialist areas specialist areas specialist areas
Partners have education 
or experience in a 
specialist area such as 
science background or 
business experience
Yes
Particular management  Particular management  Particular management  Particular management 
areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern
Participated in 
discussions with 
portfolio company on: 
Strategy (e.g. market 
share, product 
development, 
competition);
Frequent: provided 
advice for the strategic 
direction of Electronic 
Arts, PMC-Sierra, and 
RedBack Networks
Strategic audit;Y es, Yahoo! and Oracle
Employee recruitment; Yes, eToys
Executive stock options;Y es
Marketing or advertising 
campaigns;
Yes, Veraz, Google
Outsourcing; andY es, Oracle 
Any other value-added 
activity (e.g. product 
packaging)
Yes; focus is on solving 
problems - PMC-Sierra, 
RedBack Networks88
The built-to-last strategy
Sequoia’s built-to-last strategy has shown that it rewards patient investors. Sequoia is 
still on the board of Cisco, 13 years after it first invested. And Arthur Rock has been on 
Intel's board since the early 1970s. Sequoia has maintained a long-term commitment to 
building lasting companies that contribute not only to Silicon Valley, but also to the 
national and global economies. As a result, today, Cisco and Intel combined are worth 
nearly $900 billion in total market capitalisation.
Banks are not as successful in funding winning innovations as venture capital firms like 
Sequoia because their key people are better at assessing technologies and 
entrepreneurs. Like physical capital, the people in the venture capital firms are the 
‘product’. Their human capital is based on their ability to (1) separate potential winners 
from likely failures, and (2) increase the odds of success of the companies they pick. 
Furthermore, venture capital firms commit their own funds to underscore the credibility 
of their assessments. This is possible only if they possess deep knowledge of 
technology and markets, not of financing per se. Having competencies in technology 
and entrepreneurship that no bank could match is what give them a competitive edge, 
not the skill in financial wizardry. In fact, there is no Sequoia Capital partner who has a 
financial background!
Sequoia Capital is thus an interesting example of ‘new economy’ firms. Their value 
creation model is different from the way manufacturing secure quality standards. 
Sequoia illustrates how strategic choices are strongly related to the type of value 
creation model employed. As Michael Porter says, real choices reflect trade-offs (1996). 
Manufacturing firms make tradeoffs between cost and differentiation. Networks, such 
as AOL, make tradeoffs between the size of the community served and the range of 
exchange services that can be offered to that community. Knowledge firms, such as 
Sequoia Capital, make tradeoffs between the depth of specialisation in particular areas 
and the breadth of problems they can take on. 
Sequoia Capital creates value by solving unique problems for customers. The value 
created by ‘experts’ is not directly related to costs. Although solving a certain problem 
(e.g. legal or financial or even staffing problems in the context of venture industry) may 
involve very little direct effort from the expert, it may be extremely valuable to the 
client. A surgeon can make a diagnosis and undertake a medical procedure in a few 
days that may be invaluable to the patient. A lawyer may in a few minutes see a judicial 
solution to a problem that is worth millions of dollars to the client. A venture partner 
may see an opportunity in the existing company operations for diversification.
There are also economies of small scale in problem solving. This is why ventures are 
generally organised as committees. Because individual members have the required 
expertise, the small numbers comprising a committee avoid the extensive co-
ordination required in large, complex projects. Further, service firms may also enjoy 
scale advantages in knowledge networks, where the ability to draw from a large pool of 
resources may provide competitive advantages. Solving advanced problems however 
requires highly specialised expertise. Specialising may limit the scope of problems that 
the firm can undertake and the approaches to solutions that it masters. Conversely, 
scale may reduce efficiency because of higher coordination costs. Obviously, Sequoia’s 89
strength lies in its ability to provide specialised solutions to its portfolio companies’ 
problems.90
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Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary
On many occasions, through its portfolio companies, Carlyle has successfully defused 
best management practices. This case provides examples of two management practice 
areas in which Carlyle has been actively engaged: public to private deals and 
outsourcing. Public to private deals involve a new array of management practices, for 
example, new inventory practices, more appropriate executive incentives and better 
targeted sales and marketing strategies. By focusing in these areas, Carlyle has 
successfully turned many failing businesses into profitable entities. Similarly, Carlyle 
has tried to add value into its portfolio company operations by encouraging them to 
outsource their activities. In fact, a new business concept with an outsourcing plan has 
more success in receiving funding from Carlyle than a model which has a great market 
potential but no outsourcing strategy.     
In recent years, businesses have been experimenting with many different novel 
management practices to maintain their competitive edge. Some innovations have past 
the test of time and become best management practice adding value to businesses 
and people alike. Venture capital companies such as Carlyle are very keen to spread 
many such best management practices through their network of portfolio companies 
because of the need to create better returns for themselves and their investors. This 
case looks at those management practices which the Carlyle Group has adopted when 
dealing with their investee companies.
Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile
The Carlyle Group is one of the world’s largest private equity firms, with more than 
$18.3 billion under management. Carlyle claims to generate extraordinary returns for its 
investors by employing a conservative, proven, and disciplined approach.C arlyle 
invests in buyouts, real estate, leveraged finance and venture in Asia, Europe and North 
America. It focuses on aerospace and defence, automotive and transportation, 
consumer, energy and power, healthcare, industrial, technology and business 
services, and telecommunications and media. More than 600 investors from 55 
countries entrust Carlyle with their capital and their reputations and as a means of 
aligning its own interests with those of its Limited Partner investors, Carlyle has 
committed more than $900 million of its own capital to its funds. 
Carlyle’s team of investment professionals includes 133 MBAs,2 5 JDs and 13 
PhD/MDs from many of the world’s most prestigious universities. Carlyle’s 
conservative investment philosophy and disciplined investment process has generated 
extraordinary returns for its investors. 
Carlyle is a private partnership, which means that it is owned by a group of individuals, 
most of whom are Managing Directors at Carlyle, and one institution, CalPERS, which 91
owns 5.5 percent of Carlyle. CalPERS is the California Public Employees Retirement 
System, one of the largest institutional investors in the world.  The companies and real 
estate Carlyle buys and the companies it invests venture capital in are owned by the 
funds that invested in the companies. 
Carlyle, with more than 500 employees, is based in Washington, DC and has offices in 
14 countries.  Day-to-day management of the organisation is conducted by its three co-
founders and Managing Directors, William E. Conway, Jr,D aniel A. D’Aniello and David 
M. Rubenstein. Carlyle’s Chairman is Louis V. Gerstner, its Chairman Emeritus is Frank 
C. Carlucci and it has 80+ managing directors and nearly3 00 investment 
professionals. One of the reasons Carlyle has a large staff is because many of the roles 
other private equity firms contract out are done in-house at Carlyle, including, 
fundraising, accounting oversight, deal sourcing and due diligence, and various back 
office duties.
Investment Strategy Investment Strategy Investment Strategy Investment Strategy
The CarlyleG roup has distinguished itself through a high profile, politically connected 
cluster of general partners. It has built an LBO (Leveraged Buy-Outs - a debt-financed 
transaction, typically via bank loans and bonds, aimed at taking a public corporation 
private) franchise by targeting investment opportunities in industries, like defence and 
aerospace, where business and government intersect. And it has been using that 
standing to similarly expand internationally and into other product areas as well. 
Through a partner list that includes the former US Secretary of Defence Frank Carlucci, 
former US Secretary of State James Baker III and former Budget Director Richard 
Darman, Carlyle capitalises on a network of influential friends and advisers that helps it 
find good deals not generally available through normal auction markets. Indeed, roughly 
60 per cent to 65 per cent of the LBO firm's transactions are handled on a proprietary 
basis, with the balance being done through auctions.
Carlyleh ad its share of problems early on and, consequently, had to prove to investors 
that it offered more than simple political clout. It purchased the country's largest airline 
caterer, Caterair, just as the industry moved into a cost cutting mode in the wake of the 
Gulf War - though eventually it made four times its investment in the company. It 
bought CB Commercial Real Estate, the biggest commercial brokerage, just as the real 
estate market took its tumble. And Carlyle may have been the only firm to lose money 
in the 1990s buying and selling radio stations. 
But then the firm found its niche - aerospace and defence - and this time it timed it just 
right. In a period of airline bankruptcies and post-Cold War defence downsizing, the 
buyout firm was able to snap up the defence electronics businesses of companies, 
including General Dynamics Corp. and Magnavox Electronic Systems Co, very cheaply. 
The biggest coup for Carlyle was Howmet Corp, a former unit of Pechney International 
that produces the cast parts that go into most of the jet engines and gas-power 
turbines across the globe. The firm, which teamed up with aerospace supplier Thiokol 
Corp to purchase Howmet, reaped huge profits two years later when it took the 
company public at close to seven times its purchase price.
Indeed, Carlyle has broadened its investment scope so that it can specialise in a 
number of different industries involving significant regulatory oversight, such as 
information technology, telecommunications, and environmental remediation 92
(industries for safer environment). But that is not all Carlyle,  which now invests over $5 
billion for clients, has done to reposition itself for future deals. In addition to its $1.4 
billion domestic corporate buyout fund, the firm has also raised a $220 million venture 
capital fund designed predominantly to look at telecom, biotechnology, healthcare and 
information technology deals in the Washington, DC, area. 
Unlike several of its competitors in the buyout arena, which raise one big fund and 
allocate portions to invest in different regions of the world, Carlyle has taken a divide-
and-conquer approach to global investing, says Carlyle Managing Director David 
Rubenstein. The firm recently closed a $1 billion-plus European buyout fund, and a 
$750 million Asia fund, which is geared mostly towards China, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Korea, and the Philippines. The plan is to take advantage of government 
privatisation and corporate restructuring opportunities in those regions. Its contacts will 
no doubt figure prominently in this international effort too. Indeed, Carlyle has a 
network of 250 global limited partners in 50 different countries, whose investments 
account for roughly half of its total funds.
Carlyle’s Private Equity Operations
Carlyle’s size has raised questions about its ambitions to be more than an investor and 
whether it would seek to become a powerful industry player, perhaps in the defence 
sector. Although Carlyle often uses a buy and build strategy to glean synergies (see its 
role in Edscha and Blackboard), it is unlikely that it could play a significant role in 
industry consolidation, especially in the venture capital area. Recent successful exits 
include French building materials company Matéris, which was sold to another private -
equity house for more than two times Carlyle's investment, and the partial exit of 
United Defence via an IPO, which returned over five times Carlyle's equity investment 
to investors.
As a buyer, Carlyle tends to shy away from the biggest private- equity auctions. Its 
strategy globally is to stick to mid-market deals of about  5 00 million as the very large 
deals attract too much competition. Carlyle'sm ain differentiating strategy is the 
breadth and number of its funds. It is one of a handful of private- equity houses that 
have truly global aspirations. While most private- equity houses are engaged in one or 
two investment areas, Carlyle's funds span five classes. In addition to buyouts, venture 
capital and real estate, it is also active in turnround situations and in debt management, 
with four high-yield funds that invest in bonds, leveraged loans and mezzanine debt.
In Europe most private- equity houses focus on just one or two investment areas -
usually buyouts and venture capital or real estate. It terms of global ambitions, 
European private- equity firms are way behind their US counterparts as the Carlyle’s 
example shows. The European firms do not seem to be dramatically expanding outside 
Europe in the way that US firms are expanding outside the US. Nor are the European 
funds offering multiple types of private- equity funds.
Although in Europe Carlyle is primarily perceived as a buyout specialist, the group is no 
stranger to technology-based investments, having completed more than 20 
investments in Internet, telecoms and information technology companies. Sector 
expertise is, however, of limited use unless it is allied to local market knowledge. 
However, although Carlylei s a relatively new face on the European stage, Carlyle93
Internet Partners Europe was able to draw on a wealth of relevant experience. Its 
management team was headed by Jean-Bernard Tellio, formerly president of 
investment and information technology at LVMH/Groupe Arnault, where he was 
responsible for some 30 European and US Internet investments. Carlyle is also looking 
beyond Western Europe for opportunities, with Russia a focal point.
Management of relations with portfolio companies
Given its wide-scale venture operations, it is important for the Carlyle Venture to pay a 
particular attention to its contractual and communications relations with its portfolio 
companies. The Carlyle’s term sheet therefore sets out in minute detail the portfolio 
company's valuation and capital structure, the composition of its Board of Directors, 
the vesting schedule for its management's stock options and the size of the employee 
stock option pool, as well as the registration rights for its investors if and when the 
company launches a public-offering (see Table 1).
Table 1: Table 1: Table 1: Table 1: Carlyle’s Investment Profile  Carlyle’s Investment Profile  Carlyle’s Investment Profile  Carlyle’s Investment Profile
Investment Type Investment Type Investment Type Investment TypeM ilestone funding –
funding available in 
stages
No
Full funding Yes
Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions 
(the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet – –––
conditions are set in  conditions are set in  conditions are set in  conditions are set in 
the contract)  the contract)  the contract)  the contract) 
Capital structure (i.e. 
Liquidation preferred 
equity)
Yes
Composition of Board of 
Directors
Yes
Recruitment of senior 
staff
No
Executive stock options Yes
Approval for annual 
budget
Yes
Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit StrategyT rading Preferred
Flotation or IPO (Initial 
Public Offering)
The organisational arrangements between Carlyle and portfolio companies are reported 
in Table 2. There are some formal procedures for reporting important decisions to 
Carlyle but certain types of interaction, for example additional communications with 
portfolio company managers, are not always recorded and in a number of instances, 
Carlyle interacts in this way but has no record. Thus the examples below reflect those 
activities that have been recorded and reported and may not reflect all interaction 
undertaken. For example, some of the communications are about Carlyle’s insistence 
on portfolio companies adopting a set of recommended management strategies such 
as outsourcing. Carlyle believes that major efficiency gains can be obtained from 
outsourcing not only auxiliary operations but also core activities such as ICT operations. 
Similarly, as discussed under the Public to Private Deals, Carlyle has normally insisted 
on providing a more appropriate set of incentives to managers and employees.   94
Carlyle also supports studies into the actual outsourcing practices. For example, for all 
international car manufacturers, organising and managing an efficient network of 
suppliers for their tooling needs is essential to guarantee the efficiency of their 
production organisation. In order to re-evaluate a portfolio company’s model of tooling 
supply, Carlyle requested a study on the tooling supply system of a competitor. The 
research was to provide an overview of the types of relationships the competitor 
establishes with its tooling contractors, for which tooling, for which models of car, etc. 
The research was delivered in a report on the competitor’s organisation of tooling 
supply and it was a base for discussion in the portfolio company’s corporate board on 
how to reconsider their supply system.
Table 2: R Table 2: R Table 2: R Table 2: Reporting Arrangements eporting Arrangements eporting Arrangements eporting Arrangements
Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Comment Comment Comment Comment
Telephone or write to 
express 
concerns/decisions
General issues of 
concerns to Carlyle such 
as feedback on 
management 
development 
programmes
There were frequent 
interactions between 
Carlyle and its investees 
via this medium
Meet with investee 
company managers
To provide advice on 
new personnel 
appointments or 
investment in new 
operations
One or two meetings in 
a month
Corporate Board 
meetings 
To discuss strategic 
issues relating to 
product launch or 
company preparations 
for IPO 
5 to 6 meetings in a 
year
Company reportF ormal accounts and 
projects
Yearly
Carlyle has a policy and organisational structure in place which addresses how it 
discharges its responsibilities in relation to its portfolio companies and the broad topics. 
Most communications as summarised in Table 3 are about portfolio companies’ 
progress on management development programmes.
Human Capital: Skill Utilisation Strategies
Much has been made of Carlyle's connections with former US Defence Secretary 
Frank Carlucci, former UK Prime Minister John Major, former US Secretary of State 
James Baker, former US Budget Director Richard Darman and has had former US 
President George Bush Snr, among its advisers and board members.
In 1989 Carlyle hired Carlucci. He helped redirect the focus to the defence and 
aerospace and laid the foundations of the group's worldwide success. The group has 
attracted hostile comment at times because of those connections and, for some, a 
perceived lack of transparency. Carlyle is not alone in using such tactics. For example, 95
in 2002 Hicks Muse Tate and First hired former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
to its European strategy board, and last year Blackstone appointed former US Treasury 
Secretary Paul O'Neill as an adviser. Yet it is the combination of political connections 
with a focus on defence and aerospace that has fed the rumour mill.
Carlyle has been at pains recently to alter its image and address criticisms of secrecy. 
Perhaps as part of that quest it now has one of the most comprehensive web sites in 
the business. There is a definite sense that it wants to move away from the publicity 
generated by some of its high-profile former government officials. It has been 
suggested that one way for private- equity houses to manage succession would be to 
sell shares to the public. In the UK, 3i, which is listed on the London Stock Exchange, 
has done this but it remains an isolated case.
Carlyle’s New CEO: A Departure from the Tradition
The Carlyle Grouph ired former IBM Corp. CEO Louis V. Gerstner as its chairman, 
replacing Frank C. Carlucci, who moved on to become chairman emeritus of the firm. 
Gerstner previously headed the computer giant as CEO until his retirement in 2001. 
Carlylef irst approached Gerstner about being a keynote speaker at an investor 
conference the firm was sponsoring, and from that meeting the relationship between 
the two sides evolved. Daniel D'Aniello, a Managing Director and co-founder at Carlyle,
said the transition did not represent a new direction for the firm. "The model will be the 
same, but Lou will help make it better," he said, citing Gerstner's business acumen and 
his experience in integration as two of the primary factors in the decision.
Gerstner commit approximately 20 per cent of his time providing strategic guidance on 
Carlyle'sg lobal business, adding management input to the firm's portfolio companies 
and helping to review and approve Carlyle's global investments. Because of his vast 
experience in the technology sector, he is able to give expert advice to Carlyle’s 
technology companies such as Blackboard. Prior to IBM, Gerstner served as Kohlberg 
Kravis Roberts and Co.'s handpicked successor to head RJR Nabisco after their highly 
publicised buyout of the company, still the largest LBO of all time. Gerstner's hiring 
signals a divergence from previous Carlyle appointments, as he is not professionally 
involved in politics.
Engagement Practices Engagement Practices Engagement Practices Engagement Practices
Carlyle'sp owerful connections and in-house expertise have been crucial to its success 
when setting up funds and landing acquisitions. Carlyleg oes deeper than most in 
establishing a network of contacts generally and particularly in their chosen industry 
sectors. As crucial to its success is Carlyle's tactic of hiring nationals in countries it 
invests in. One of the major keys to its success is having local employees and 
connections and its industry experts and local knowledge give it an extra dimension 
and competitive edge.96
Table 3. Carlyle’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. Carlyle’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. Carlyle’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. Carlyle’s Engagement Strategy
Engage Engage Engage Engagement Method ment Method ment Method ment MethodC omment Comment Comment Comment Carlyle’s Practice Carlyle’s Practice Carlyle’s Practice Carlyle’s Practice
Board membership Board membership Board membership Board membershipV enture nominates non-
executive director(s) on 
portfolio company’s 
board 
Yes
Syndication Syndication Syndication Syndication Venture collaborates 
with other funds
No
Advisory Board Advisory Board Advisory Board Advisory BoardV enture has industry 
experts on its advisory 
board (e.g. IT luminaries 
in the IT sector)
Yes
Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Specialist fund for 
experts / prominent 
people (to get their help 
for portfolio companies)
Yes
Partners have  Partners have  Partners have  Partners have 
background in  background in  background in  background in 
specialist areas specialist areas specialist areas specialist areas
Partners have education 
or experience in a 
specialist area such as 
science background or 
business experience
Yes
Particular management  Particular management  Particular management  Particular management 
areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern
Participated in 
discussions with 
portfolio company on: 
Strategy (e.g. market 
share, product 
development, 
competition)
Frequent
Strategic audit Yes
Employee recruitment Yes
Executive stock options No
Marketing or advertising 
campaigns
Yes; Gave technical 
support to Blackboard
Outsourcing (this is a 
particular focus of 
Carlyle; see discussion 
below)
Yes; Advised Edscha on 
supply chain 
management
Any other value-added 
activity (e.g. product 
packaging)
Yes97
Public to Private Deals
Carlyle is often linked to one of the biggest names in both manufacturing and service 
industries. Part of the argument given by the venture capitalists for taking companies
from public to private is that they can make the necessary management changes more 
effectively when a business is in private hands. Without the hassles of spending time 
with City analysts and the media, the company can instead focus on the important 
business – maximising company value (see the role of Carlyle Group in taking Edscha 
into private hands). In contrast, a major quoted company will inevitably have a like-for-
like sales mentality and always has to think about what the external perceptions will be
of its actions. 
For example, Carlyle acquired Empi in a public-to-private transaction in 1999 after a 
period in which the company suffered significant performance deterioration. Empi is 
now a leading manufacturer and provider of non-invasive medical products for physical 
rehabilitation and, more recently, for the treatment of incontinence. It markets such 
products as continuous passive motion devices, knee braces, electrotherapy, and a 
wide range of orthopaedic soft goods. Customers include orthopaedic surgeons, 
orthotists and orthopaedic dealers. This upturn in company performance has been 
achieved under the watchful eyes of the Carlyle management. Similarly, Edscha had 
non-core operations under the previous ownership which acted as a bottleneck in its 
further growth and development. With the help of Carlyle, the business has just turned 
itself into a success story.
Private status enables a greater focus on cash generation, by acting quickly to reduce 
dangerous build-ups of stock and introducing heavy markdowns in order to sell it, for 
example. This generates cash and clears shelf space for stock. Such a manoeuvre 
would be much more difficult for a quoted company whose like-for-like and margin 
numbers come under regular close scrutiny and any big markdowns would be seen as 
a negative by the City.
Incentivising management is also an issue for quoted companies. If they want to offer 
big rewards as an incentive to the management team they get criticised and are 
stamped with the 'fat cat' label. In the venture capitalists' world, equity stakes reign 
supreme and can be tailored around management hitting performance milestones. For 
example, some corporates let their venture employees invest in a side fund – a form of 
stock option. 
Carlyle’s Outsourcing Strategy
Carlyle’s use of the buy and build strategy often translates into its frequent emphasis 
on outsourcing operations. Traditionally, international outsourcing has been a way to 
cut costs. Now, investors are recognising that it can also generate hefty profits. 
Outsourcing is not just for the blue chip companies any more. Carlyle insists, as a 
condition of investment, that any company it invests in outsource its computer 
programming tasks as far as possible.
In another, even more vivid example, several American and European investors, 
including Carlyle recently put up several million dollars to back a Hungarian clinical 98
research outfit whose core business is obtaining outsourcing business from American 
pharmaceutical companies.
What makes this business noteworthy, both as a business and as an indication of 
future direction for venture investors, is that the Hungarian company, Goodwill 
Research, is not just handling repetitive or mundane tasks, like software service calls or 
data-entry work, rather, it is a highly sophisticated medical services company that 
specialises in conducting clinical trials for pharmaceutical companies - at one-fourth to 
one-third the cost of the going rates in the US.
Clinical testing is one of the most daunting tasks facing any pharmaceutical company. 
Completing it efficiently and effectively is key to obtaining approval from the US Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) for new drugs, which is required before any drug can be 
marketed in the US. Goodwill Research’s experience provides a number of general 
lessons about the outsourcing phenomenon, especially as it affects venture investing:
• Smaller companies can obtain significant business opportunities from 
outsourcing, no matter where they are located. They benefit from outsourcing 
tasks in terms of improved efficiency
• Outsourcing is moving up the so-called ‘value chain.’ The tasks being 
outsourced are increasingly sophisticated, and thus less subject to 
commoditisation down the road
• As a result of the first two items, companies that make effective use of 
outsourcing will increasingly attract the attention of venture investors. They seek 
out companies with sustainable competitive advantages, intellectual property, 
and other key indices of long-term and appreciating value.
Venture capitalists such as Carlyle thus view outsourcing as not just a way to save 
money, but to create value. Outsourcing is a way for small and medium-sized 
companies to speed development and focus on their core competencies by leveraging 
cash. This also means that a small company’s ability to attract venture capital is not 
limited to its location, but increasingly to its ability to make the best use of both its 
physical and intellectual assets.99
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TechnoStart TechnoStart TechnoStart TechnoStart
Case  Case  Case  Case Summary Summary Summary Summary
TechnoStart represents a model of skill development and utilisation, applicable 
especially in the environs of venture capital. Scientists may originally have some nice 
ideas but may lack the expertise to turn their discoveries into viable commercial 
options. TechnoStart has invented its own Technology Radar Screening approach – a 
skill development strategy - to identify potentially useful inventions from the academic 
sector. TechnoStart provides support and expertise to develop academic projects as a 
start-up company. After finding that the technology works on a laboratory scale, further 
funding is used to explore the full commercial potential of the now validated 
technology platform. For example, it set up different workshops with patent lawyers 
for ItN Nanovation. This case therefore demonstrates both the type of skill 
development and utilisation strategy (i.e. identifying and training academic scientists in 
business acumen) specific to the venture industry and the type of management 
practices which investors are likely to influence (i.e. patent development, outsourcing).
TechnoStart believes there is enormous scientific and technological potential at 
European academic institutes waiting to be turned into business. The venture has 
developed Technology Radar designed to generate its own dealflow through the pro-
active monitoring of selected scientific fields and institutes. 
To its portfolio companies, above financing, TechnoStart provides hands-ons upport as 
co-entrepreneurial partner. From day one, it strives to establish a partnership with the 
management and shareholders of its portfolio companies. This investment approach is 
aided by the fact that TechnoStart’s team has a broad range of experiences in industry, 
academia and finance. For example, all its investment managers have an educational 
background in science or engineering.
This case describes the skill development and utilisation strategies of TechnoStart 
within the general context of the venture capital industry.
Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile
The venture, operating in South Western Germany, focuses on seed and early stage 
technology companies. It boasts more than $100 million under management in three 
different funds: Beteiligungsfonds, Ventures I and Ventures II. The company’s strategy 
has been to hire scientists as investment managers.
The investors into the three funds managed or advised by TechnoStart belong to three 
groups: Blue chip financial institutions, corporate investors, and selected private 
individuals. TechnoStart was set up as an investment adviser and manager of venture 
capital funds in 1990. In 1991, it started to invest from the ‘TechnoStart 
Beteiligungsfonds’, a first time seed fund raised and managed by Michael Mayer. It 100
took until 1998 and the successful exit from TechnoStart's first biotech seed 
investment in MorphoSys for TechnoStart to be transformed into a fully-fledged 
Venture Capital organisation and has about a dozen staff members at present.
Since then, TechnoStart has not only offered strategic, financial and management 
support at the seed stage, but has also assisted companies to steer their course 
through the full venture cycle. Nevertheless, TechnoStart clearly focuses on early stage 
investments, contributing to later rounds outside its own portfolio in only a few cases 
and in up to three rounds of finance within its own portfolio. Depending on their 
individual legal structure, TechnoStart serves as general partner and manager to the 
companies or as investment adviser for funds.
Investment approach Investment approach Investment approach Investment approach
TechnoStart invests a minimum of $630,000 in the seed phase, keeping money aside 
for future investment rounds. Over time, the total investment generally reaches just 
more than $6 million. About 70 per cent comes from institutional investors like 
Switzerland’s Partners Group, technology venture capital group 3i and the European 
Investment Fund (EIF). Business angels, individual investors and Dow Chemical Co. 
contribute the rest.
From an investor's point of view, letting a specialised venture capital group like 
TechnoStart do the pre-selection makes sense – particularly for a funds investor like 
the EIF, a European Union investment body. The EIF has more than $3 billion invested 
in nearly 200 venture capital funds, with plans to invest substantially more over the 
next three years. 
‘The main job we have isn’t to focus on a too specific level,’ said spokesman Arango. 
‘We prefer to work with people who know the area, because it isn’t wise to throw 
money at activities that need to be thought through, and thought through again.’  
TechnoStart’s formula doesn’t always work. The company has had its share of 
insolvencies, two of which occurred in 2003. ‘In the VC business, you always have 
investments that don’t go that well,’ admits the spokesman. The company aims for a 
success rate of 6 out of 10. The present success rate of the Ventures I is more like 
three out of 10, but there are success stories, like biopharmaceutical firm MorphoSys 
AG, on which TechnoStart recouped its investment 55 times over, when it was sold on 
the German stock market in 2000.
Investment Interests Investment Interests Investment Interests Investment Interests
TechnoStart closed its new fund, TechnoStartV entures GmbH and Co Fonds, on 
DM80 million (  41 million). Investors signed by the second closing included TBG, the 
European Investment Fund, Technologie Holding and Dow. TechnoStart Ventures also 
raised capital from private individuals. Institutional investors provided 50 per cent of the 
second closing total and corporate sources 8 per cent, while the balance of 42 per cent 
was drawn from private individuals. TechnoStart had soft circled commitments taking 
the fund to around the DM 70 million mark and expected to bring in further private 
investors alongside additional domestic and non-domestic European institutions by the 
final close. 101
The fund was slated for investment in early-stage opportunities in platform 
technologies, principally in the biotechnology, new materials and information 
technology sectors. TechnoStart Ventures focuses primarily on Germany and the 
German-speaking markets but may also invest in other European counties. 
The new fund, which has completed seven investments to date, aims to build a 
portfolio of 15 to 20 companies. TechnoStart Ventures' three most recent investments 
were: Graffinity Pharmaceutical Design, a drug discovery company; WebSentric 
Software, a specialist developer of web-based presentation tools; and Absolute 
Software, which creates tools for client server and Internet application development. 
Technology Radar Screening
TechnoStart looks for new and highly innovative technologies enabling a broad range of 
applications within large and lucrative markets. Once developed, those technologies 
have the potential to create a paradigm shift in their respective industries.
Since 2002, the venture has started its ambitious new Technology Radar programme 
aimed at using venture capital to actively source "blue sky" technologies and turn 
scientific explorations into commercial opportunities. Usually, those technologies 
emerge from fundamental discoveries or inventions in the academic sector. With its 
money and support, those academic projects form the nucleus for further development 
within a start-up company. After having proved that the technology works on a 
laboratory scale, further funding is used to explore the full commercial potential of the 
now validated technology platform. In principle, enabling technologies of interest to 
TechnoStart might derive from all science disciplines, and it is equally receptive to all of 
them. The Venture expects to identify suitable projects emerging particularly from 
applied physics, life sciences and new materials. Interdisciplinary technologies, like 
nanotechnology as a combination of applied physics and new materials, are of special 
interest.
At TechnoStart, the management believes that there is huge potential in German and 
European academic institutes waiting to be unlocked. This is why the Venture’s 
management has developed, and continue to expand, its Intellectual Radar Screens 
which help it in its search at the frontiers of science. It constantly monitors selected 
scientific fields and institutes, trying to keep tabs on cutting-edge academic groups. As 
a result, its staff are able to prepare the ground for a competent partnership with 
potential scientific founders and are well positioned to learn in advance of a 
breakthrough discovery which might form the basis for a start-up company.
The management specifically looks for ‘cross-over’ themes that have not been picked 
up by academic institutes (‘too industry-oriented’) or corporate R&D labs (‘too blue sky’). 
The novel-spinning technology company Spinox Ltd is the first project resulting from its 
Technology Radar Screening. This is following a breakthrough in the field of bio-
mimetic spinning of spider silk by University of Oxford. 
Relations with portfolio companies Relations with portfolio companies Relations with portfolio companies Relations with portfolio companies
TechnoStart’s term sheet (contract with its portfolio company) sets out the company's 
valuation and capital structure, the composition of its Board of Directors, the vesting 102
schedule for its management's stock options and the size of the employee stock 
option pool, as well as the registration rights for its investors, if and when the company 
launches a public-offering (see Table 1).
Table 1: TechnoStart’s Investment Profile Table 1: TechnoStart’s Investment Profile Table 1: TechnoStart’s Investment Profile Table 1: TechnoStart’s Investment Profile
Investment Type Investment Type Investment Type Investment TypeM ilestone funding –
funding available in 
stages
Yes
Full funding No
Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions  Contractual Conditions 
(the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet  (the term sheet – –––
conditions are set in  conditions are set in  conditions are set in  conditions are set in 
the cont the cont the cont the contract)  ract)  ract)  ract) 
Capital structure (i.e. 
liquidation preferred 
equity)
Yes
Composition of Board of 
Directors
Yes
Recruitment of senior 
staff
No
Executive stock options Yes
Approval for annual 
budget
No
Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit Strategy Exit StrategyT rading
Flotation or IPO (Initial 
Public Offering)
Preferred
The organisational arrangements between TechnoStart and investees are reported in 
Table 2. There are some formal procedures for reporting important decisions to 
TechnoStart but certain types of interaction, for example additional communications 
with TechnoStart partners, are not always recorded and in a number of instances, 
investees interact in this way but has no record. Thus the examples below reflect 
those activities that have been recorded and reported and may not reflect all interaction 
undertaken.
Information sharing is essential for successful joint efforts. Thus, the Venture strives to 
establish a basic feeling of trust between the founding teams and TechnoStart. This 
includes, on the Venture management’s part, openness to the highest possible degree, 
which it, in turn, expects from the teams it is working with. Of course, it reports to its 
investors on what it does with their money and keep them informed about the 
economic development of the portfolio companies. However, it never passes on to 
them any technological information other than by headlines. Given its pro-active 
information sharing approach, TechnoStart invests primarily in Germany. Nevertheless, 
investments in neighbouring Western European countries are also considered, if 
minimal travel time still allows it to maintain its high level of involvement.
Research Support for a Portfolio Company
TechnoStart has supported a leading provider of patent and scientific information with a 
range of well established proprietary products and services for information 
professionals and end-users. Through research and analysis aided by TechnoStart, the 103
company has built up knowledge of the use of the patent information systems by 
various user groups and industries in Europe and the US. 
The company already had a significant customer base amongst the larger companies in 
the pharmaceutical, biotechnology and chemical sectors and had an understanding of 
their patent use and patent information needs. In a project involving TechnoStart, the 
emphasis was to ascertain the use made of the patent system and patent information 
systems by SMEs in various European countries, and to identify any differences 
between countries. The TechnoStart’s research conclusions were used by the portfolio 
company to consider ways of improving patent access and patent information systems 
for SMEs. The joint report represented the first attempt to research patent use by 
SMEs in Europe. It provided the portfolio company with useful data and analysis on 
which to base service developments targeted at this specific group. For example, the 
research noted that European SMEs under use patents as an information source, but 
that carefully targeted marketing campaigns and the development of less complicated 
databases geared to SMEs needs could increase use.
Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements
Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Comment Comment Comment Comment
Telephone or write to 
express 
concerns/decisions
General issues of 
concerns to TechnoStart 
such as general 
management capability
There were frequent 
interactions between 
TechnoStart and its 
portfolio companies
Meet with portfolio 
company managers
To provide advice on 
general management 
issues such as planning 
budgets etc
Fortnightly meetings
Corporate Board 
meetings 
To discuss strategic 
issues relating to 
product launch or 
company preparations 
for IPO 
7 to 8 meetings in a 
year
Company reportF ormal accounts and 
project reports
Yearly
Engagement Practices Engagement Practices Engagement Practices Engagement Practices
As an investor, TechnoStart selects founders who in their academic life have excelled 
in their disciplines and fields of work. They usually, develop their new technologies at 
the forefront of science and realise the value of an appropriate patent strategy. With its 
co-entrepreneurial mind-set TechnoStart assists them in virtually all tasks related to 
constructing a business (see Table 3). Many of the teams in which TechnoStart did 
invest in approached them after having learnt of TechnoStart’s style of co-operation 
from its portfolio companies.104
From Concept Development to Business  From Concept Development to Business  From Concept Development to Business  From Concept Development to Business Shop: How TechnoStart Works Shop: How TechnoStart Works Shop: How TechnoStart Works Shop: How TechnoStart Works
TechnoStart is prepared to invest early, sometimes even in proposals which, at the 
beginning, do not consist of more than an idea and one (or more) excellent brains. 
Usually, the technology description, data from the research lab demonstrating the 
technology’s feasibility and one or several patent applications are the information it 
needs to decide whether it wants to work together with the founders to establish the 
nucleus of a company. After the investment decision, TechnoStart and the 
entrepreneurs work closely together to develop a detailed and market-oriented 
business plan. Jointly, they identify the tasks to be fulfilled after a potential investment, 
thus forming the guideline for further discussions. All information received from a 
founding team is kept secret, and the venture is prepared to enter into Non-Disclosure 
Agreements.
TechnoStart is normally represented on the advisory or supervisory board of its 
portfolio companies and also helps to identify and recruit additional board members 
with relevant experience and competence. Offering co-operation well beyond the early 
months is as important as supplying the necessary funds. The Venture is therefore not 
only involved in the establishment of an organisation and the development of financial 
strategies, but in all aspects determining the structure and pace of the company’s 
development; in particular it assists in recruitment and strategies for business 
development and marketing.
The venture’s management is well experienced in the huge tasks faced when building 
a company from conception, virtually from scratch, through various rounds of 
structuring, teambuilding and financing. Therefore,  at least one member of its team 
almost fully dedicates him- or herself to the project for quite some time, and organises 
further input from other members of the TechnoStart team.  In order to avoid any 
misunderstanding, it stresses that the Venture acts as co-entrepreneurs: The Venture 
is not the entrepreneur, and it is the entrepreneur who is ultimately responsible for top-
quality performance.105
Table 3. TechnoStart’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. TechnoStart’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. TechnoStart’s Engagement Strategy Table 3. TechnoStart’s Engagement Strategy
Engagement Method Engagement Method Engagement Method Engagement MethodC omment Comment Comment Comment TechnoStart’s Practice TechnoStart’s Practice TechnoStart’s Practice TechnoStart’s Practice
Board membership Board membership Board membership Board membershipV enture nominates non-
executive director(s) on 
portfolio company’s 
board 
Yes
Syndicat Syndicat Syndicat Syndication ion ion ion Venture collaborates 
with other funds
Yes
Advisory Board Advisory Board Advisory Board Advisory BoardV enture has industry 
experts on its advisory 
board (e.g. IT luminaries 
in the IT sector)
Yes
Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Affiliate Fund Specialist fund for 
experts / prominent 
people (to get their help 
for portfolio companies)
Yes
Partners have  Partners have  Partners have  Partners have 
background in  background in  background in  background in 
specialist areas specialist areas specialist areas specialist areas
Partners have education 
or experience in a 
specialist area such as 
science background or 
business experience
Yes
Particular management  Particular management  Particular management  Particular management 
areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern areas of concern
Participated in 
discussions with 
portfolio company on: 
Strategy (e.g. market 
share, product 
development, 
competition);
Frequent; Advised ItN 
Nanovation in the area 
of patents – e.g. set up 
different workshops 
with patent lawyers
Strategic audit;Y es
Employee recruitment 
and training;
Yes; Gave support to 
Evotec OAI on its 
training policy
Executive stock options;N o
Marketing or advertising 
campaigns;
No
Outsourcing; and No
Any other value-added 
activity (e.g. product 
packaging
Yes; Assisted ItN 
Nanovation in 
developing its general 
management capability
It sometimes seems as though small-tech entrepreneurs think very differently from 
investors. Some say that this disconnect comes from the fact that many small-tech 
start-ups are launched by academics without much experience in the business world. 
‘The scarcity of professional skills, or rather the combination of technical and financial 
skills, is one of the missing elements in the development of this kind of activity,’ said 
Orlando Arango, of the European Investment Bank. 106
However, TechnoStart is trying to bridge this culture and knowledge gap. Bettina 
Schrick is one of four technology analysts at TechnoStart. Her previous job involved 
developing nanoparticles to be used for environmental cleanup in a lab at Pennsylvania 
State University. Schrick was looking for a new challenge, so she came aboard as the 
resident chemistry expert of the group. ‘We also have a biotechnologist, a physicist 
and a biochemist at the firm, so that we can cover all the specialties,’ she said.  Such 
expertise on hand makes it possible to have much more frank discussions with 
entrepreneurs on their projects, particularly when the business area is at the vanguard 
of science. This is often the case with small-tech, which represents about a third to half 
of TechnoStart’s investments. “The entrepreneurs work with other VCs and they are 
impressed that we actually understand the technology,” Schrick said. ‘We can ask the 
tough technical questions.’ 
Example portfolio companies Example portfolio companies Example portfolio companies Example portfolio companies
That was certainly true in the case of ItN Nanovation, a company that makes 
nanoparticles for ceramic products to be used in ovens or in water purification 
installations, among other applications. The Saarbruecken-based firm raised $3.8 million 
in financing thanks to TechnoStart. Ralph Nonninger, one of the company’s managing 
partners, recalled that his firm had been in contact with about 25 venture capital firms 
in the year they spent trying to raise the initial round of funding. ‘The impression you 
get when you talk with VCs is that the only thing they are interested in is money. 
TechnoStart looked more deeply into things; they took some of our nanoparticles with 
them and examined them under an electron microscope.’ said Schrick.
TechnoStart’s other defining characteristic is that it offers money and guidance –
essential during a company’s early stage. Scientists don’t necessarily have the training 
‘to manage people, to write patents, to find markets or to find other applications for 
their technology,’ Schrick said. 
In the case of the ItN Nanovation investment, managerial help was not really needed 
because Romeo Volz, Chief Financial Officer and Dirk Busse, who is in charge of sales 
and marketing, both have extensive management experience. However, TechnoStart’s 
strategic expertise did come in handy in the area of patents.  ItN Nanovation now has 
35 of them. ‘TechnoStart set up different workshops with patent lawyers for us, to 
help us see what the most appropriate patent might be,’ Nonninger said, ‘so that we 
could patent not just the product, but the technology.’ 107
Appendix 2: Private Equity Fund Portfolio Company Case Studies Appendix 2: Private Equity Fund Portfolio Company Case Studies Appendix 2: Private Equity Fund Portfolio Company Case Studies Appendix 2: Private Equity Fund Portfolio Company Case Studies
1. Plastic Logic 1. Plastic Logic 1. Plastic Logic 1. Plastic Logic
Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary
Start-up companies often struggle to turn their exciting new business ideas into 
profitable opportunities. They need finances but, in many instances, they also require 
support in professionalising their human resource base – a skill development strategy. 
This case demonstrates how Plastic Logic is strengthening its management with the 
help of its Ventures by nominating new corporate board members as well as appointing 
new staff. Plastic Logic is now well placed for its next stage of product 
commercialisation. On the other hand, venture help is also crucial for Plastic Logic in 
continuing with its product development activities.
Company Pro Company Pro Company Pro Company Profile file file file
Plastic Logic is a leading developer of plastic electronics technology. It combines the 
power of electronics with the pervasiveness of printing to create innovate uses of 
electronics. Founded in November 2000 as a spinout from Cambridge University's 
Cavendish Laboratory, Plastic Logic is building on over 10 years of fundamental 
research by a world-class team. It is developing and exploiting a portfolio of intellectual 
property based on inkjet printing of active electronic circuits using advanced plastic 
materials.
With its Headquarters in state-of-the-art clean room facilities on the Cambridge Science 
Park, the company has received investment of over £15 million from a range of Venture 
Capital and other investors. Plastic Logic is a successor, of sorts, to Cambridge Display 
Technology Ltd, formed 10 years ago to commercialise light-emitting plastic based on 
research conducted previously by Richard Friend. Plastic Logic's value is based on a 
combination of choosing the right plastic materials and inventing a viable manufacturing 
process. Instead of hard chips, as at present, plastic chips could be printed on rolls of 
film that could then be applied to clothing, to curved surfaces such as bottles and to 
large displays. Partners include leading chemical and printing companies.
Because of its work in technology development, Plastic Logic was named a 
Technology Pioneer by the World Economic Forum. The Technology Pioneers are a 
constituency of the World Economic Forum and are profiled in a report published by 
the Economist Intelligence Unit and Apax Partners entitled ‘The Next Big Thing?’ which 
was available from www.weforum.org/techpioneers. According to Jose Maria Figueres, 
Co-Chief Executive of the World Economic Forum, ‘Each innovation, whether it has 
large or small consequences, is another step in society’s attempt to harness, adapt and 
utilise technology to change and improve the way business and society operate. 
Through the Technology Pioneers programme, the Forum identifies and integrates 
those companies around the world that are involved in the design and development of 
new technologies. The Forum is investing in monitoring and highlighting these 
innovations and explaining the societal repercussions they may have. It is the 108
innovators and out-of-the-box thinkers who refuse to accept the status quo and seek 
constant improvements and change.’
Investor Relations Investor Relations Investor Relations Investor Relations
When Richard Friend, Cavendish Professor of Physics, and Henning Sirringhaus, 
Lecturer, both of the Cavendish Laboratory, realised they were on to something with 
their printed circuit work, they also knew they would need help to bring their invention 
to the marketplace. Friend and Sirringhaus, along with co-founder Stuart Evans, then 
started Plastic Logic, of which Evans is now CEO, Friend is Chief Scientist, and 
Sirringhaus is Technical Director. They found technology partners in both Dow 
Chemical and Seiko-Epson of Japan. Financial partners include Dow Venture Capital 
Group (Dow Venture Capital), Amadeus Capital Partners, and Cambridge Research and 
Innovation, Ltd. In particular, Dow Venture Capital has worked with Plastic Logic to 
create an innovative deal structure that meets the young company's needs. 
Dow is also contributing semi-conducting polymer technology, based primarily on its 
proprietary polyfluorene chemistry, and continues to work with Plastic Logic to develop 
new semi-conductor materials technology. How have Dow and its Venture Capital 
Group helped Plastic Logic reach its objectives? ‘During the University research stage 
of this project,’ comments Friend, ‘we enjoyed a fruitful collaboration with Dow, who 
have considerable expertise in the specialist materials we required. We were very 
pleased they chose to invest in Plastic Logic as well.’ Evans adds, ‘Clearly we value 
Dow's materials expertise and financial resources. However, what's as important is 
that their Venture Capital group are pretty savvy. The Dow Venture Capital team have 
been very responsive in providing general commercial advice and assistance.’
Dow Venture Capital has committed over $300 million to businesses involved in Life 
Sciences and Biotechnology, Communications and Information Technology, Electronics, 
and Materials Science and has investments in venture funds through more than ten 
institutional venture capital firms. Additionally, Dow Venture Capital collaborates 
globally with a broad network of venture partners that specialise in targeted investment 
areas. Plastic Logic is one of the innovative companies in Dow's Venture Capital 
portfolio. Plastic Logic’s technology has the potential for disruptive entry into many 
markets, including displays, inventory tags, and signage. It is just the type of 
opportunity the Dow Venture Capital Group typically targets.
Second Closing of first-round Investment
Plastic Logic had a £2.45 million second closing of its first round private financing in 
2002. With a first closing of £6.3 million announced earlier that year, the total amount 
raised in this round was now £8.75 million. Participants in the second closing were 
Bank of America Capital Partners (Chicago, Illinois, USA), Yasuda Enterprise 
Development Company (Tokyo, Japan), St John’s College (Cambridge, UK) and Steve 
Kahng (Palo Alto, California, USA). The company’s existing lead investors were 
Amadeus Capital Partners (London and Cambridge, UK) and PolyTechnos Venture-
Partners (Munich, Germany).
It was expected that new shareholders to the company would all help the management 
to position the company as the dominant provider of solutions for printing active 109
electronic circuits. The funds are also used to expand the current team of 35 and 
accelerate technology development and commercialisation.
The organisational arrangements between Plastic Logic’s Ventures and the company 
are reported in Table 1. There are some formal procedures for reporting important 
decisions to the Ventures but certain types of interaction, for example additional 
communications with Venture Partners, are not always recorded and in a number of 
instances, Plastic Logic interacts in this way but has no record. Thus the examples 
below reflect those activities that have been recorded and reported and may not reflect 
all interaction undertaken.
Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements
Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Comment Comment Comment Comment
Telephone or write to 
express 
concerns/decisions
General issues of 
concerns to the 
Ventures such as 
feedback on product 
development
There were frequent 
interactions between 
Plastic Logic and its 
Ventures via this 
medium
Meet with Venture 
Partners
To seek advice on new 
personnel appointments 
or investment in new 
operations
One or two meetings in 
a month
Corporate Board 
meetings 
To discuss strategic 
issues relating to 
product launch or 
company preparations 
for IPO 
5 to 6 meetings in a 
year
Company reportF ormal accounts and 
projects
Yearly
Plastic Logic has a policy and organisational structure in place which addresses how it 
discharges its responsibilities in relation to its investors and the broad topics covered. 
Most of the communications, summarised in Table 1, are about Plastic Logic’s 
progress on product development and how it plans (including the timeframe) to 
commercialise its products.
Plastic Logic’s various financial backers are represented on its corporate board. 
Hermann Hauser, a founder and Director of Amadeus Capital Partners, is a non-
executive Director of Plastic Logic.  He has been involved with over 20 technology 
companies as director, executive or investor and is currently Chairman of Virata and a 
non-executive Director of Cambridge Silicon Radio, AT&T Laboratories Cambridge 
(previously Olivetti) and several other companies. Earlier in his career, he founded 
Acorn Computers - from which ARM traces its origins. He specialises in early stage 
technology companies with global potential, and takes a 'Silicon Valley' based approach 
to help companies grow rapidly (see also Amadeus case study). Hauser has 
encouraged Plastic Logic to strengthen its management team by recruiting new 
personnel and putting in place a product commercialisation strategy at the earliest 
possible opportunity. 110
Plastic Logic’s corporate board has been very keen to support the company’s vision of 
building pioneering technologies that have the potential to be a world leader in its 
particular market. The board is assisted by the Ventures’ investment teams that consist 
of qualified senior executives and technology specialists with a track record of building 
world-class, technology oriented companies. For example, one of the Plastic Logic’s 
backers, PolyTechnos, uses its insights, expertise, and networks to impact its 
investments and has brought new staff to Plastic Logic. Another backer, Bank of 
America Equity Partners (BAEP) delivers specialised expertise to help portfolio 
companies across a spectrum of sectors realise competitive advantages and target 
superior returns. Both of these companies have been closely involved with Plastic 
Logic’s efforts to produce a truly innovative product within its particular range. They 
have provided Plastic Logic with market data and other product demand related 
information. This also shows in the continued support that Plastic Logic has enjoyed in 
terms of financing for its product development strategy.
Recent Board Appointments
Simon Segars, executive vice president of engineering at ARM Ltd, has recently joined 
Plastic Logic Ltd, as a non-executive Director. Segars joins a growing band of early 
ARM employees who have garnered experience during ARM's rise and are now 
sharing that experience with local start-up companies.
‘Robin Saxby encourages us to take up these non-exec opportunities,’ said Segars 
referring to ARM chairman Sir Robin Saxby. Segars said that ARM executives moving 
on to the boards of other companies is useful for the companies, and for the individuals 
concerned as they get to learn about other ways of doing things.  ‘For example ARM 
never had venture capital funding so that is something I am learning about,’ said Segars. 
Sir Alec Broers recently joined its board as non-executive Chairman. Sir Alec is also a 
non-executive Director of Vodafone plc and R J Mears LLC, President of the Royal 
Academy of Engineering and has recently become a senior adviser to Warburg Pincus. 
Plastic Logic faces the challenge of bringing the most disruptive technology in the 
technology world, with the potential to make flexible displays practicable and 
dramatically reduce the cost of electronics, to the market place. This is not going to be 
easy but it is expected that a strong team of outside directors can make a tremendous 
difference. Plastic Logic is hoping to benefit from new directors’ international 
experience in high technology and business experience, especially when it launches its 
products in the market.
Professionalising the Human Resource
Plastic Logic has used various funding rounds to develop its expertise and human 
capital (see also Table 2). For example, as a consequence of new funds being made 
available by private equity funds in the second closing of first-round funding, Plastic 
Logic has been able to assemble a world-class team of experts and an impressive array 
of partners, thus ensuring an array of supplier and buyer contacts necessary for its 
product sale and commercialisation. It is building on the science base experience, 
combined with the entrepreneurial flare of the company’s CEO. 111
Plastic Logic has also strengthened its senior management team with the appointment 
of Simon Jones, Vice President of Business Development and Bridget Kerle, Chief 
Financial Officer and General Counsel. Mr Jones, previously General Manager of the 
Bluetooth Business Group at Tality, has extensive experience of setting and executing 
strategies for turning new technologies into business success. At Cambridge design 
company Symbionics, he started and grew a digital TV practice developing a worldwide 
blue-chip client list. After Symbionics was acquired by Cadence Design Systems, he 
took up several senior commercial roles in design services and IP licensing in a range 
of application areas. He brings to Plastic Logic a wealth of experience, particularly at 
closing complex deals with international companies and working closely with technical 
colleagues to deliver on customers’ expectations.
Miss Kerle was most recently CFO at Commtag, a leading wireless data software 
company where she managed the finances and was instrumental in their recent 
merger with Finnish company Smartner. Prior to that she was Head of the Corporate 
Department at lawyers Hewitsons where she specialised in the technology sector. She 
brings to Plastic Logic an abundance of business and legal experience including fund 
raising and the successful exploitation and protection of intellectual property.
Table 2: Management Areas of Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Influence
Subject Subject Subject Subject Comment Comment Comment Comment Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome
Employee Recruitment Plastic Logic is a start-
up company so it needs 
to strengthen its human 
capital along with its 
technological progress 
Dow Venture Capital 
provided funds 
earmarked to recruit and 
train its employees – a 
few times it also gave 
new personnel contacts
Product DevelopmentT he company plans to 
enter market with a 
portfolio of new 
products 
Dow and others
provided initial funds; 
Amadeus has provided 
additional funds for 
further technological 
developments
Venture Support for Product Development
Plastic Logic has now received additional funding of about £2 million from Amadeus to 
work on its technology for such applications as active-matrix drives for mobile phone 
displays and for larger displays. Other Plastic Logic investors in this area include 
Cambridge Research and Innovation Ltd and Seiko Epson. These Ventures have given 
valuable market research support to Plastic Logic. The goal of this product 
development assistance is to improve the company’s market competitiveness by 
strengthening its product portfolio. 
Other semi-conductor companies around the world, including Royal Philips Electronics 
and Intel Corp, are pursuing or investing in similar type research. One area of interest is 
plastic semi-conductors which have already been demonstrated in single-transistor and 
integrated circuit forms. The attraction is not performance, because electron mobility in 
plastic is inferior to that of silicon semiconductor material, but plastic holds the promise 112
that systems that don't require critical performance could benefit from the lower cost 
production of electronics printed onto packaging or incorporated within plastic casings. 
Such technology could make it possible for packaged goods to communicate with 
point-of-sale terminals without being removed from a shopping cart. With the active 
support of its Ventures, Plastic Logic hopes to become a world leader in the provider of 
solutions for printing active electronic circuits.113
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Care UK Care UK Care UK Care UK
Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary
Care UK operates in a sector that is continually being liberalised and restructured, with 
the effect that new trends are presenting tremendous business growth opportunities 
for the company. However, Care UK can only exploit these potential opportunities if it 
is able to develop new social care models supported by an excellent training 
programme. Care UK’s venture, Sovereign Capital (the influence of other ventures was 
not very significant), has helped the company to create new business concepts in areas 
as diverse as home from hospital, rapid response schemes, intensive homecare, and 
extra care schemes. Furthermore, Sovereign Capital has also vigorously argued for 
Care UK to make its training function its flagship product strategy. In fact, Sovereign 
organised special training workshops for the skill development of Care UK’s managers. 
Forh ome from hospital and rapid response schemes, Sovereign also helped Care UK 
organise project teams with multiple skills.   
Background Background Background Background
Care UK plc was created in 1994 and operates nursing and residential homes for the 
elderly, the mentally ill and people with learning disabilities. Originally trading as Anglia 
Secure Homes plc, which was listed on the USM (the Unlisted Securities Market) in 
1986, Care UK is an extensive home care service for people in their own homes and 
supported living services for people with learning disabilities within community based 
houses. It also provides specialist recruitment services to the sector. Following many 
successful years of trading, the group has invested over £80m in new healthcare 
facilities.
Care UK is a dedicated provider of high quality care services and is able to provide a 
range of comprehensive and flexible home support packages through its well trained 
and committed care staff. With the aid of its Venture, it is able to deliver more complex 
solutions including service reprovision and staff transfers. Examples of some of its 
most recent and innovative service models include:
Home from hospital - providing a time limited service to people who need help with 
personal care or practical assistance on returning home from hospital. 
Rapid response schemes - short-term emergency care to prevent hospital admissions 
where the provision of care is achievable at home.
For both these schemes, Sovereign Capital helped Care UK organise project teams 
with multiple skills. Because both these schemes were new to Care UK it was 
important for the company to have help in organising teams of skilled staff who could 
deliver specialised services to customers. Care UK is a preferred provider of homecare 
services for many Local Authorities and currently operates over 30 branches across the 114
UK, providing over 50,000 hours of home care support each week. Care UK is 
registered by the National Care Standards Commission and upholds the minimum 
standards laid down by the Commission.
Investor Relations Investor Relations Investor Relations Investor Relations
Until quite recently, Sovereign Capital was a major Venture Capitalist investor of Care 
UK. Following an active year-end including a name change and the launch of its third 
fund, Sovereign Capital, formerly Nash, Sells and Partners sold its remaining interest in 
Care UK in 2001.
Sovereign's principals (major shareholders) remain substantial shareholders in the 
company. Executive management holds equity and options currently worth around £4 
million. The business was conceived in 1991, when Anglia Secure Homes, then the 
second largest sheltered housing developer in the UK, came under substantial pressure 
from its banks. Sovereign Capital agreed an innovative proposal with Anglia to fund a 
ring-fenced joint venture. Anglia would contribute its two nursing homes with its 
existing management, and Sovereign would supply capital to fund the further rollout of 
the business. Sovereign invested an initial £2.0 million for an 80 per cent interest. 
As part of its investment in what was to become Care UK, Sovereign maintained a 
close working relationship with management through board seats for two of 
Sovereign's Directors and through continual contact on development issues.  This 
proximity to the business allowed Sovereign to catalyse several key development steps 
for the business. The original joint venture was reversed into Anglia in early 1994 and 
renamed Care UK, enabling the business to gain access to the equity capital markets at 
quite an early stage in its development. Sovereign was the one which furnished this 
idea. Upon completion, Sovereign Capital held over 60 per cent in the company. 
Sovereign then rolled CHS, which was a separate company in Sovereign’s investment 
portfolio into Care UK, thereby generating critical mass and economies of scale 
supported by a competent management team. These initiatives proved very successful 
in creating a competitive business in an emerging service sector area. The contribution 
of Sovereign was not merely limited to this transfer, indeed it encouraged Care UK 
management team to think more innovatively about providing solutions to service 
sector problems. Sovereign believed that the merger with CHS would strengthen Care 
UK’s management ability to expand within its area of operations. 
The sale of non-core assets generated proceeds of around £13 million that were used 
to fund the rapid organic growth of the core business without further recourse to its 
shareholders. Care UK is now a market leader in the provision of care under contract to 
health authorities. It has over £200 million of future contracted income within 30 
different facilities across the country. 
Richard Clough, chief executive Care UK, said: ‘Sovereign Capital has provided a 
valuable input into Care UK’s strategic decisions, especially in developing its 
operational strategies such as developing rapid response schemes – a sustained 
growth achieved by Care UK over the years proves the competency of the Venture.’ 
John Nash, partner at Sovereign Capital, stated that with Care UK they discovered a 
niche and it remains part of Sovereign's strategy to look for sectors that are going to 
create strong market opportunities.115
The organisational arrangements between Sovereign's principals and Care UK are 
reported in Table 1. There are some formal procedures for reporting important 
decisions to the principals but certain types of interaction, for example additional 
communications with these principals, are not always recorded and in a number of 
instances, Care UK interacts in this way but has no record. Thus the examples below 
reflect those activities that have been recorded and reported and may not reflect all 
interaction undertaken.
Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements
Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Comment Comment Comment Comment
Telephone or write to 
express 
concerns/decisions
General issues of 
concern to the 
Principals such as 
development of new 
training programmes / 
facilities
There were frequent 
interactions between 
Care UK and 
Sovereign's principals
via this medium
Meet with Sovereign's 
Principals
To seek advice on new 
personnel appointments 
or investment in new 
operations
One meeting in a month
Corporate Board 
meetings 
To discuss strategic 
issues relating to 
product launch or 
company preparations 
for IPO 
5 to 6 meetings in a 
year
Company reportF ormal accounts and 
project reports
Yearly
Care UK has a policy and organisational structure in place which addresses how it 
discharges its responsibilities in relation to its investors and the broad topics covered 
(e.g. approval for senior personnel hiring decisions; any changes in its operational plans). 
Most communications, summarised in Table 2, are about Care UK’s progress on 
product development and how it plans (including the timeframe) to commercialise its 
products (including its relationship with the NHS).116
Table 2: Ma Table 2: Ma Table 2: Ma Table 2: Management Areas of Influence nagement Areas of Influence nagement Areas of Influence nagement Areas of Influence
Subject Subject Subject Subject Comment Comment Comment Comment Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome
Strategic and 
Operational Models
Care UK has developed 
innovative operational 
models such as home 
from hospital, rapid 
response schemes, 
intensive homecare and 
extra care schemes
Sovereign Capital 
provided technical and 
managerial expertise at 
all stages of the models’ 
development (e.g. 
Sovereign organised 
training workshops; 
organised project teams 
with multiple skills)
Professionalising the 
human resource base
Care UK is a growth 
company so it needs to 
strengthen its human 
capital base along with 
its operational progress 
Sovereign Capital 
provided expert advice
Product DevelopmentT he company plans to 
develop new health care 
schemes to meets its 
strategic objectives 
Sovereign's principals 
are closely involved in 
these developments
Sovereign Capital: How the Care UK’s Venture Works Sovereign Capital: How the Care UK’s Venture Works Sovereign Capital: How the Care UK’s Venture Works Sovereign Capital: How the Care UK’s Venture Works
Sovereign Capital backs unquoted UK businesses. Operating in key sectors, Sovereign 
typically invests between £5-15m of equity to support proven management teams 
committed to growing their businesses. In the last 5 years Sovereign has successfully 
enabled some 16 management teams to acquire their business, either as a 
management buy-out or as a buy-in.
These businesses have all benefited from Sovereign’s expertise in platform buy and 
builds. Its aim is to help management teams achieve significant capital gains for all 
shareholders, by providing not only equity, but also expertise and strategic advice 
throughout the length of its investment. With commitments from some 20
international pension funds, insurance companies and endowment funds, Sovereign 
has £175 million under management.
Once Sovereign invests in a business, it is committed to its success and remains 
closely involved. While Sovereign takes a seat on the board, this does not mean it 
wants to run the company.I ts role is to provide the right support at the right time; the 
management team's role is to focus on building the business.
Sovereign focuses on sectors that demonstrate the potential for medium to long-term 
growth. This might be driven by a variety of factors including demographic or technical 
change, emerging markets, opportunities for restructuring, or contra-cyclical 
performance patterns.
No matter which sector Sovereign works in, it ensures that all fundamentals are in 
place: a high-calibre entrepreneurial management team with a proven track record, a 117
compelling pitch, a clear vision, and the determination to build a scaleable business that 
has the potential to emerge as a brand or market leader. This is how Sovereign was 
able to mould the management practice of Care UK into delivering an innovative range 
of services in the UK’s social services market (see the performance measurement 
section, among others, for relevant examples).
Milestone Events Milestone Events Milestone Events Milestone Events
The Government's restructuring of UK health and social care services continues to 
present opportunities for Care UK to progress its evolution to a broad based health and 
social care services provider, working in partnership with the NHS and Social Services. 
Realizing these opportunities, Sovereign Capital encouraged Care UK to invest in 
enhanced skills and develop innovative services to enable the Group to benefit from 
these opportunities.
Previously, one of the major focuses of Sovereign was the quality of care. Now quality 
care is a fundamental principle of the group and to achieve it Care UK places great 
emphasis on focused management teams, significant staff training and an extensive 
quality assurance system. Each activity has its own highly skilled managers who are 
extremely knowledgeable about their particular market and focus on the problems 
facing both the service user and the purchaser. It is generally recognised that 
maintaining quality is always a delicate matter, especially in the service sector. Hence, 
Sovereign was particularly candid in various board meetings to highlight the potential 
problems in Care UK’s quality operations. Therefore, although resentful of Sovereign’s 
direct interest in the company’s operational matters, Care UK nevertheless accepted 
Sovereign emphasis on recruiting highly skilled staff and putting in place quality control 
mechanisms for a consistent level of service delivery.
A fully integrated Quality Assurance System is utilised which combines the benefits of 
an independent audit of services with constructive help to managers and staff for the 
continuous improvement of care. With the help of Care UK’s Sovereign's principals, it 
has now developed a growth strategy aimed at becoming the UK’s leading provider of 
a range of health and social care services, contracted to the NHS and Social Services 
that deliver:
• High quality service, clinical and educational standards 
• Innovation and added value
• A balanced portfolio focused on complex needs
• Elderly residential and nursing care and rehabilitation
• Homecare: domiciliary, complex, rehabilitation, nursing.
Training
To achieve the above business goals, Care UK’s core management capability is in its 
training function. This strategy was devised in line with the advice given by Sovereign’s
principals. In fact, Sovereign initially organised training workshops for Care UK to 
develop its own training. Sovereign realised that its business ideas could only be 
successful if matched by the practical support that it could offer to Care UK. This 
recognised of the role of personal development in Care UK’s sector. Care UK is now a 118
national training, provider specialising in delivering quality, best value services to the 
care/health sector. Through its team of experienced Regional Trainers, the company is 
able to train social services staff to meet the needs of service users. Most parts of the 
group have received ’Investor in People’ accreditation - their in-house training division 
was awarded the prestigious ‘Investors in People’ Award in September 2003.In 
addition, staff benefit from a multitude of training courses from induction programmes 
and NVQs to highly specialised support for qualified personnel.
Care UK set up their own training division five years ago to meet the increasing training 
needs of their nursing and care staff. The demand for high quality training in care is 
such that the Care UK training division is now providing training to other local and 
national care providers including Carewatch, Hackney Social Services, Great Yarmouth 
Primary Care NHS Trust, The Oaks Colchester and Better Caring Services.
Sara Murdoch, Group Training Manager of Care UK said: ‘IIP is all about valuing and 
developing your staff as well as company communication. We are very proud of this 
achievement as it shows others that we practice what we preach, as a training 
organisation this is very important. At a recent exhibition several people commented on 
the IIP kite-mark we are allowed to display and I am sure it gave them the confidence 
to try our services. I would encourage other businesses to go for the award, especially 
with the small firms initiative the assessment network now offer.’
All the above training initiatives have the full support of its private equity investors, 
including Sovereign Capital's principals. This is to ensure a growth strategy that not 
only benefits Care UK but also provides a healthy return to the shareholders.
Performance Measurement
Care UK’s activities pose a significant challenge to its performance measurement 
function, especially since a lot of its investment is based upon the ventures’ positive 
assessment of its performance. Recently, an increasing number of companies have 
started measuring employee satisfaction, customer loyalty and other performance 
areas that are not financial but that they believe affect profitability. This is due to the 
belief that doing so offers several benefits - managers can get a glimpse of the 
business’s progress well before a financial verdict is pronounced; employees can 
receive better information on the specific actions needed to achieve strategic 
objectives; and investors can have a better sense of the company’s overall 
performance, since intangible investments such as R&D efforts are not usually 
reflected in the formal accounting statements such as balance sheets.
Care UK’s ventures have thus insisted on the company establishing better links 
between its strategy and its performance measurement system to achieve a better 
allocation of resources - for example its investment in its training activities. A great deal 
of subjectivity is involved in measuring what is important to customers, employees, 
suppliers or other stakeholders, and a better understanding of their underlying 
assumptions could bridge the gap between subjective assessments and actual financial 
returns. These assumptions are primarily related to setting the right performance 
targets in terms of what is desirable on the part of investors or other stakeholders, for 
example, whether investors are looking for short term gains or they value more long 
term performance indicators such as growth and stability. In this respect, Care UK’s 119
ventures have been vociferous in their emphasis upon the company pursuing long-term 
strategic goals such as more investment in its training function.120
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Ardana Ardana Ardana Ardana
Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary
Ardana has used its venture funds to accelerate the in-house research projects and to 
carry out a number of strategic initiatives for the acquisition, licensing and co-marketing 
of reproductive health products.  These specific areas were targeted for venture 
funding so they can be enhanced by Ardana’s proprietary technologies, development 
capabilities and marketing skills. These are also the areas in which investor influence is 
more visible than other management practices. The company was able to establish 
various joint ventures and acquisitions, to grow the company's core competencies and 
introduce new areas. This was partly due to the fact that Ardana’s ventures carry out a 
consistent approach to due diligence. Now a major challenge facing the company is 
preparing for its IPO. This is a major area of concern for Merlin and 3i. Consequently, 
new appointments have been made to prepare the company for a successful flotation.
Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile
Astonishing advances in life sciences and biotechnology have created a whole new 
industry with tremendous growth potential and far reaching consequences for the way 
people live. A particularly exciting area in which innovative research is contributing to 
new knowledge is reproductive health. Advances in this area will bring improvements 
in fertility treatments, more convenient contraceptives, novel treatments for 
gynaecological disorders, and innovative obstetric products. Ardana Ltd was created in 
2000 to meet the needs of this reproductive health market, estimated to be worth 
£10.2 billion per year. 
History
The dot.com bust was not unique. In 1990, some biotech companies had $1 billion in 
revenue, but by 1995, no amount of technology or business could get investors 
interested in biotech. There was an under investment cycle and some good companies 
were built without getting the value or returns. The evidence suggests that biotech has 
come out of this cycle in the last 2 years.
Ardana Ltd is an emerging pharmaceutical company focused on reproductive health. It 
aims to become a leading source of clinical and commercial innovation in the $19.5 
billion human reproductive health market. Ardana was created to commercialise 
research that had been carried out by the Medical Research Council's (MRC) Human 
Reproductive Sciences Unit (HRSU) in Edinburgh. The HRSU has been at the forefront 
of research into the human reproductive system for the last 30 years, and the unit is 
one of only four academic centres of excellence in human reproductive biology in the 
world. Ardana aims to apply commercial and technical innovation to the reproductive 
health market. The market is currently growing at 9 per cent per year and it could reach 
$20 billion per year as companies address unmet or underserved clinical needs such as 121
male and female contraception and female sexual dysfunction. Ardana aims to become 
profitable and cash positive no later than 2007.
Ardana has an exclusive relationship with the HRSU in Edinburgh, Scotland. Under this 
arrangement, Ardana has the right to assess, and the exclusive option to obtain, a 
licence or assignment of all existing unencumbered intellectual property and 
unencumbered patent applications which arise in the course of HRSU research until 
July 2005. Through the HRSU, Ardana gains an innovative early stage product portfolio 
and exceptional clinical development resources. The HRSU has been active in 
reproductive science for over 30 years. It employs 100 staff with an annual budget of 
£3.8 million, committed for five years until 2005. The Unit benefits from a close 
relationship with the University of Edinburgh Department of Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology and is a partner in the Contraceptive Development Network. These 
relationships provide bench-to-bedside biology and give Ardana ready access to 
specialised clinical expertise, reproductive tissues and patients. In 2004 the HRSU 
moved to a custom-built £39 million institute.
In order to secure a later stage and near market product pipeline to complement the 
HRSU programmes, Ardana has executed a series of licensing agreements and 
acquisitions (see Table 1):
Table 1: Ardana’s Partnering Arrangements Table 1: Ardana’s Partnering Arrangements Table 1: Ardana’s Partnering Arrangements Table 1: Ardana’s Partnering Arrangements
Date Date Date Date Transaction Transaction Transaction Transaction Products Products Products Products Indications Indications Indications Indications
Phase of  Phase of  Phase of  Phase of 
Development Development Development Development
June 2002
Ardana 
acquires 
Europeptides
Global rights to 
Leuprorelin
Prostate cancerP hase II
Global rights to 
Teverelix 
(excluding 
Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan)
Infertility; 
contraception; 
prostatic disease; 
endometriosis; 
fibroids
Phase I
October 2002
Ardana 
acquires rights 
from Columbia 
Laboratories 
Inc
Euro rights 
(excluding Italy) 
to testosterone 
buccal tablet
Hypogonadism in 
men
In registration
December 
2002
Development 
and license 
agreement 
with Columbia 
Labs
European rights 
to terbutaline 
vaginal gel 
product
Infertility; 
Dysmenorrhoea
Phase II trials 
to be initiated 
in 2004122
Investor Relations Investor Relations Investor Relations Investor Relations
Since it was established, Ardana has raised £43.4 million in four funding rounds. Ardana 
investors include DVC Deutsche Venture Capital, Albany Venture Managers Limited 
and 3i Bioscience Investment Trust, Merlin Biosciences Limited, MVM Limited (MVM), 
Techno Venture Management (TVM), ABN-AMRO Participates, 3i Group plc, ISIS 
Equity Partners plc, Scottish Widows Investment Partnership Ltd, Saffron Hill Ventures, 
Mitsubishi Corporation and Green Highlander, LLC. Ardana is a global company in the 
truest sense of the word.
In May 2004, Ardana raised £9 million in an extension to its most recent financing 
round. The extension received strong support from existing and new investors. The 
new investors are DVC Deutsche Venture Capital, Albany Venture Managers Limited 
and 3i Bioscience Investment Trust. Of the current investors, Techno Venture 
Management (TVM), MVM International Life Sciences Fund, ABN AMRO Participates 
BV, 3i, Merlin Biosciences Limited, Scottish Widows Investment Partnership, ISIS 
Equity Partners, Green Highlander LLC and Saffron Hill Ventures increased their 
investment.
In July 2003, Ardana raised £20 million ($32 million equivalent) from a group of 
prominent international venture capital investors in its second full round of fundraising. 
The financing round was led by Techno Venture Management (TVM) of Munich 
Germany. A mainstream institutional investor, ISIS Equity Partners plc, participated for 
the first time and five existing Ardana shareholders (Merlin Biosciences Fund II, MVM 
Limited (MVM), ABN AMRO Capital, 3i, and Green Highlander LLC) all increased their 
stake. 
In October 2001, Ardana raised £13.3 million ($20 million equivalent) from a group of 
prominent international venture capital investors in its first full round of fundraising. The 
funding round was led by Merlin Biosciences and included further investment by 
Ardana's founding venture capital firm, Medical Venture Council. Other new 
participants included ABN-AMRO Capital (Netherlands), 3i (UK), Mitsubishi Corporation 
(Japan) and Green Highlander, LLC (US).
This money is being used to accelerate the in-house research projects, and it has 
supported a number of strategic initiatives for the acquisition, in-licensing and co-
marketing of reproductive health products (see Table 1 for details). Previously, Ardana 
raised £1.1 million ($1.6 million equivalent) of seed capital from its founders and early 
backer during 2000-01. The funding also helps the company to develop in licensing and 
co-marketing of reproductive health products. These specific areas are chosen so they 
can be enhanced by Ardana’s proprietary technologies, development capabilities and 
marketing skills. This round of funds allowed the company to establish various joint 
ventures and acquisitions, to grow the company's core competencies and introduce 
new areas.
The organisational arrangements between Ventures and Ardana are reported in Table 2. 
There are some formal procedures for reporting important decisions to the Ventures 
but certain types of interaction, for example additional communications with Venture 
Partners, are not always recorded and in a number of instances, Ardana interacts in this 
way but no record is kept. Thus the examples below reflect those activities that have 123
been recorded and reported and may not reflect all interaction undertaken. In particular, 
the major area of concern for the company’s ventures relates to its preparations for its 
IPO.
Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements Table 2: Reporting Arrangements
Communication Typ Communication Typ Communication Typ Communication TypeeeeM atters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters DiscussedC omment Comment Comment Comment
Telephone or write to 
express 
concerns/decisions
General issues of 
concern to the Ventures 
such as feedback on 
product development
There was frequent 
interaction between 
Ardana and its Ventures 
via this medium
Meet with Venture 
Partners
To seek advice on new 
personnel appointments 
or investment in new 
operations
One or two meetings in 
a month
Corporate Board 
meetings 
To discuss strategic 
issues relating to 
product launch or 
company preparations 
for IPO 
5 to 6 meetings in a 
year
Company reportF ormal accounts and 
projects
Yearly
Ardana has a policy and organisational structure in place which addresses how it 
discharges its responsibilities in relation to its investors and the broad topics covered. 
Most communications, as summarised in Table 3, are about Ardana’s progress on 
product development and how it plans (including the timeframe) to commercialise its 
products.
Milestone Events Milestone Events Milestone Events Milestone Events
DVC Deutsche Venture Capital, Albany Venture Managers Limited and 3i Bioscience 
Investment Trust have helped Ardana formulate the following strategic objectives:
• Identifying validated targets and assembling the appropriate drug discovery 
infrastructure to support its products’ rapid and effective progress into 
development
• Developing, registering, marketing and selling proprietary products which 
address niche reproductive health markets
• Successfully launching its first product in 2004
• Completing further judicious company and product acquisitions
• Adding value to and/or out-licensing non-core products and territories and those 
products which address large, non-speciality markets such as the primary care 
sector, and
• Being ready to achieve IPO at the earliest appropriate juncture.
Some of the measures taken by the company to achieve the above objectives are 
briefly outlined below (see also Table 3).124
Professionalising the Human Resource Base 
Venture funding for Ardana has been used for initiating key organisational and human 
resource changes at the company. Ardana is at a key stage in its development, with its 
first product Striant
TMSR, launched in the UK and a broad pipeline of product candidates. 
These moves reflect the needs of the company as it becomes an integrated 
pharmaceutical company and will ensure that it is well positioned to become a global 
leader in reproductive health. As a result, the company is also moving to strengthen its 
human and organisational resource capability, which is reflected in a number of key 
professional appointments.
For example, Ardana has recently strengthened its senior management team by 
making a number of new appointments. Mr Simon Best (founder and previously Chief 
Executive Officer) has been appointed as Chairman with Dr Maureen Lindsay promoted 
to Chief Executive Officer and Graham Lee appointed as Chief Financial Officer. 
Table 3: Management Areas of Influence Table 3: Management Areas of Influence Table 3: Management Areas of Influence Table 3: Management Areas of Influence
Category Category Category CategoryC omment Comment Comment Comment Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome
Professionalising the 
Human Resource Base
Ardana is a start-up 
company so it needs to 
strengthen its human 
capital along with its 
technological progress 
DVC Deutsche Venture
Capital, Albany Venture 
Managers Limited and 
3i Bioscience 
Investment Trust 
provided funds 
earmarked to make new 
appointments 
New acquisitions and 
alliances
In Ardana’s market new 
alliances are critical for 
its growth
TVM, MVM 
International Life 
Sciences Fund, ABN 
AMRO Participates BV, 
3i, Merlin Biosciences 
Limited, Scottish 
Widows Investment 
Partnership, ISIS Equity 
Partners, Green 
Highlander LLC and 
Saffron Hill Ventures 
supported Ardana’s 
various acquisitions and 
alliances as reported in 
Table 1. They also 
ensured due diligence.
Product Development The company plans to 
enter market with a 
portfolio of new 
products 
Merlin Biosciences has 
provided additional 
funds for in-house 
research
IPOT o company plans to 
float on the market
Discussed in detail 
plans with TVM and 
others 125
Ardana’s Flotation Plans
Ardana’s success in developing an attractive product range has prompted its ventures 
to pop up the question of its IPO. As a result, it has taken a major step closer to 
flotation by appointing pharmaceutical industry veteran John Brown as a new non-
executive Director. Significantly, he is also a non-executive Director of Vectura, a 
Wiltshire biotechnology company which recently floated on the Alternative Investment 
Market. Vectura is one of three flotation candidates which have been watched 
anxiously by biotechnology firms looking to go public. Its success makes it more likely 
that Scottish companies Ardana, Cyclacel and the newly merged Strakan/ProSkelia will 
float. Brown’s experience in floating two companies has made him a hot property in 
Scotland’s fledgling biotech sector.
Luring Brown is a major coup for Ardana, which has issued a stream of good news on 
funding, product launches and acquisitions over the recent past. Strengthening the 
board would make it easier for Ardana to float within the next 18 months - the target 
set by Best earlier this year. Dr Lindsay said the company still had to decide on when 
to go public, adding that the so-called IPO window for flotations was more like a ‘cat 
flap’.
Due Diligence
Acquisitions have generally produced little value. Companies attempt to carefully 
analyse the size and scope of a deal in question, sometimes by assembling large teams 
and spending a lot of money. However, once senior management has the target in 
sights, it becomes difficult to make the right choices. Even when the deals are deeply 
flawed, managers find it difficult to resist the temptation. Here the role of due diligence 
becomes very critical to ensuring the integrity of the whole process. Due diligence is 
about conducting a fair analysis of the deal’s strategic logic and the acquirer’s ability to 
realise value from it. However, managers often find that due diligence has failed to 
uncover major problems or the analysis was enhanced to look better for the deal. 
Another common problem is that managers routinely overestimate the synergies 
available from an acquisition. 
Ardana’s ventures have therefore been concerned with its acquisitions and have 
therefore ensured that the business case for the acquisition of Europeptides holds up 
under close scrutiny. The ventures put the broader, strategic rationale for the 
acquisition under the microscope. They discussed the business case in its entirety, 
probing for strengths and weaknesses. In general, Merlin Biosciences takes a highly 
disciplined and objective approach to the process of due diligence, and their partners 
pay close heed to the results of their investigations. Merlin is also prepared to walk 
away from a deal, even during the very late stages of negotiations.126
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iOra iOra iOra iOra
Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary
iOra is trying to exploit new trends in offline networking with the help of its ventures. 
With new equity investments from Cazenove Private Equity and b-business, iOra hopes 
to develop and market more competitive products in the area. iOra now needs to make 
partnership agreements with other industry players to market its products. In this 
respect, iOra’s ventures are influencing its strategy through informed discussions at 
the board level meetings, in addition to the role they had earlier played in creating a 
partnership between iOra and Lotus. Further, its ventures have helped it to recruit new 
staff that are likely to improve its existing skill base. 
The iOra’s Ventures helped the company determine the potential for offline networking 
technology among the client’s registered users. They also assisted in developing a 
sensitivity model detailing the risk associated with a range of offline networking
solutions. Its recommendation was for the company to focus on the development of a 
specific type of technology solution, prototyped and reaction tested as part of the 
study. By adopting a risk study approach to new product development the company 
saved considerable time and investment. The discourse also defined the way forward 
for marketing.
Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile
iOra provides industry-leading products for offline networking to some of the world’s 
largest companies and the military. iOra was founded in 1997 and has offices in the UK 
and USA.
iOra develops, licenses and services offline networking software. It enables business 
and operational continuity for some of the world’s largest companies and the military 
by giving constant access to mission critical data, taking both content and web 
applications offline, so that remote sites or users can access it, wherever and 
whenever they need it. iOra does this ‘without compromise’ – giving constant access 
to vast amounts of data while allowing it to be updated even over the slowest network 
links. For web portals, users can access the same content offline, with the same 
interface and the same URLs as they would if online. 
iOra was founded by four ex-Novell employees in 1997 with the goal of providing 
software solutions for mobile workforces who, in today's market, are typically working 
over an intermittent connection. Working in that mode is quite a challenge. Most of the 
applications that organisations use today are built assuming a client server architecture 
operating across a LAN (local area network) for which lots of bandwidth is required. For 
mobile employees, such as consultants and sales people, the reality is that they simply 
do not have that kind of bandwidth available; that is what iOra addresses. 127
iOra’s patented Epsilon Technology is highly effective at moving and replicating an 
organisation’s document and web content to a mobile workforce - typically 100 times 
faster than other replication approaches. iOra’s Mobile Intranet product, built on Epsilon 
Technology, allows companies to deliver information to mobile workers wherever they 
need it - without needing massive bandwidth. The benefit to companies is in cost 
savings and productivity increases. This has especially gone down well with many blue 
chip customers, and has been adopted by, among others, KPMG, PwC, Microsoft and 
HP. PwC recently rolled out a solution for its 4,000 strong team of auditors following a 
2-month trial with 60 staff. The solution is being used by staff members who spend a 
lot of time away from the office on assignment, and is estimated to be saving them 
each between one and three hours per week in not having to wait for lengthy 
downloads.
iOra has demonstrated a more than doubling of revenues each quarter averaged over 
the past 2 years, signing up a wide range of enterprise customers including Shell and 
GlaxoSmithKline.
Investors in iOra
iOra was founded in 1997 with founder and angel investment. In June 1999, iOra 
received £2M in venture funding from MTI. In April 2001, European venture capital firm 
b-business partners and London-based Cazenove Private Equity invested £10M in 
equity funding. Collectively, this funding has enabled iOra to develop its unique mobile 
infrastructure technology and products, and to grow a successful business. 
Simon Edwards, Managing Director at b-business partners, commented, "iOra's record 
is impressive, and potential for growth is significant - we are excited to be part of the 
team that will grow the company. This is our biggest investment in pure technology to 
date, which reflects our belief in the importance of iOra's software for the future of 
mobile content management, and in the company's potential for growth." b-business 
partners is a $900 million ( 1  billion) venture capital company set up in 2000 to invest in 
innovative business-to-business technologies. The company has to date invested in 
nine companies in Sweden, Germany and the UK.
MTI, the early-stage venture capital investor, initially invested £2m in iOra. The 
investment was used to finance iOra’s expansion of its sales channels for SoftCD, its 
software solution that uses a new patented replication technology for the remote 
updating of information contained on a CD, and for other new products. MTI also 
provided technical support in developing iOra’ marketing strategy. MTI, the UK's 
leading early stage high technology venture capital fund manager, is an independent 
firm with a remit to provide risk capital and management resources to British 
technology companies that are at an early stage of their development or recovery. MTI 
is now established as one of Europe's principal venture capital fund managers 
dedicated to the early-stage high-technology sector, with funds managed aggregating 
$210 million (£158 million).128
Investor Relations Investor Relations Investor Relations Investor Relations
iOra has recently completed $15 million equity financing that will enable the company 
to accelerate its growth in the mobile content management market. European venture 
capital firm b-business partners and Cazenove Private Equity are providing the equity 
funding. The funding was arranged by MTI who also provided an earlier first round of 
funding which enabled iOra to develop its unique mobile infrastructure technology and 
products.
The equity and venture technical support will be used to continue to aggressively build 
market presence via direct, channel, and OEM sales in the booming mobile content 
management market. iOra will also continue development of its breakthrough products 
and technology to extend support across dominant laptop and PDA devices.
The organisational arrangements between iOra’s Ventures and the company are 
reported in Table 1. iOra’s experience suggests that companies need to maintain a 
variety of innovation efforts if they want to flourish over the long run. One component 
of this strategy is to constantly pursue incremental innovations – further developments 
in offline networking products as in the case of iOra. Small improvements in the 
existing products and operations that let the companies operate more efficiently and 
deliver greater value to customers are at the heart of this incremental innovation 
strategy. For example, iOra may have to frequently tweak the basic networking product 
to increase its efficiency and effectiveness. The continuous support of iOra’s ventures 
for its innovation activities requires that ventures fully understand the dynamics of its 
innovation strategy. Therefore, iOra has established an information sharing mechanism 
that ensures that its ventures have full information and rationale for its development 
efforts.
Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements
Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Comment Comment Comment Comment
Telephone or write to 
express 
concerns/decisions
General issues of 
concerns to the 
Ventures such as 
feedback on product 
development
There was frequent 
interaction between 
iOra and its Ventures via 
this medium
Meet with Venture 
Partners
To seek advice on new 
partnership agreements 
or investment in new 
operations
One or two meetings in 
a month
Corporate Board 
meetings 
To discuss strategic 
issues relating to 
product launch or 
company preparations 
for IPO 
5 to 6 meetings in a 
year
Company reportF ormal accounts and 
project reports
Yearly
iOra has a policy and organisational structure in place which addresses how it 
discharges its responsibilities in relation to its investors and the broad topics covered. 129
Most communications as summarised in Table 2 are about iOra’s progress on product 
development and how it plans (including the timeframe) to commercialise its products.
iOra’s Ventures adopt a professional approach to its commercial development needs. 
For example, the ventures wanted it to conduct a customer satisfaction and awareness 
survey to be rolled out across its various sales regions. They wished to determine 
satisfaction levels with its products and services across various criteria including quality, 
price, service support and sales support. The survey also considered satisfaction levels 
with, and awareness of, other suppliers and these results were used to benchmark the 
company’s performance, and the perception of the company, against its competitors. 
Table 2: Management Areas of Investor Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Investor Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Investor Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Investor Influence
Category Category Category CategoryC omment Comment Comment Comment Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome
Partnering 
Arrangements
To increase its market 
share, the company 
enters into several 
partnering 
arrangements
CNEAF and b-business 
have been consulted in 
selecting the individual 
partners
Professionalising the 
Human Base 
iOra is a growth 
company that needs to 
strengthen its human 
capital base along with 
its technological 
progress 
MTI and Cazenove 
Private Equity provided 
funds earmarked to 
recruit new personnel
Product DevelopmentT he company is 
developing new 
products in offline 
networking 
Cazenove Private Equity 
and b-business are 
actively involved in 
providing funds and 
expertise
Marketing support iOra launched new 
products which required 
expert marketing 
support 
MTI initially invested 
£2m in iOra to finance 
iOra’se xpansion of its 
sales channels for 
SoftCD. MTI also 
provided relevant 
technical expertise
Milestone Events Milestone Events Milestone Events Milestone Events
Professionalising the human resource base 
As a growth company, iOra has been particularly concerned with developing its human 
resource base and on many occasions sought help from its Ventures in this regard. For 
example, iOra's Board of Directors has a unique blend of technology and business skills 
that are necessary to lead and build strong foundations for global technology ventures. 
A number of Board Directors come from its equity ventures. The Board members bring 
their experience of growing and leading technology companies from start-up to 
commercial entities. Together they bring their experience in sales, marketing, and 
finance to iOra, helping to build its success in the mobile content management space.130
The Board consists of key Management Team members, plus Dr. Paul Castle, the 
founder and Chief Executive of MTI, until end-2003, and an Investment Director of 
Cazenove Private Equity. All these board members are involved in discussions over the 
iOra’s current product development strategy and partnership agreements.
Product De Product De Product De Product Development velopment velopment velopment
The growth in hotspots creates an interesting opportunity for corporate laptop users to 
become connected more often, but the gaps are a problem. With the iOra approach 
these gaps could be bridged with information that is as up to date as possible and can 
be usefully refreshed even over a 2G GSM phone connection because of the efficiency 
of the compression differencing. The data is also securely transmitted and stored on 
the laptop due to the use of this proprietary compression technology.
With new equity investments from Cazenove Private Equity and b-business, iOra hopes 
to develop and market more competitive offline networking products. Cazenove Private 
Equity believes that iOra’s management team has the skills and background to deliver 
products which are relevant to the mobile content management market both today and 
in the future. The efficient transmission of data will continue to be important to 
companies and content providers irrespective of future developments, and iOra's 
technology in this area is world class. At a time when the markets are down and 
investors are more cautious, Cazenove’s involvement is a significant endorsement of 
iOra. The investment from b-business partners and Cazenove Private Equity reflects its 
success to date, the value of its solution, and the significant potential for growth in this 
market.
Partnering Arrangements
iOra works with large enterprises wishing to give access to critical information and web 
applications to remote sites and users. After a number of board discussions involving 
its Ventures, the company has a new partnering strategy which it hopes will enlarge its 
market as well as helping its partners share in the mobile data management market. 
The Ventures believes that only a cooperative arrangement with other players is likely 
to give iOra the strength necessary for exploiting the full market potential. 
As with any new product in a new market, initial direct sales have been vital for iOra. 
But, having built up a customer base that includes Bacardi, GlaxoSmithKline and the 
United Nations, iOra is ready to take the channel partner route. iOra anticipates 
partners coming from four areas: companies involved in building intranets; ASPs 
(application service providers); system integrators; and those involved in wireless 
technologies, as these emerge.
iOra’s ventures ensured that the company put together a balanced management team 
from both partners. In doing this, the company and the team had to hammer out a 
completely fresh strategy, an organisational model, and guiding principles for the new 
partnership. Moreover, the company recognised it could not compromise the new 
partnership’s goals and values for the sake of making anyone comfortable. The 
company would risk putting the partnership in jeopardy if it failed to set a clear strategy 
and articulate a new value system before setting people loose on new projects.131
As well as getting others to sell its software, iOra is adept at spotting key competitors -
and neutralising them with the active support of its ventures. Early in the company's 
history a big-league rival was identified by the four founders of iOra. Lotus was the 
clear and present danger to the fledgling iOra, with the mobile component of its Notes 
software, the browser access element of Lotus Domino and the offline feature 
introduced with Domino Offline Services. 
Happily, it was discovered that Lotus "didn't have anything like Epsilon" which is iOra’s 
patent-pending compression technology, described as being based on the fact that ‘a 
lot of corporate intranet content repeats itself’. Without such compression technology, 
Lotus users were experiencing very long download times and, as a result, no one was 
using any of the mobile elements. Further iOra’s ventures suggested that it became a 
technology partner with Lotus and it is now selling through their channel.132
Appendix 2: Private Equity Fund Portfolio Company Case Studies: No. 5 Appendix 2: Private Equity Fund Portfolio Company Case Studies: No. 5 Appendix 2: Private Equity Fund Portfolio Company Case Studies: No. 5 Appendix 2: Private Equity Fund Portfolio Company Case Studies: No. 5
Primal Pictures Primal Pictures Primal Pictures Primal Pictures
Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary
This case is an example of a start-ups’ efforts to increase its skills base by collaborating 
with educational institutions and government bodies. Primal Pictures had a nice idea to 
start with but needed a refined marketing approach to build its cutting-edge 
technology. This came from its partnership with the UCL. The European Commission 
and the Department of Trade and Industry contributed towards the financial support 
specifically targeted at developing its production-related skills. CAIPE, Primal’s venture, 
is now in the process of refining the product range and marketability of Primal Pictures.
The Primal Pictures’ CD-ROMs offer the first ever complete 3D anatomical model of 
the body. The Interactive Series consists of several CD-ROMs - Hand, Hip, Shoulder, 
Knee, Foot, and Ankle - which are designed for qualified and general medical teaching 
environments. Each CD-ROM displays an anatomically correct graphic model of part of 
the body built into a three-dimensional model from Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) 
and Computerised Tomography (CT) scans using sophisticated computer graphics. 
Primal Pictures' products, developed over the past ten years, now include the entire 
muscular-skeletal system and the Spine, which was launched in September 2001. The 
interactive models allow surgeons, physiotherapists, teachers of anatomy, and other 
health professionals to strip away the skin and examine muscles, ligaments and bones 
of various parts of the body.
The company is working closely with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 
Cambridge University and University College in London (UCL). UCL had been 
researching techniques for visualising bones in the head and this research was used by 
Primal Pictures to produce the Interactive Skeleton. The Interactive Skeleton has won a 
number of awards, including the British Medical Association Award for Best Electronic 
Product of 1996, and the prestigious International Association for Media in Science 
Prize.
Primal Pictures, which operates in the rapidly expanding electronic health care 
education market, is experiencing huge demand for its products, with sales in the last 
year doubled at £1 million. A recent funding round raised £3 million to finance the 
development and marketing of its products.
Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile
Primal Pictures is an electronic anatomy model developer. It was established in 1991 
with the goal of creating the only complete and medically accurate 3D model of the 
human anatomy. In July 2003 it completed this mission. The 3D anatomy software is 
widely adopted in education and it is currently used for patient, practitioner and student 
education in over 20 countries. By 2004 over half a million students will learn anatomy 
using Primal software. 133
The representation of the body is unique because of its accuracy and detail. It is 
derived from medical scan data interpreted by a team of staff anatomists and "built' by 
its in-house team of graphics specialists. The anatomy is accompanied by 3D 
animations showing function, biomechanics, and surgical procedures. Supplementing 
the core 3D anatomy are clinical videos and text written by some of the leading 
medical specialists in the world. ‘The word anatomy does not really reflect the nature 
of innovation in our products,’ explained Chris Briscoe, creative Director at Primal 
Pictures. ‘These are the most advanced 3D models of anatomical structures ever built.’
Primal also works on many customisation projects every year to tailor the model to the 
needs of its clients’ marketing or training programmes as well as to ‘animate’ surgery 
or disease. For its corporate clients it is its combination of detailed accurate knowledge, 
medical and graphics expertise which makes it so different from competitors. Software 
production is based in London, England but its sales consultants are based around the 
US as well as in the UK. Future software developments at Primal will create ever more 
effective education tools in anatomy, pathology and physiology.
With £950,000 of recently raised venture capital, the company intends to go global with 
marketing. It plans to create more disks of body parts, to add to Foot and Ankle, 
Shoulder and Knee, until the company has a full set of about 20. And a pay-per-view 
service is launching on the web in a few months aimed at audiences such as medical 
students who cannot afford to pay the CD's £150 purchase price. 
All this activity should by next year double the company's planned 2003-2004 turnover 
of £14.3m. But with the web an unknown quantity and the medical profession's 
appetite for high-tech training aids seemingly insatiable, there is no telling how fast 
Primal Pictures might grow. ‘The market for educational medical products is going to 
increase over the coming years, partly because there is a great emphasis now on 
patients being as well-informed as doctors,’ says a commentator. 
Investor Relations Investor Relations Investor Relations Investor Relations
Primal has been successful in raising funds from the venture capital industry. In fact, 
the collaboration involves three parties – Primal, UCL, and CAIPE. Credit Agricole 
Indosuez Private Equity (CAIPE) led a £3.2 million funding round in 2001. CAIPE 
invested £1.6 million, with existing investors British Smaller Technology Companies 
VCT, British Smaller Companies VCT, Capital for Companies VCT and BWD AIM VCT, 
and chairman, David Carman, providing the balance of £1.4 million. CAIPE also made a 
£200,000 share purchase from the co-founders, taking CAIPE's total investment up to 
£1.8 million. CAIPE has the option to invest a further £0.5 million if the company 
decides to accelerate further development.  Nick Jones of CAIPE took up a seat on the 
company's board.  He promises to strengthen the on-going relationship between Primal 
and the UCL by further emphasising the innovative nature of Primal’s work. 
The organisational arrangements between CAIPE and Primal are reported in Table 1. 
There are some formal procedures for reporting important decisions to CAIPE but 
certain types of interaction, for example additional communications with Venture 
Partners, are not always recorded and in a number of instances, Primal interacts in this 134
way but has no record. Thus the examples below reflect those activities that have been 
recorded and reported and may not reflect all interaction undertaken.
Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements
Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Comment Comment Comment Comment
Telephone or write to 
express 
concerns/decisions
General issues of 
concern to the Ventures 
such as feedback on 
management 
development issues 
There were frequent 
interactions between 
Primal and CAIPE via 
this medium
Meet with CAIPE 
Partners
To seek advice on new 
alliances or investment 
in new operations
One or two meetings in 
a month
Corporate Board 
meetings 
To discuss strategic 
issues relating to 
product launch or 
company preparations 
for IPO 
5 to 6 meetings in a 
year
Company reportF ormal accounts and 
projects
Yearly
Primal has a policy and organisational structure in place which addresses how it 
discharges its responsibilities in relation to its investors and the broad topics covered. 
Most communications as summarised in Table 2 are about Primal’s progress on 
product development and how it plans (including the timeframe) to commercialise its 
products.
CAIPE helped Primal Logic develop a comprehensive set of statistics upon which it 
may base a demand model. This involved commissioning a market research firm to 
provide a coherent picture of product demand across Europe. The firm collated data 
and advised on its definition, consistency and the basis for estimation of missing data. 
This invaluable set of data formed the basis for discussion at Primal’s board meeting.  
Milestone Events Milestone Events Milestone Events Milestone Events
Bringing the human body to life
Primal Pictures was set up by Laurie Wiseman, a former reporter at the UK’s first 
national breakfast station, TV-am, and his friend Chris Briscow. They saw an article in 
Broadcast  magazine about EC grants being available for computer educational tools and 
applied for one with a view to creating a mass-market coffee-table book of 3D graphics 
of the human body.
Wiseman, also a former award-winning Channel 4 documentary filmmaker, hankered 
after studying medicine but had opted to become a journalist. ‘I didn’t want to commit 
to being a doctor at that stage,’ he says. He heard about the possibilities of producing 
3-D models of the body after making a documentary about ear implants. Fellow 
Director Chris Briscoe pioneered some of the graphics techniques used in the CDs. 
Their first product, an interactive skeleton, filled a niche. It was becoming increasingly 135
difficult for doctors to buy the real thing when imports from one of the key markets, 
India, were banned. A version of the skeleton for the educational market, licensed to 
publisher Dorling Kindersley, has sold 60,000 worldwide.
Their venture took a different turn when they met Dr Alf Linney from University College 
London (UCL). Dr Linney is an expert in creating 3D graphics used to plan facial surgery. 
His office is full of before-and-after-surgery photos, in which people who have 
sustained horrific head wounds through trauma or disease, are literally rebuilt along 
plans laid out in 3D graphics. UCL also contains a world-famous teaching hospital, 
thereby providing the opportunity for product experimentation. 
Dr Linney’s expertise is not limited to creating these images, he is also very good at 
securing grants. He helped Primal Pictures to receive a range of Government funding 
including, initially, an Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) 
grant for collaborative research into ways of modelling soft tissues and bones. These 
developments made Laurie Wiseman realise that their principal market was not going 
to be the mass market - it was going to be surgeons and students. 
‘UCL and Alf Linney were fantastic. They helped us find what we wanted to do, helped 
us secure the funding, and then we went and did it.’ This collaboration resulted in their 
first CD-ROM, the Interactive Hand - an anatomy guide in full colour, and fully animated. 
One could watch the hand's layers of skin, muscle, veins and arteries, and nerves, all 
being slowly stripped back to the bone, and then replaced, all in 3D and all viewable 
from any angle. One could also watch its articulation and movement at all stages. 
Medical students now had a means of gaining an intimate understanding of the human 
hand.136
Table 2: Management Areas of Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Influence
Category Category Category CategoryC omment Comment Comment Comment Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome
Partnering 
arrangements
Primal shares its 
technology with other 
different research 
organisations to develop 
and refine its products
Both research and 
financial collaboration 
with UCL and 
Cambridge University; 
collaboration for funding 
under EU’s Framework 
Programme 6
Marketing campaignsP rimal is developing 
different marketing 
strategies in line with its 
product range
CAIPE provided funds 
for developing pay-per-
view service; helped 
design its 
commercialisation 
strategy
Product Development Primal is actively 
developing its in-house 
research capabilities 
CAIPE financed its 
latest product range; 
also received 
Engineering and 
Physical Sciences 
Research Council 
(EPSRC) grant for 
collaborative research
European Funding for Research at Primal
The innovation has now created more ambitious plans. Dr Linney says: ‘Currently, 
we’re trying to raise some money for a complex dynamic model of the entire human 
body. A fair amount has been achieved already. Muscles and skeleton – we’ve already 
done some. But we want to extend that to the entire body, an entire model of the way 
joints work, including the stresses and strains under various activities.’ 
Primal Pictures and UCL are looking at pan-European funds. The European 
Commission’s latest research funding programme, Framework Programme 6 includes 
headings for projects such as multi-media and anatomy. Primal Pictures is now looking 
for partners from across Europe. ‘We’ve put out a search for partners on an Internet 
notice board, where people pin up their interests. At the moment a group in Spain 
might be interested. And we’ve identified some people in Switzerland we'd like to 
work with,’ says its founder.
Primal Pictures and UCL also used the DTI-funded Teaching Company Scheme (TCS), 
as a cross-university/business training programme. Dr Linney says the number of 
applicants from this is ‘overwhelming’, with as many as 250 people applying for a 
single position. ‘It’s popular because successful applicants get the chance of training 
that no company could hope to teach you without university help,’ he says. 
Primal Pictures is not only employing medical expertise from UCL. ‘In the case of our 
second TCS, we went for a trainee in the marketing side, because we needed to 
develop our marketing power. We advertised for the trainee and brought the candidate 137
into the TCS via UCL’s business management school. UCL is not just a teaching 
hospital! It was a very successful move, and really helped us develop our marketing 
side,’ says Wiseman.
Business Benefits
He adds that ‘UCL has been very good at bringing venture capital money into the 
company at critical times. Historically the value of that cannot be overestimated. The 
collaboration has also helped us gain credibility. When a small company gets 
associated with a university it can be of immense value. We still quote our 
collaboration with UCL as part of our badge of honour, our credentials.’ 
UCL also keeps Primal Pictures aware of new 3D imaging technologies and new 3D 
displays. ‘They give us access to new technologies and help us become aware of 
them,’ says Wiseman. But for him it's the creative vision of UCL that is invaluable: 'In a 
commercial environment you can lose sight of what blue skies could be - the 
possibilities of Research and Development (R&D). But universities are not tied to 
commercial imperatives. So it makes sense for companies to try to collaborate with 
universities. In our case such collaboration gives us an R&D vision and edge which is 
not usual in a small company.’ 
‘SMEs generally don’t have the resources to invest in such research. Now, as the 
collaboration develops, UCL helps us hang on to that vision and they instil new vision. 
They help us ask: ‘What more possibilities could there be?.’ Wiseman identifies other 
benefits peculiar to his particular product line: ‘A large part of our market is medical 
students. UCL is a large medical school, so we have access to market knowledge as 
well. It’s like having a good market sample right on our doorstep. They’ve also given us 
access to staff - anatomists and medical physics experts. Our collaboration with UCL 
effectively means we can dip in and sample their skills. That’s part of the great 
personal relationship we have.’
Primal’s Commercialisation Strategy
The commercialisation approach to innovation is critical for Primal because it helps 
determine how much money the company will make from its products over the years. 
Further, commercialising the wrong way may simply fail the new ideas despite their 
huge potential in increasing customer satisfaction. In general, companies may not be 
lacking in ideas, resources, or opportunities to succeed, but may lack knowledge of the 
right way to go about bringing products into the markets. They may base their 
commercialisation decisions on fragmented and partial evaluations of factors such as 
the industry, the innovation, and the risks. For example, it is important to look at the 
product’s life cycle in order to determine the window available to recoup investments. 
The Ventures are very keen to ensure that Primal’s commercialisation analysis captures 
what is unique about the innovation and points to the approach that will maximise the 
company’s profits. The following areas have been discussed in details in various board 
meetings:
(i) It was decided to take into account the structure of the industry the company is 
trying to enter. The following factors were deemed important: the magnitude of 
investment to enter the market (this will also determine the ventures’ future 138
investment); the nature of the supply chain; the importance of the Primal’s brand; and 
the intensity of competition.
(ii) The nature of the innovation itself was another consideration. Included in this were 
Primal’s complements and substitutes. The identification of the products’ 
complements would increase the product’s scope in terms of its customer use. For 
example, there is a possibility that other related learning softwares would complement 
and therefore enhance the use of the Primal’s CDs. Similarly, it would be important to 
identify substitutes for Primal’s CDs to ensure effective competition strategies.
(iii) Risk analysis was the third feature of Primal’s commercialisation strategy. This 
included an analysis of whether Primal’s products would actually deliver the improved 
performance they promise. Another dimension of the analysis was the investment that 
Primal needed to commercialise its products. This would also inform the ventures’ 
future investment profile. 139
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Blackboard Blackboard Blackboard Blackboard
Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary
Blackboard is a growth company. Major areas of investor influence have therefore been 
related to its IPO and more recently its drive to become a global company. 
Blackboard’s unique product range presents itself with many global challenges. It 
entered into a very useful partnership with Welocalize to implement an enterprise-wide 
globalisation plan (services provided in many different countries) related to the 
Blackboard Learning System. The partnership will directly affect how e-education is 
deployed and offered around the world and enable educational institutions abroad to 
tailor e-learning to their local pedagogical approaches (educational approaches adopted 
by individual establishments) by focusing on further empowering Blackboard’s clients, 
partners, and Building Block application developers. Blackboard’s ventures provided 
significant input into the negotiations with Welocalize in terms of the potential benefits 
and cost to the company in going global. Similarly other alliances have been fully 
supported by Blackboard’s ventures.
Blackboard’s financial stability makes additional mergers and acquisitions a viable 
option as the company moves forward. Additionally, Blackboard is always looking for 
new partnerships with small to mid-sized businesses. In fact, partnership opportunities 
are written  into the plan, which is to offer clients a "total e-Education Infrastructure". 
Blackboard’s venture owners such as Carlyle have been fully supportive of  
Blackboard’s partnership and acquisition strategy. This has also been helped by the 
leadership skills of Matthew Pittinsky and the management team he has been able to 
assemble over the years. For example, the alliance with George Washington University 
was particularly aimed at developing the specific skills of Blackboard’s employees and 
managers.
Blackboard Inc is an online education company that provides effective platforms (e-
learning tools) for teaching and learning over the Internet. Blackboard provides 
"Universal Learning Solutions," a roadmap (e.g. long-term strategy) for educators to 
host (provide on-line teaching) single course web sites with Blackboard com, multiple 
course web sites with Blackboard CourseInfo, and entire online campuses with 
Blackboard Campus. Blackboard customers include hundreds of institutions such as 
Arizona State University, Cornell University, Georgetown University, the University of 
Southampton and The College of William and Mary.
Blackboard Campus is the first enterprise-grade system (systems which provide on-line 
multiple educational facilities such as teaching, assessment, feedback etc) for 
supporting the academic activities of an entire college or university. Students, 
educators and visitors to an online campus powered by Blackboard Campus experience 
a thriving, interactive and customised online-learning environment that provides around 
the clock access to academic programmes and the personality of campus life. 140
Investor Relations
Fresh from a successful Initial Public Offering (IPO), Blackboard has major plans and, so 
far, investors seem intrigued. Blackboard (BBBB) entered the market on June 18, 2003 
at $14 a share, which rose to $23.38 and finally closed the day at $20.01. With 5.5 
million offered shares, representing 21.5 per cent of the company, Blackboard raised 
$77 million. IPO analyst Tom Taulli liked what he saw: ‘This IPO seemed to excite 
investors, and they seemed to go ahead and jump on the bandwagon.’ Since the IPO, 
the stock has retreated a bit. Now the question is: How much growth can Blackboard
produce in coming months and years? Blackboard is not the only company offering 
educational systems and services software. Its main competitors are: WebCT, 
eCollege.com (ECLG), Desire2Learn, SunGard Data Systems (SDS), Diebold (DBD), and 
CBORD Group. Many of these competitors extend their offerings beyond educational 
services, making them attractive suppliers to customers with multiple needs.
Blackboard will also be moving forward with a new round of $30 million in equity 
financing. Strategic investors from the first round of financing include America Online 
Inc, Dell Computer Corp, Pearson, Inc, Internet Capital Group, The Carlyle Group, 
Novak-Biddle Venture Partners, Kaplan Inc, Aurora Funds, and Merrill Lynch Kecalp LP.
The organisational arrangements between Blackboard’s Ventures and the company are 
reported in Table 1. There are some formal procedures for reporting important 
decisions to the Ventures but certain types of interaction, for example additional 
communications with the Venture Partners, are not always recorded and in a number 
of instances, Blackboard interacts in this way but has no record. Thus the examples 
below reflect those activities that have been recorded and reported and may not reflect 
all interaction undertaken.
Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements
Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Comment Comment Comment Comment
Telephone or write to 
express 
concerns/decisions
General issues of 
concern to the Ventures 
such as feedback on 
product development
There were frequent 
interactions between 
Blackboard and its 
Ventures via this 
medium
Meet with Venture 
Partners
To seek advice on 
product delivery 
arrangements etc
One meeting a month
Corporate Board 
meetings 
To discuss strategic 
issues relating to 
product launch or new 
acquisitions / alliances
5 to 6 meetings in a 
year
Company reportF ormal accounts and 
project reports
Yearly
Blackboard has a policy and organisational structure in place which addresses how it 
discharges its responsibilities in relation to its investors and the broad topics covered 
(e.g. how the Blackboard is entering into new alliances or supplier agreements). Most 
management areas of influence which are summarised in Table 2 are about 141
Blackboard’s progress on product development and how it plans (including the 
timeframe) to commercialise its new portfolio of products.
Table 2: Management Areas of Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Influence
Subject Subject Subject Subject Comment Comment Comment Comment Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome
Preparations for IPOV entures such as 
Carlyle Group still 
maintain significant 
equity holdings in the 
company so their 
involvement in the 
preparations for 
Blackboard’s IPO was 
important (e.g. Carlyle 
provided the necessary 
legal expertise) 
Carlyle was closely 
involved in the 
company’s IPO
Product Launch The company 
introduced Blackboard 5 
in 2003  
Dell Computer Corp, 
Pearson, Inc, Internet 
Capital Group, The 
Carlyle Group and
America Online Inc. 
provided technical and 
marketing support
Acquisition and 
Partnering 
Arrangements
Blackboard made major 
alliances with 
Prometheus, Welocalize 
and NextEd (see below)
AOL-Time Warner, 
Internet Capital Group, 
Microsoft Corporation 
and Pearson Education 
funded these alliances. 
Carlyle provides 
expertise to develop its 
global delivery network 
(see the relevant 
section)
Milestone Events Milestone Events Milestone Events Milestone Events
When Matthew Pittinsky and Michael Chasen started Blackboard in 1997, they were 
still in their 20s, but not everyone saw their youth as a plus – Blackboard has many 
critics. ‘If I were CEO, I would surround myself with grey haired public company men 
and women.... You need a management team that has a lot of depth,’ Taulli says. 
Initially, the entrepreneurial spirit of Pittinsky and Chasen, as discussed below, made 
sure that Blackboard was able to gain a toehold in its particular market, but then the 
support given by Carlyle and other ventures became a crucial factor in sustaining the 
company’s growth patterns. Still, Taulli agrees Blackboard is a strong competitor right 
now and a hot IPO. He believes that if it continues on its current growth trajectory, 
Blackboard could be acquired by one of its bigger competitors at some point.
A leading executive in education technology and e-learning, Matthew Pittinsky co-
founded Blackboard with a mission to "transform the Internet into a powerful 
environment for teaching and learning." Today, with 2,700 client institutions, 415 staff, 142
4 acquisitions, and more than $100 million in investment financing, Blackboard is 
considered by most industry analysts to be the leading provider of e-education systems 
around the world.
Blackboard’s co-founders are focused on building a company that can react rapidly to 
what customers want. In addition, it has the support of ventures such as Carlyle who 
are willing to provide all the help it needs. This support can be in areas as diverse as 
finding global suppliers, deal structuring and general management support such as the 
recruitment of technical workers (see also sections on Consolidation and Supplier 
Agreement for Global Delivery Network).
As chairman, Pittinsky leads Blackboard's corporate and product strategy, including the 
company's merger and acquisition activity, from an educator's perspective. He also 
serves as Blackboard's chief spokesman to the academic and financial communities,
and leads the company's internal communications and culture-building activities. 
Pittinsky based Blackboard's original business plan on research he conducted while a 
student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. Prior to co-founding Blackboard, 
he worked as a consultant in KPMG Consulting's Higher Education practice, where he 
was an early participant in the Educause IMS (Instructional Management Systems) 
standards project.
Meanwhile, Blackboard plans to expand beyond universities into the K-12 (US school 
grades) market as a means of boosting revenue, although Richard Peterson, a market 
strategist for Thomson Financial in New York, points out that it may be a difficult sector 
to tap. "You have to look at building relationships with public schools vs. private," he 
says. "There may not be a lot of funding there. But if [Blackboard appeals to] local 
school boards and they have a willingness to fund it, they'll find [the money]." Still, 
Peterson believes Blackboard can remain a successful IPO if it continues to meet 
growth expectations. "It's about growing the business and trying to remain focused," 
he says. For investors, IPOs have had a shaky run the past few years, but Blackboard is 
off to a good start although the risks are clear.
With the latest release of Blackboard 5, Blackboard Inc. will expand its offerings from a 
platform for offering online courses to a complete enterprise portal (also offering 
services such as assessment, student feedback etc). The offering will allow individuals 
connected with a campus to pull up a personalised screen that, in addition to online 
components of courses and email, gives access to information in administrative 
systems (fees due, grades, schedules, etc), academic resources, and a number of 
modules for information from campus affiliations and selected news and e-commerce 
organisations.
Consolidation
To consolidate the market in which Blackboard operates, Carlyle proposed that 
Blackboard form a partnership with Prometheus. The Prometheus course management 
system was designed in 1997 at George Washington University (Washington, DC) and 
is currently used by 65 post-secondary institutions, including Rochester Institute of 
Technology and The Wharton School.143
George Washington University is receiving a combination of debt and equity from 
Blackboard, explains Pittinsky, and offers his company significant new resources in 
‘talent, technology and a blue-chip client base.’ Blackboard can use this talent in 
developing its own enterprise software products and services to educational 
institutions and providers, and makes its software licensing, professional services, 
transactions, ASP services, and hardware bundles more attractive. This alliance 
therefore serves the skill development needs of Blackboard. 
The acquisition will mean a marginal increase in Blackboard's overhead in the short-
term due to relocation and other overheads. However, Carlyle has been quite happy 
with Blackboard’s increased overheads because of the long-term benefits that the 
consolidation can potentially bring. For example, Prometheus is a community source 
software, allowing clients to customise code in an open environment. On the other 
hand, Blackboard is an open architecture system. The merger will allow system 
extension and better customisation. These potential long-term benefits have motivated 
Carlyle to fully support the acquisition. Pittinsky says it is absolutely not an attempt to 
simply add to his client base. ‘At this stage of the industry's development, numbers of 
clients is not nearly as important as depth of relationship,’ he argues. ‘Prometheus' 65 
licensees include some of the most innovative institutions in the industry.’
Despite the shaky economy, Pittinsky sees no softening of the education market, and 
says the core Blackboard business continues to exceed internal financial targets. He 
believes the market will continue to consolidate over the next few years, with a 
number of large players left standing. The question is will one of those players be 
Blackboard? Strategic acquisitions such as the Prometheus deal certainly help. 
Additionally, Blackboard has raised more than $100 million in private financing from 
heavyweights such as AOL-Time Warner, Internet Capital Group, Microsoft Corporation 
and Pearson Education (see also Table 2). The company expects to be cash-flow 
positive and profitable "on an ongoing basis" in 2004, according to Pittinsky.
Supplier Agreement for Global Delivery Network
Responding to the rapid global adoption of its e-learning software, Blackboard Inc 
entered into an expansive partnership with Welocalize (Welocalize specialises in four 
industries or ‘verticals’: life sciences, e-learning, storage and supply chains) to 
implement an enterprise-wide globalisation plan (services for more than one country) 
related to the Blackboard Learning System. Focused on further empowering 
Blackboard’s clients, partners, and Building Block application developers, the 
partnership will directly affect how e-education is deployed and offered around the 
world and enable educational institutions abroad to tailor e-learning to their local 
pedagogical (educational) approaches. This is very much in line with Carlyle’s emphasis 
on exploiting global outsourcing trends – in fact, Carlyle had been instrumental in 
initiating negotiations with other companies. Carlyle boasts a highly skilled team with 
an extensive knowledge of the global market, having first hand experience in all the 
major industrial and service markets. The Venture is therefore best suited to offering 
high level expertise to its portfolio companies.
Blackboard has been working with Welocalize for several months and selected the 
company as its long-term partner in the full globalisation of the Blackboard Learning 
System. “This will be a tremendous benefit to our entire client base, which increasingly 144
requires enterprise technology and customisable applications that can cross all 
borders,” says Andrew H. Rosen, general manager of Blackboard’s international 
operations.
Blackboard Inc has also formed a strategic licensing agreement with NextEd Ltd, a 
multi-national provider of web-based education hosting and delivery solutions. The 
venture lays the foundation for the first global delivery network for accredited online 
higher education. This agreement has the support of Blackboard’s financial backers -
Carlyle in particular. As mentioned earlier, Carlyle has the necessary expertise in global 
deal making because of its operations in many other parts of the world, so it is no 
surprise that Carlyle provided all relevant market information to Blackboard for it to 
reach a profitable agreement for the company.    
Under the terms of the agreement, NextEd licenses the Blackboard Campus software
platform for use across its international server network, deployed to reach students in 
13 countries in Asia/Pacific, Europe and Africa. This agreement was seen as a major 
step in harnessing the power of the Internet to benefit education around the world. It 
also provides a solid step in NextEd’s strategy to expand the Blackboard platform 
worldwide. Now students - even those in many remote regions inaccessible to higher 
learning institutions - are able to access faculty talent at some of the world's best 
colleges and universities. This potential for business is the reason that many private 
equity firms such as the Carlyle Group (the major investor of Blackboard) are keen to 
get involved with companies such as Blackboard and NextEd - not only to help them 
with further consolidation but also to spread the gospel of globalisation to their other 
portfolio companies.145
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Edscha Edscha Edscha Edscha
Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary
Edscha provides supply motor parts to a range of manufacturers all over the world. To 
meet the increasing demands of its customers, Edscha introduced a strictly customer-
oriented organisational structure which, however, resulted in them experiencing 
uncertainties in their own supply chain. Realising the difficulties faced by Edscha, 
Carlyle encouraged it to obtain the services of a specialist consulting firm to re-orient 
its supply chain. Carlyle also supported Edscha’s existing vocational training 
programme to continue with the practice of producing high quality supply chain 
specialists. The performance effect has since been rewarding for both Edscha and its 
ventures.
Edscha represents innovative supply chain solutions in the automotive industry. It is 
one of the largest and most sophisticated supply chain management companies in 
Germany, serving a range of global auto companies. It started by offering simple motor 
parts solutions but realised that there were huge opportunities offering value-added 
products. Its solutions enable customers to realise enormous savings through better 
and more efficient supply chains and improved quality products. 
Edscha had a head start because motor parts and supply chain solutions were not 
handled professionally in the sector. The company’s unique product range also made it 
attractive to customers in many regions, not least the North American’s large 
automotive market. When the company started its operations, it was among the few 
companies able to manage the huge increase in the demand for its product range, due 
to its efficient solutions. It trained people and had the resources to handle such a large 
inventory flow. As a result of this expertise, the company was able to win huge 
contracts for supplying auto parts to the downstream producers.
The company’s growth has been aided by the fact that its owner, the Carlyle Group, is 
a private equity fund house with an expertise and willingness to support company 
management efforts in providing innovative solutions to its customers. This is 
significant because Edscha constantly needs to restructure and improve its supply 
chain management practices.
The primary objective of Edscha is to steadily increase the value of the company in the 
interest of its shareholders, employees and customers. To achieve this, its products, 
manufacturing processes and customer service must be "best in class" and remain so. 
Accordingly, it concentrates on niches in the automobile industry in which it already 
holds such a position or can work to obtain it in the medium term. This case describes 
the nature and scope of the combined efforts of both Edscha and Carlyle in formulating 
the supply chain responses to market demands.146
Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile Company Profile
Edscha's principal activity is the manufacture and distribution of car body parts to the 
automotive industry. The Group consists of four divisions: Hinge Systems, Convertible 
Roof Systems, Driver Controls and Sliding Roofs for Trucks. The products of the hinge 
systems include hinges for car doors, hoods and hatches, door checks and integrated 
systems. Convertible roof systems division develops and supplies soft tops, hard tops 
and retractable hard tops. Driver controls division reviews pedals and parking brakes 
and the sliding roofs for trucks division, provide curtain sliders, full covers or sliding 
frame covers. The Group's subsidiaries are located in Europe, North and South America 
and Asia. Hinge systems accounted for 71 per cent of 2002 fiscal revenues; convertible 
roof systems, 19 per cent; driver controls, 6 per cent; and sliding roofs for trucks, 4 per 
cent.
In recent years, Edscha has leveraged its position as a specialist in mundane parts -
hinges and control parts - into a growth field where innovation is marketable. It has 
shifted expertise in hinges into making convertible tops as automakers started seeking 
suppliers capable of designing and supplying roofing systems. Its roofing operation has 
grown to more than 100,000 convertible top systems annually. In addition, Edscha had 
contracts for DaimlerChrylser's 2004 PT Cruiser convertible and 2003 Smart Roadster.
Through acquisition and internal growth, Edscha also expanded its driver control 
operation from making pedals into Tier 1 status as a producer of pedal modules. Since 
December 1999, Edscha has made acquisitions in Belgium, Portugal, the Netherlands, 
the UK and the US. For instance, Edscha purchased vehicle development specialist 
IVM Automotive, a German subsidiary of family owned IVM Group. Edschas aid it 
bought IVM Automotive because it was one of the few development companies 
experienced in project management for complete vehicles. IVM Automotive has know-
how in body development and design; engine, drivetrain and running gear technologies; 
automotive electronics; and prototype construction and testing. Edschai s now looking 
at acquiring operations outside Germany, involved with similar types of activities.
Edscha already has a presence in North America - an EdschaR oof Systems Inc 
subsidiary. Based in Michigan, USA, Edscha roof systems initially employed 10 
engineering and project managers in Southfield, and 10 more at Edscha’s Jackson 
Automotive Group unit in Jackson, Michigan. Thomas Wunsche, Edscha’s CEO of 
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area) operations, was appointed head of the new 
subsidiary. Previously Edscha’s only North American product was the roof system for 
BMW's future Z3 replacement. Edscha developed the cabriolet top in Europe and then 
produced it in the USA at Spartanburg, North Carolina assembly facility as part of a local 
joint venture with roof system supplier ASC. All of Edscha’s previous cabriolet roof 
systems were produced in Europe.
Investor Relations Investor Relations Investor Relations Investor Relations
Edscha is best known as Europe's largest automotive hinge maker, but its expansion 
into convertible roofs led to its acquisition by the Carlyle Group, a US investment fund. 
Carlyle bought its stake from PCI Edscha Partners, Deutsche Beteiligungs and Flint 
Echo. Carlyle created a holding company, EdCar, to take Edscha private. Carlyle holds 147
77 percent of Edscha equity, and four members of Edscha's management board hold 
the other 23 percent.
Carlyle is expected to accelerate Edscha's international expansion and eventually may 
take Edscha public again when financial markets are more favourable. Carlyle wants to 
partner with the company on a long-term basis. The deal also confirms the current 
importance of the private equity houses in the industry at present. Carlyle already has a
pattern of international expansion in the automotive sector. Carlyle owns the Honsel 
group, a German supplier of aluminium castings. As part of its consolidation strategy, 
Carlyle integrated the strategic management functions of Honsel into another Carlyle 
venture, AMCAN Consolidated Technologies of Canada, a producer of automotive light-
metal precision components.
The organisational arrangements between Carlyle and Edscha are reported in Table 1. 
There are some formal procedures for reporting important decisions to Carlyle but 
certain types of interaction, for example supplementary information to Venture Partners, 
are not always recorded and in a number of instances, Edscha interacts in this way but 
has no record. Thus the examples below reflect those activities that have been 
recorded and reported and may not reflect all interaction undertaken.
Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements
Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Comment Comment Comment Comment
Telephone or write to 
express 
concerns/decisions
General issues of 
concern to Carlyle’s 
Managing Directors 
such as feedback on 
new appointments
There were frequent 
interactions between 
Edscha and Carlyle’s 
Managing Directors via 
this medium
Meet with Carlyle’s 
Managing Directors
To seek advice on new 
personnel appointments 
or investment in new 
operations
One or two meetings in 
a month
Corporate Board 
meetings 
To discuss strategic 
issues relating to new 
acquisitions or company 
preparations for IPO 
5 to 6 meetings in a 
year
Company reportF ormal accounts and 
project reports
Yearly
Edscha has a policy and organisational structure in place which addresses how it 
discharges its responsibilities in relation to its investors and the broad topics covered. 
Most communications, as summarised in Table 2, are about Edscha’s supplier chain 
management.148
Table 2: Management Areas of Investor Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Investor Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Investor Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Investor Influence
Category Category Category CategoryC omment Comment Comment Comment Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome
Acquisitions Globalisation trends 
made sectoral 
consolidation desirable
Carlyle influenced the 
decision to acquire IVM 
Automotive and 
provided funds for the 
purpose
Restructuring  Increased market 
competition forced 
Edscha to restructure its 
operations to achieve 
efficiency and 
effectiveness
Carlyle provided 
technical expertise for 
"Mobility 2005" plan – it 
discussed in detail all 
relevant strategies
Supply chain 
management
Edscha implemented 
new techniques of 
supply chain 
management
Carlyle brought up the 
issue at a board 
meeting and 
participated in 
discussions with
Swisslog Supply Chain 
Consulting Division to 
formulate the new 
programme
Employee development Vocational training is a 
key element in the 
German industry’s 
global competitiveness
Carlyle fully support 
Edscha’s long-standing 
vocational training 
programme
Milestone Events Milestone Events Milestone Events Milestone Events
Acquisition of IVM Automotive
To achieve its goal, Edscha takes advantage of the most important trends in the 
automotive sector: globalisation, reduction of the number of suppliers, extension of the 
range of products from components to create modules and systems, and outsourcing 
of production and development. It intends to further improve its excellent market 
position, mainly by expanding its development capacities – a major success factor and 
a market with growing significance in the automobile industry. It took a big step 
forward on this path with the purchase of the vehicle developers IVM Automotive in 
July 2002. As mentioned above, Carlyle has a pattern of international expansion in the 
automotive sector as it owns the Honsel group, a German supplier of aluminium 
castings. In line with this strategy, Carlyle participated in discussions over this purchase. 
With IVM Automotive Edscha is able to self-reliantly extend its products to encompass 
new technologies and adjoining body areas, and can also open up entirely new, 
attractive niches relating to any aspect of the automobile.  149
Restructuring at Edscha
A package of measures, called "Mobility 2005", has recently been introduced by the 
Management Board (Carlyle has a representative on the board) to adapt the Edscha 
Group to be flexible within difficult economic conditions and to strengthen its earning 
and growth power. Carlyle was concerned with the Edscha’s ability to maintain its 
competitive advantage and saw  ‘Mobility 2005’ as a way to focus the Group’s 
strategies. For the 2003/2004 financial year, the Edscha Group will not be able to reach 
its sales and earning targets but by adopting the measures contained in "Mobility 2005", 
Edscha expects to be able to recover its flexibility and live up to its "best in class" claim 
economically.
Important elements of the programme are rigorous exploitation of savings potentials in 
purchasing and through outsourcing, capacity adjustments, concentration of capacity at 
low-cost locations, reduction of overhead and personnel costs, and avoidance of 
excessive investment. The Vehicle Design business division adjusted personnel 
capacities to the changed level of demand by closing the Sindelfingen location by end 
August 2004; the same level of customer service in Baden-Wurttemberg, however, is 
guaranteed by the Stuttgart and Bad Friedrichshall locations. The Driver Controls 
division will reduce cost by relocating the central development centre from 
Hengersberg, Germany, to Vendas Novas, Portugal. The Hinge Systems and 
Convertible Roof Systems divisions are currently investigating concentration and 
outsourcing opportunities.
Innovations in Supply Chain Management
As a supplier to the automotive industry Edscha’s operating fields include car body 
products, convertible top systems and sliding canvas tops for trucks. For the highly 
competitive automotive components industry, which is characterised by major annual 
price reductions, it was necessary for Edscha to introduce a strictly customer-oriented 
organisation. Services desired by customers had to be fulfilled rapidly, on time, in top 
quality, and at market-oriented prices. This is where Edscha seemed to regularly 
experience problems due to uncertainties in their own supply chain – a purchased part 
otherwise always available might be suddenly out-of-stock, or a capacity bottleneck 
previously undetected might come up. The issue was taken up by the Carlyle 
representative, at one of the board meetings, with the consequence that Edscha 
management decided to re-evaluate its existing supply-chain practices. 
With the target of firmly anchoring process orientation across the entire organisation, a 
project was launched in co-operation with Swisslog Supply Chain Consulting Division. 
This was actively supported by Carlyle’s Managing Directors throughout its 
implementation. Order centres were installed in all three plants of Edscha assuming 
responsibility for the planning and controlling of the entire performance process –
inventory, volume, schedule effectiveness, and shorter throughput times – using the 
WAY Supply Chain Simulation. This phase was followed by the rapid reorganisation of 
business processes, improvement in data quality, and training of employees in the use 
of WAY and the new processes, transforming the company into a process-oriented 
organisation.150
Performance Effect:
Truly efficient process planning and control can only be successful if the entire process 
is free of all potential bottlenecks for material as well as capacity. By identifying and 
eliminating these bottlenecks, the new procedures proved to be an indispensable tool. 
Thanks to the visualisation of the performance chain, the order centre was able to 
harmonise the entire supply chain for the first time ever. Since the beginning of 
December 1998, all work groups in production at the works in Remscheid are planned 
and controlled by the order centre and are free of any planning errors. All 
manufacturing tasks (controlling information for the work groups) are tested for 
material availability and sufficient capacity without exception. Employees at Edscha can 
now meet deadlines, since bottlenecks are detected during simulation and can be 
eliminated before they actually occur. Benefits are:
• In less than 12 months, inventory linked to the supply chain was cut by more 
than half. This has virtually eliminated production misplan
• Just-in-time delivery is now 100 per cent guaranteed on the production side
• Schedule effectiveness has been increased by over 95 per cent – without buffer 
stocks!
• Inventory turnover at finished parts level is approx. 150 times per year.
Moreover, the new organisation has had a positive effect on the corporate culture and 
the ongoing improvement process. The high level of transparency also means that 
employees have stopped looking for a guilty party; instead they have begun searching 
for practical ways of permanently eliminating the causes of interruptions.
Employee Development
Edscha is convinced that people acting on their own responsibility and enjoying their 
work are the best basis for successful work in the area of supply chain management. 
Comprehensive customer orientation both inwardly and outwardly, organisational 
structures of greater complexity and not least globalisation call for creative and open-
minded employees who take a logical approach to the agreed objectives and 
dependably achieve them. This philosophy is very much in line with the work ethics of 
its new owners - the Carlyle Group, which also means that Edscha can now pursue its 
personnel development policies with new vigour and commitment. Carlyle’s influence 
in this area is however limited to approving the continuity of the Edscha’s existing 
personnel development plans, as they are seen as a major source of the traditional 
competitive advantage that the company has enjoyed over the years.
This is why Edscha focuses on training and developing its employees and also on 
winning additional talent. Within the Edscha Group worldwide, it has pioneered many 
innovative training programmes. It has done this by international job exchange, the 
further qualification of the employees at all levels and outside the Group, by working 
with universities, by targeted advertising of vacancies and by its network of consultants. 
For example, Coventry Centre for Investment has worked closely with Edscha UK 
Limited, assisting them with their investment in Middlemarch Business Park and 
subsequently on business-related issues. This included a ‘Partnership at Work’ Fund 
project as well as an active participation in CCfI Improvement Action Networks.151
Partnership at Work Fund project: Edscha UK Manufacturing Ltd is a private sector 
manufacturer in Coventry, which produces automotive components. Its project has 
been created to "foster partnership in the workplace to address issues of high levels of 
staff turnover, and achieve much higher levels of labour retention." Edscha and its 
partner want innovative and creative problem solving solutions in the workplace and a 
'Partnership Charter' approach for new working practices and increased worker 
participation.
Due to the company's organisation - flat hierarchies and short reporting channels -
employees can take on responsibility early on for a wide range of tasks in supply chain 
management, in some cases affecting more than one location. The company is glad to 
support its employees; employees’ personal development and more far-reaching tasks 
are an integral part of annual objective agreement meetings. Employees are also 
assisted in their professional careers by programmes for junior executives and targeted 
human resources development measures.152
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Evotec OAI Evotec OAI Evotec OAI Evotec OAI
Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary Case Summary
Evotec OAI’s competitive advantage is clearly dependent upon its ability to create work 
environments that promote employee creativity and innovation. Although the problem 
of retaining scientists is common to all industry players, Evotec OAI simply could not 
overlook the problem any longer as its commercial strategy was clearly based on 
achieving company growth and development on a continuous basis - a factor which has 
attracted unremitting support from many of its Ventures. When Mulligan BioCapital of 
Hamburg, one of its Venture’s, raised concern about the employee retention problem 
Evotec OAI simply had to act. With the Venture’s backing, Evotec OAI’s was able to 
introduce several innovative employee incentive schemes, including one involving 
share ownership scheme, which has helped it to improve its employees’ satisfaction 
level. This case demonstrates the extent to which investor influence can be significant 
in core management practice areas.
Evotec OAI is a leading provider of biology and screening services. Traditionally, the 
company has held a strong position in the market but the sector is becoming 
increasingly competitive with new entrants, notably from oversees, coming in. Most 
customers purchase from more than one supplier and quality is the key driver in 
purchasing decisions. Evotec OAI’s human resource management (HRM) was 
improved through the presentation of detailed data and comment from its ventures on 
its employee incentive system as well as on its organisational system.
Background Background Background Background
The pharmaceutical industry
There appears to be no end to the development of novel technologies and mutually 
beneficial arrangements, and most industry watchers agree the expansion rate for 
alliances between businesses is also starting to increase rapidly. One example of this 
trend is EvotecB io Systems GmbH, which formed a collaboration with SmithKline 
Beecham to bolster its position in functional genomics. Indeed, pharmaceutical 
companies may be focusing their biotech efforts less on individual disease areas than 
on fostering technologies that will be crucial to breakthroughs in the future. Any 
technology getting closer to identification of a novel molecular target will be a prime 
target for investment funds. 
Biotech/pharmaceutical alliances are structured in a variety of ways. Some include an 
equity component.  Others involve an up-front licensing fee paid by the pharmaceutical 
company to the biotech firm. Milestones may be set in order to determine payments 
from the pharmaceutical partner to the biotech partner, and up-front or staggered 
clinical support payments are negotiated. Outright acquisition of a biotech firm is rare. 
When it does occur, it usually grows out of an existing alliance.153
Important breakthroughs over the last few years, particularly in the area of genomics 
and combinatorial chemistry, have put biotech companies in a stronger position to 
make deals. In the early ‘90s it was hard to strike a deal, but now that biotech can 
finance themselves through the capital market, companies can be more selective about 
the alliances they form and deals are becoming more strategic.
Pharmaceutical companies have traditionally preferred exclusive arrangements but 
exclusivity is not always achievable. New technologies, such as genomics, high 
throughput screening and database creation, require an industrial environment and a lot 
of capital. What is going on in genomics could be called the industrialization of biology. 
A non-exclusive structure makes more sense than having one company exploit the 
technology and biotech companies are pouring more money into this than a single 
pharmaceutical company would want to. 
Non-exclusive arrangements and deals put together under a variety of different 
structures are being driven in part by a new generation of business development 
managers. Schering-Plough and Bristol-Myers Squibb, for example, are cited as 
examples of companies where business managers - often ones whose careers began 
in research - have been willing to consider new strategies and new forms of industry 
partnership. ‘These loosely knit alliances are forming a web of connections that will 
eventually lead to an industry structure that looks something like a spider's web,’ notes 
one industry observer. 
What biotech companies have found is that they do not need to be controlled by one 
set of investors or one management team. There is room for lots of models and 
financing structures. Evotec OAI’s financing arrangements with a variety of Ventures 
(involving both equity funds and private financing) exactly demonstrate these trends. 
More importantly, the way Ventures have been targeting the micro management 
practices in their portfolio companies is also apparent from the case of Evotec OAI and 
its relationships with its Ventures.
Company Prof Company Prof Company Prof Company Profile ile ile ile
Evotec OAI was formed in December 2000 from the merger of EVOTEC BioSystems 
AG and Oxford Asymmetry International (OAI). The merger brought together these two 
major companies in the provision of biology and screening services and chemistry 
services respectively, to meet the special needs of the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries. Evotec is a world leader in ultra high throughput screening 
from primary development to clinical trials, but it does not cover biological screening. 
The acquisition of OAI gives it expertise in libraries, R&D, manufacturing and scale-up. 
Some companies are focused on screening using traditional technologies, but not at 
the high throughput levels. There are two important parameters in ultra-high 
throughput screening - the speed of screening is one and the other is that it is 
important that data quality is high because the information content is valuable.
Evotec OAI endeavours to understand the pressure facing the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries today to get new drugs to market faster and more cost 
effectively than their competitors. To date the unique range of fully integrated services, 
ranging from individual services right through from target to IND scenarios (i.e. 154
complete delivery of portfolio services), has enabled Evotec OAI to deliver seamless 
solutions for all of the top pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. Evotec OAI’s 
other services include:
• Fully integrated biology, screening and chemistry services 
• Seamless solutions with one company through all stages from target to IND 
• A proven track record across pharma and biotech industry 
• Critical mass: quality of people and extensive state of the art facilities. 
Evotec OAI and New Outsourcing Trends 
Evotec says growth in outsourcing in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries 
is accelerating and claims that on average, companies currently outsource around 25 
per cent of drug development work, with this figure set to rise to around 30 per cent in 
2004. Evotec, following its absorption of OAI, aims to position itself as a 'one-stop-
shop' in order to meet the needs of companies outsourcing work in the sector. Evotec
claims it is more convenient and saves time and money for companies to deal with just 
one service provider. 
Evotec OAI’s intentions in this respect became clear when it bought Oxford 
Asymmetry International of the UK for £285m (US$427m). Evotec OAI’s Ventures 
made a significant contribution to this acquisition. The deal forms a company which 
both parties believe will have no direct rivals in the drug discovery and development 
marketplace. In addition, the combination of companies is described as having no 
overlapping skills in its combined portfolio. 
The deal combines Evotec’s activities in ultra high throughput screening and assay 
development with OAI's biotechnology expertise. Both companies hope that their 
combined skills allow clients to perform ultra-high throughput at speed, creating an 
advantage over competitors. Another key advantage of the deal, Evotec claims, is to be 
able to offer a combined range of services for both companies' sets of clients. Evotec
and OAI both already have extensive clients in biotech and pharmaceutical industries, 
so many cross selling opportunities can be created. The two companies will also be 
able to take advantage of opportunities in the US and Europe with their combined skills 
portfolio.
Investor Relations Investor Relations Investor Relations Investor Relations
Evotec has recently secured a   625m first round of venture capital financing for its 
neurosciences subsidiary. The parent company EvotecO AI now own some 42 per cent 
of Evotec Neurosciences (ENS). The latest financing comes as the company 
announced what it called a 'significant' in-licensing agreement with Roche on selective 
antagonists (e.g. infection control solutions in hospitals), and will allow accelerated 
development of its proprietary and in-licensed compounds, helping it to build an 
exciting and broadly balanced portfolio of central nervous system (CNS) drug 
candidates.
Closing one of the largest first rounds of financing in a difficult environment for 
European biotech is validation of the quality of Evotec OAI's R&D investments. It 
allows ENS to further expand its portfolio in the field of CNS diseases. Evotec has also 155
secured   17.5m in private financing for its Direvo Biotech subsidiary. The cash has 
been raised in Germany through investment firms Techno Venture Management, and 
Mulligan BioCapital of Hamburg, as well as private investors. The private backers 
include Nobel laureate Prof Dr Manfred Eigen and Dr Ruthild Winkler-Oswatitsche of 
the Max Planck Institute for BioPhysical Chemistry in Gottingen, Prof Dr Heinrich 
Schulte of the Clinic for Endocrinology, Hamburg, Dr Metin Colpan and Peer Schatz of 
Qiagen in Hilden (all Germany). Following the deal, the investors own 50 per cent of 
the company's shares, and Direvo's capital has increased from   50,000 to   100,000.
Investor-investee communications arrangements
The communications arrangements between Evotec OAI’s Ventures and the company 
are reported in Table 1. There are some formal procedures for reporting important 
decisions to the Ventures but certain types of interaction, for example additional 
communications with Ventures, are not always recorded and in a number of instances 
Evotec OAI interacts in this way, but no record of it is kept. Thus the examples below 
reflect those activities that have been recorded and reported and may not reflect all 
interaction undertaken.
Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements Table 1: Reporting Arrangements
Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Communication Type Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Matters Discussed Comment Comment Comment Comment
Telephone or write to 
express 
concerns/decisions
Routine matters such as 
budgetary outlays, 
appointment of lower 
level staff etc
Frequent interactions 
between Evotec OAI
and its Ventures via this 
medium
Meetings with Venture 
Partners
To seek advice on 
supplier 
arrangements/changes 
or on new senior 
personnel appointments
One or two meetings a 
month
Corporate Board 
meetings 
To discuss strategic 
issues relating to new 
product launch, new 
acquisitions, company 
preparations for IPO etc 
5 to 6 meetings in a 
year
Company reportF ormal accounts and 
project reports
Yearly
Evotec OAI has a policy and organisational structure in place which addresses how it 
discharges its responsibilities in relation to its investors and the broad topics covered. 
Most communications as summarised in Table 2 are about Evotec OAI’s involvement 
with the newly acquired subsidiaries and how it plans (including the timeframe) to 
increase its market share in its particular areas of interest. Ventures have frequently 
conveyed their concern that Evotec OAI has been too quick to enter into negotiations 
with outside parties for licensing agreements/acquisitions. They are keen on Evotec 
OAI first developing a sound business plan before considering any such opportunity.156
Venture Influence
Evotec OAI’s Ventures are actively involved in the operations of the company. These 
activities are summarised in Table 2. Some of the important areas of Venture influence 
are discussed below in more detail as milestone events. 
Table 2: Management Areas of Venture Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Venture Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Venture Influence Table 2: Management Areas of Venture Influence
Management A Management A Management A Management Area rea rea rea Venture influence on  Venture influence on  Venture influence on  Venture influence on 
Evotec OAI Evotec OAI Evotec OAI Evotec OAI
Comment Comment Comment Comment
Acquisitions and 
outsourcing
Techno Venture 
Management 
participated in 
discussions over the 
financing arrangements 
of ENS and OAI’s 
acquisition
Evotec OAI is a growth 
company and thus it is 
involved in a number of 
new outsourcing 
arrangements and 
acquisitions
Employee incentivesM ulligan BioCapital of 
Hamburg advised on 
hiring a consulting firm 
and provided funds 
earmarked to offer 
employee training
Evotec OAI’s had 
experienced a particular 
problem of high 
employee turnover rate
Research and 
Development
Techno Venture 
Management and 
Mulligan BioCapital of 
Hamburg have provided 
R&D funds (but 
allocation was done by 
Evotec OAI itself)
The company is 
constantly engaged in 
developing its service 
base
Milestone FundingN o milestone funding is 
available to Evotec OAI 
– all its funding is one-
off
Some ventures provide 
additional funds 
conditional on company 
meeting certain 
performance targets
Milestone Events Milestone Events Milestone Events Milestone Events
Problems of staff retention
A couple of years ago, Evotec OAI was losing more than a quarter of its staff every 
year. The HR Director had tried various measures to stem the flow, including improving 
pay rates, changing the bonus system, updating training and development, revamping 
the appraisal system and conducting exit interviews, but to no avail. The company was 
losing 26.4 per cent of the workforce a year at a time when the company was trying to 
grow.
"This made it a double problem, as we were trying to expand rapidly," says Martyn 
Melvin, HR Director. "We were recruiting more than 100 people a year and sometimes 157
150. We were simply losing too many too soon." It wasn't that there was a flood of 
people moving overseas or to other areas of employment where they could earn more 
money — they were leaving for other pharmaceutical companies. 
After discussions at a number of Board meetings involving Evotec’s Ventures, in 
particular Mulligan BioCapital of Hamburg, it was decided to draft in an independent 
consultancy, Penna. Mulligan’s concerns were based on its experience with its other 
portfolio companies. One of the issues it frequently had to deal with was the retention 
of skilled workers. Realising a similar problem was occurring at Evotec OAI it had 
raised the issue of providing more relevant incentive regimes to the Evotec OAI’s 
employees. However, Evotec OAI management was reluctant to re-evaluate its 
existing practices because its peers in the industry were facing the same problem, 
albeit on a different scale. As a result, it was decided to ask Penna to conduct first an 
employee survey, which would later inform any discussion at the Board about this 
particular problem. The Board wanted employees to feel comfortable about expressing 
their concerns honestly and openly and felt this would be more easily achieved if an 
external body was involved. 
Penna then embarked upon another staff survey and more focus groups, including 
asking employees to assess individual managers and departments. From this, it was 
discovered that the main problem was staff management and the lack of visible career 
options. Employees liked the company and found the work interesting, but their 
managers were not providing the kind of career development they wanted. "We have 
some superb scientists who are not so good at managing people," explains Melvin. 
"What surprised us was that people felt they needed more support for their careers, 
and better communication. They felt there was more judging of their work than 
providing support and planning for the future. We had to show people that they could 
build a good, successful career here."
The company was concerned that those managers who were singled out as not 
providing sufficient support and career development would be demoralised by their 
employees' assessment. However, Melvin says the response was more one of 
concern, and managers have been eager to improve. Many managers were lacking any 
form of management training, so the company embarked on a new tranche of training. 
There were a lot of one-to-one coaching sessions for senior management, and middle 
managers were put through another series of training programmes. Work has 
concentrated on areas such as team building, how to build high-performance teams 
and how to motivate staff. 
How staff were promoted was another key area, as employees felt that certain people 
were picked for promotion, and the process was unfair. Melvin says there is now a 
formal system for promoting people, one that is much more open and fair.
The company also made some changes to the benefits package, giving the workforce 
more choice. A subsequent survey showed promising results. "Work with managers 
has improved in some areas, but others still need more work," Melvin says. Senior 
managers are now required to be more visible in the organisation, and there are 
rewards for people being good managers, as well as good scientists. One of the 
incentives used was to strengthen the company stock option scheme as described 
below.158
Evotec OAI’s new employee incentives scheme: Stock option
The new incentive structure involves Evotec offering all its employees the opportunity 
to become shareholders in Evotec OAI through stock option programmes. This move 
clearly demonstrates the company’s goal of using incentives for its specialist staff 
since this is crucial for attracting and retaining highly qualified employees amid intense 
international competition. As discussed above, Evotec OAI’s Ventures were 
instrumental in designing and implementing the new employee incentive regime. 
Because the employee survey conducted earlier strongly recommended a revised 
incentive plan, it was discussed at length at the board meetings. The study and 
subsequent discussions provided Evotec OAI with detailed data and comment on its 
employee incentive system and organisational system. At a strategic level, the 
discourse enabled the company to identify strengths and weaknesses, to assess the 
motivations of its key employees and to act on those areas in its strategic planning. At 
an operational level, the dialogue identified problem areas and areas of competitive 
advantage in specific HRM practices, and concerns which the company needed to 
address. At its Ordinary General Meeting the following stock option programmes were 
launched:
Up to 30 per cent of the total number of stock options of each group can be granted.
Options can be granted at any time as long as the requirements of each individual 
programme are met. The terms of the stock option plan provide that the Management 
Board can grant options only if the average Xetra closing price of the shares of the 
Company during the last three months of the financial year prior to the granting of 
options is at least 30 per cent higher than the corresponding average for the last three 
months of the previous financial year. 159
Table 3. Developments in Evotec OAI’s Stock Opt Table 3. Developments in Evotec OAI’s Stock Opt Table 3. Developments in Evotec OAI’s Stock Opt Table 3. Developments in Evotec OAI’s Stock Options Schemes ions Schemes ions Schemes ions Schemes
Date of the  Date of the  Date of the  Date of the 
Ordinary  Ordinary  Ordinary  Ordinary 
General  General  General  General 
Meeting Meeting Meeting Meeting
Programme Programme Programme ProgrammeT otal  Total  Total  Total 
Number of  Number of  Number of  Number of 
Stock  Stock  Stock  Stock 
Options Options Options Options
Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown
7 June 1999 Original 
Programme
1,466,000* 20%
20%
60%
Management 
Board
Key 
Employees
Other 
Employees
26 June 2000 Additional
Programme I
949,000* 10 %
90 %
Management 
Board of 
consolidated 
companies
Other 
Employees of 
Evotec OAI 
and 
consolidated 
companies
18 June 2001 Additional
Programme II
1,129,6003 00,000
150,000
679,600
Management 
Board of 
Evotec OAI
Management 
Board of 
consolidated 
companies
Other 
Employees of 
Evotec OAI 
and 
consolidated 
companies
Should the hurdle not be reached, the Supervisory Board (Ventures have direct 
representation on the Board) can nevertheless authorise the granting of options to 
employees if it is considered necessary in the interests of the Company, e.g. for 
recruiting qualified staff or for acquisitions of other companies. However, the terms 
concerning the total number of stock options granted per year, as mentioned above, as 
well as the distribution breakdown to the different groups will remain the same. 
Each of the options entitles the holder to purchase one share of the Company's stock 
within ten years of the option grant date. The holder may exercise up to one third of his 
or her options after two years, up to two thirds after three years and all of his or her 
options after four years. The Management Board is authorised to postpone the period 
for the initial exercise of the options, for parts of the Group or the Company as a whole, 
from two to three years after option rights have been granted. In this case, affected 
holders of subscription rights can exercise half of their subscription rights after three 160
years at the earliest and all of their subscription rights after four years. Options can only 
be exercised within certain exercise periods. Each exercise period lasts for two weeks 
and commences on the third trading day after one of the following events: 
• Release of the quarterly results by Deutsche Börse AG  
• Annual press conference on the financial statements of the Company 
• Annual ordinary shareholders' meeting of the Company 
Under the Original Programme, each of the options entitles the holder to purchase one 
share of Evotec OAI with a nominal value of  1 .00 at a predetermined strike price. 
Under the Additional Programmes I and II, each of the options entitles the holder to 
purchase one share of Evotec OAI with a nominal value of  1 .00 at a strike price which 
is 5 per cent above the Xetra closing price of the Evotec OAI share on the last trading 
day before the options were granted. Options can be exercised only if the Xetra closing 
price of the Evotec OAI share on the last trading day before the beginning of the 
exercise period is at least equal to the strike price.
Attrition rates are now down to 12 per cent (achieved over the space of two years). 
This has meant that the training budget has increased as less money is being eaten up 
by recruitment costs. The induction process has been overhauled, with far more 
training now offered to new staff. "Many people had said they were in the lab working 
on the first day," says Melvin. "Now, everyone is assigned a mentor to show them the 
ropes, and there is a more in-depth training programme that goes on for the first year." 
The success of these initiatives has translated to Evotec OAI’s increased ability to raise 
additional funds from various venture capitalists for its many R&D related subsidiary 
projects.161
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1. The Universities Superannuation Scheme 1. The Universities Superannuation Scheme 1. The Universities Superannuation Scheme 1. The Universities Superannuation Scheme
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
The Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS) is the main pension scheme for 
academic and academically related staff in the UK. On 31 March 2003 it had total 
assets of £15.6 billion, making it the third largest pension scheme in the UK. USS is 
an ’immature’ pension fund in the sense that its receipts from active members, and 
employers, exceed payments to pensioners and beneficiaries. Its investment objective 
is ‘... to maximise the long-term investment return on the assets having regard to the 
liabilities of the scheme and the desirability of maintaining stable contribution rates’. In 
meeting this objective, USS has an investment policy of investing approximately 40 per 
cent of its assets in UK equities, 40 per cent in overseas equities and the remainder in 
property and fixed interest securities. This reflects USS’s belief that investment in 
equities will provide superior returns to other asset classes over the longer term. The 
funds themselves are managed by both internal and external fund managers.
The trustee of USS, USS Ltd, has a fiduciary duty to manage the scheme’s investment 
assets for the benefit of members. Because of its size, and investment policies, USS 
holds a diversified portfolio of assets. It therefore has the characteristics of what 
Hawley and Williams
1  refer to as a ‘universal owner’, that is a fiduciary institution that 
holds, for the long-term, a diversified portfolio of shares that represent a broad cross 
section of the economy. As a universal owner, USS is concerned both with the 
individual companies in which it invests, and with the impact of investee companies on 
the economy as a whole. USS, and its fund managers, monitor and engage with those 
companies in which it invests and votes on company resolutions. In addition, USS is 
engaged in responsible investment (RI) with a view to reducing the risk to the long-
term returns on its investment portfolio and to the quality of life of its members.
This case study looks at USS as a universal owner. It begins by examining the concept 
of universal owner and its implications for responsible investment, before presenting 
an overview of USS and its investment strategy. Two projects are then considered in 
greater detail. The first is USS’s activities with the pharmaceutical sector and public 
health crisis in emerging markets. Here there is a perceived threat to the underlying 
business model of pharmaceutical companies from possible Government action, for 
example to weaken patent protection. The second is USS’s activities on climate 
change where the scheme was instrumental in establishing the Institutional Investors 
Group on Climate Change (IIGCC) as a vehicle for co-ordinated action by institutional 
shareholders. The activities of the IIGCC include increasing awareness of the 
implications of climate change, engagement with companies and sectors and 
involvement with policy makers.
Universal Owners and Responsible Investment
Before examining the approach of USS to its engagement activities, and in particular its 
responsible investor (RI) programmes on the pharmaceutical sector and on climate 
change, it is useful to consider the work of Hawley and Williams on fiduciary capitalism162
and the universal owner. This not only provides a framework for considering the 
activities of USS, but there are indications that USS has itself been influenced by their 
ideas. Interestingly, Hawley and Williams
2  use the work of USS on climate change as 
an important example of the involvement of institutional shareholders in policy 
initiatives.
The term  fiduciary capitalism is used to describe the third stage of corporate capitalism 
in which the ownership of shares is concentrated in the hands of fiduciary institutions 
such as pension funds and mutual funds
3 . The term itself reflects the obligations of 
financial institutions to manage the funds for the benefit of investors or beneficiaries. 
Hawley and Williams argue that fiduciary capitalism represents more that a simple 
change in the pattern in the way in which shares are held. Not only are institutional 
shareholders seen as having different incentives and behaviour patterns to those of 
individual investors, but many institutional shareholders are large and hold diversified 
portfolios that effectively represent a broad cross-section of the economy. These large 
institutional shareholders with diversified portfolios are referred to as universal owners.
The main characteristics of universal owners are described by Hawley and Williams, as 
above, and who hold shares for the long term with trading mainly restricted to 
maintaining an index. The return on the investment is therefore dependent on the 
performance of the economy as well as on the performance of each individual 
company in the portfolio. Hawley and Williams suggest that this has two 
consequences:
• Universal owners should assess the impact of those companies in which they 
invest on the economy as a whole because, as owners, they capture the benefit 
of any positive externalities and are harmed by companies’ negative externalities
• Universal owners ‘... come to occupy a quasi-public position as having an 
economic interest in the long-term health and wellbeing of society as a whole’. 
The interests of universal owners extend beyond macroeconomic policy issues 
to include regulatory concerns and the provision of public goods such as health 
care and education.
Hawley and Williams contrast two approaches to investment. First, the traditional view 
of investment is characterised by selecting companies that make profit by shifting 
costs to other companies or to society at large in the form of negative externalities, and 
by avoiding companies that generate positive externalities. Second, the alternative 
approach is one in which the investor considers the interactions between various 
elements of its portfolio, particularly the negative and positive externalities generated 
by portfolio companies. This second strategy is considered appropriate for universal 
owners who should, in addition to normal monitoring and engagement with portfolio 
companies, have an interest in the policies and programmes that promote long-term 
superior economic performance. Although collectively institutional shareholders hold a 
large proportion of the shares of listed companies, the holdings of each institution are 
usually small. Therefore, in order for universal owners to be effective in intervening, it 
is necessary to form coalitions of institutional shareholders.
Universal owners, by holding portfolios that broadly represent the economy as a whole, 
internalise both the negative and positive externalities of the companies in which they 163
invest. They therefore have an interest in encouraging companies to minimise or 
eliminate negative externalities and to produce positive ones and so have the 
incentives to be socially responsible investors. Unlike traditional socially responsible 
investors, who screen and so filter companies (or sectors) on a case-by-case basis, 
universal owners hold shares in diversified portfolios that include shares in those 
companies in sectors that would usually be excluded by traditional socially responsible 
investors. Instead of screening and filtering, universal owners may engage with 
offending companies (or sectors) with a view to influencing their activities.
Hawley and Williams point to another direction for monitoring and engagement that 
may be pursued by universal owners. They note that there are norm shifts, changes in 
society’s attitudes, which may have economic consequences for companies and so for 
universal owners. Changes in attitudes to labour practices, health and safety, tobacco 
and smoking, the use of animals in scientific testing, ethnic and gender discrimination, 
and human rights issues may impact upon companies through, for example, litigation 
and settlement costs. Universal owners, as fiduciaries, are seen as having obligations 
to track norm shifts and analyse their consequences. Hawley and Williams use the 
term universal monitoring , for this form of risk analysis.
Universal owners should, following the argument of Hawley and Williams, monitor and 
engage with companies and sectors in order to reduce negative externalities and 
encourage positive ones, particularly as ‘... negative externalities impose costs on 
affected firms that outweigh - sometimes greatly outweigh - the benefit to the polluting 
firms’
4 . In addition, they should engage in portfolio-wide monitoring using universal 
portfolio analysis to assess the impact of externalities generated within the portfolio on 
universal monitoring. Whilst universal monitoring appears to bring the interests of 
institutional shareholders closer to those of socially responsible investors (SRIs), the 
need for such monitoring is not based on ethical and moral concerns. Hawley and 
Williams write that:
‘... universal monitoring and the fiduciary nature of universal owners 
perspectives suggests that they will continue to use a different language, and 
typically a different yet complementary approach to the SRI perspective. 
Universal owners will view many of these issues not as matters of ethics or 
morality as such, but in terms of sustainability and long-term portfolio-wide 
economic effects and financial performance’.
They go on to note that large institutional shareholders cannot usually use screening 
and filtering but instead must engage often in coalition with other institutions.
Universal owners are therefore interested in both the performance of the companies in 
their investment portfolios, and in wider issues that effect long-term performance of 
the economy. Their engagement is therefore likely to be at the level of the individual 
company and sector, and on broader social and environmental levels. In their 
engagement they are likely to involve other institutional investors.164
USS as a Universal Owner USS as a Universal Owner USS as a Universal Owner USS as a Universal Owner
Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS), which was established collectively by UK 
universities through a trust deed at the end of 1974, came into operation in April 1975. 
It is the main pension scheme for academic and academically related staff in UK 
universities and certain other institutions. At 31 March 2003, the scheme had a total 
membership of just under 187,000, 53 per cent of whom were active members, 28 per 
cent deferred members, 16 per cent pensioner members, and 3 per cent beneficiaries. 
The scheme is therefore immature in the sense that receipts in respect of active 
members exceed payments to pensioners and this situation is likely to continue into 
the next decade. On 31 March 2003 the scheme had total assets of £15.6 billion, 
making it the third largest pension scheme in the UK.
The investment objective of USS is stated in its 'Statement of Investment Principles’ 
as ‘... to maximise the long-term investment return on the assets having regard to the 
liabilities of the scheme and the desirability of maintaining stable contribution rates’. 
The Statement goes on to describe the investment management structure and the 
investment asset mix. First, the securities component of the fund is managed by a 
number of discretionary specialist managers and index tracking, and enhanced index 
tracking managers, and the property portfolio is managed internally. Second, the 
appropriate distribution of assets within the fund is UK equities 40 per cent, overseas 
equities 40 per cent, fixed interest 10 per cent and property 10 per cent.  The 
approximate allocation of the securities portfolio is 55 per cent internally managed 
balanced fund, 15 per cent index tracking/enhanced index tracking funds, and 30 per 
cent with externally managed specialist funds. Finally, generally no more than 4 per 
cent of the fund can be invested in any one company, and the fund may not hold more 
than 10 per cent of the market capitalisation of any one company without prior 
authority from the chairman of the investment committee.
The USS Statement of Investment Principles sets out the scheme’s policies on 
responsible investing. Generally, USS Ltd aims to be ’... an active and responsible long-
term shareholder of companies and markets in which it invests’. It sees a policy which 
encourages responsible corporate behaviour as also one which protects and enhances 
the value of the fund’s investments. More specifically, USS Ltd requires:
‘... its fund managers to pay appropriate regard to relevant corporate 
governance, social, ethical and environmental considerations in the selection, 
retention and realisation of all fund investments. The management committee 
expects this to be done in a manner which is consistent with the [USS Ltd’s] 
investment objectives and legal duties.’
Following on from this, fund managers (both internal and external) are required to use 
their influence to promote good practice in the companies in which they invest and 
markets in which they are significantly exposed. 
An outline of the approach taken by USS Ltd is included in the Statement of 
Investment Principles. This includes first a requirement for the management 
committee to review, and where appropriate update, the company’s corporate 
governance, social, ethical and environmental policies to ensure that they are 
consistent with good institutional investor practice. Second, fund managers are 165
expected to monitor the policies and practices of the companies in which they invest, 
or may possibly invest, on material corporate governance and social, ethical and 
environmental issues. Third, USS Ltd expects its fund managers to collaborate, where 
this is likely to be effective, with other institutional investors to encourage the 
managers of companies to address these issues appropriately. Finally, as a part of the 
engagement strategy with companies, USS Ltd indicates that it will use its voting 
rights ‘in a prioritised, value-adding and informed manner’.
USS and its fund managers monitor and engage with the companies in which they 
invest in much the same way as other institutional investors as described by 
Stapledon
5 . This can be conveniently characterised as routine and extraordinary actions. 
Routine actions include the analysis of information concerning companies and 
meetings and dialogue with their managers. It also includes voting on resolutions 
presented at companies’ AGMs. The shares held both in internally and externally 
managed funds are voted in accordance with the wishes of USS. USS uses Manifest, a 
voting proxy specialist, to manage its voting of shares in UK companies. USS has 
developed a voting template which Manifest uses for voting; resolutions that are in line 
with USS’s voting policies are supported and others are referred to USS for 
consideration. A resolution that is inconsistent with the voting policies may 
nevertheless receive support. Not only does the use of the Manifest service minimise 
the operational problems associated with voting, it also serves to screen resolutions 
and frees time to focus on contentious issues.
In addition to the routine monitoring of, and engagement with, companies, USS and/or 
its fund managers may take extraordinary actions. These are usually triggered by share 
price performance, with either a company performing poorly relative to the sector, or a 
sector performing poorly relative to the market. An attempt is made to understand the 
reason for poor performance, either through the fund manager and/or broker, and/or 
through meetings with the company. Transparency, as well as poor performance, is 
therefore important. In this way USS is similar to the institutional shareholders 
described by Hebb
6 , who reports that a number of activist institutional shareholders 
believe that there is a link between shareholder value and transparency. The 
companies targeted by institutional shareholders are almost invariably those exhibiting 
poor performance. Hebb notes, however, that institutional shareholders appear to be 
willing to maintain investments in poorly performing companies which exhibit a high 
level of transparency
7 . Although institutional shareholders would prefer to invest in 
companies that have both strong performance and high levels of transparency, they 
appear to be willing to accept companies that have strong performance coupled with a 
low level of transparency. Although companies with low transparency and strong 
performance are rarely, if ever, targeted by institutional shareholders, Hebb reports that 
many of the corporate scandals, such as Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat and Hollinger 
International, involve companies with these characteristics.
In addition to engagement by fund managers, USS has a Responsible Investment (RI) 
strategy, supported by a team of three specialists. Consistent with being a universal 
owner, the RI strategy is based on engagement rather than screening. The overall 
strategy is summarised as follows:
‘Our strategy is based on active engagement with the companies whose 
shares we hold. This involves dialogue about acceptable standards of corporate 166
governance, environmental, ethical and social performance. This dialogue is 
professionally planned and when needed, robust. Engagement also involves 
work to shape the context in which company-specific discussions take place ....
Apart from the moral issues involved, proper assessment of the reputational 
impact of the company’s performance on these wider fronts is increasingly 
material to investment considerations.’
8
The programme of RI activities includes work with other institutional shareholders to 
ensure companies operating in Myanmar (Burma) are fully aware of the risks and 
comply with best practice; engagement with oil and gas companies on a variety of 
social and environmental issues; and the development of corporate governance policies 
for UK and US companies. It also includes work on pharmaceutical companies and the 
public health crisis in emerging markets and on climate change. Both these projects are 
considered in detail below.
Pharmaceutical Companies and the Public Health Crisis in Emerging Markets Pharmaceutical Companies and the Public Health Crisis in Emerging Markets Pharmaceutical Companies and the Public Health Crisis in Emerging Markets Pharmaceutical Companies and the Public Health Crisis in Emerging Markets
Oxfam launched a campaign in 2001 focussing on increasing the access of poor people, 
primarily those in poor countries, to drugs and medicines. Following the launch of the 
campaign, Oxfam, together with about ten institutional investors, including USS, met 
with Glaxo. A year later, a project on the pharmaceutical sector was added to USS’s 
SRSI (now RI) programme. The objective of the project is ‘To encourage the 
[pharmaceutical] sector to address the risks associated with public health crisis in poor 
countries/emerging markets and to raise awareness amongst the sector’s 
investors/analysts of the importance of this debate about affordable access’. The 
position of USS is that the public health crisis in poor countries poses a threat to the 
business model of the pharmaceutical sector, which relies on patents to protect 
investments in risky research and development projects, and so to the long-term 
performance of companies in the sector. The model would be threatened if 
governments, for example, weakened the protection provided by patents in emerging 
markets or imposed caps on the price of pharmaceutical products.
The project, which initially involved USS and ISIS Asset Management and later 
extended to include other institutional investors (forming the Pharmaceutical 
Shareowners Group
9 ), has a number of strands. A key element is the development of a 
framework of good practice for pharmaceutical companies in relation to public health 
issues in poor countries and emerging markets. This focuses on encouraging 
companies to disclose in their annual reports an assessment of the risks or 
opportunities arising from the public health crisis, and of the effectiveness of their 
systems for managing such risks and opportunities. It is noted that investors ‘... 
particularly want to understand the rationale for companies adopting specific policies or 
approaches (e.g. differential pricing and donations versus voluntary licensing)’
10. The 
framework also provides examples of good practice in areas such as pricing and 
patents, public-private partnerships, and research and development.
The importance of the framework is that it provides guidance on what information 
should be included in annual reports so: (i) reducing the costs of investors in collecting 
information; and (ii) encouraging companies to adopt best practices. The 
‘Pharmaceutical Shareowners Group’ is making the framework available to other 
investors and analysts, and encouraging its wider use. It also has a programme of 167
engagement with the large pharmaceutical companies. This includes a letter, written in 
March 2003, to twenty top pharmaceuticals companies, including GlaxoSmithKline, 
AstraZeneca and Novartis, in which the Group outlined the steps they believe are 
required to be taken in order to reduce reputational risk to the industry
11.
A number of significant elements can be identified from the pharmaceutical project
about the way in which USS engages as a universal investor: (i) USS holds shares in 
companies, rather than selling them, and attempts to change policies and strategies at 
sector and company levels; (ii) intervention is justified by USS on the basis of the long-
term financial and operating performance of companies rather than on social/ethical 
grounds; (iii) USS develops relationships with other institutional investors to develop a 
shared approach; (iv) USS engages with companies as part of an alliance of institutional 
investors rather than on its own; and (v) USS and its partners develop a framework that 
enables both effective monitoring and encourages good practice. Some of these 
elements emerge again in USS work on climate change.
Climate Change Climate Change Climate Change Climate Change
Changes in the physical environment linked to shifts in the climate, such as rising sea 
levels, flooding and droughts, and higher temperatures, are seen by many as posing a 
threat to social and political stability and to businesses. Action by governments and 
businesses, for example by programmes to reduce carbon emissions, may contain the 
risks associated with climate change. As changes in the climate could have major 
effects on the quality of life and on the economy, issues related to climate change are 
legitimate concerns of pension fund trustees. USS has consequently included climate 
change on its list of responsible investment (RI) projects.
USS’s involvement in climate change issues stems from a report it commissioned on 
the risks to institutional investors associated with changes in the climate. This report 
both analysed the risks and responses to climate change, and its impact on institutional 
investors. It identified a set of ten action points to help institutional investors better 
manage the risks and opportunities associated with climate change. One of the action 
points was to involve other institutional investors to develop joint action and USS has 
subsequently played an important role in the establishment and running of the 
Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC
12). Much of USS’s activity on 
climate change has been directed through this group. Before examining the approach 
to climate change issues taken by the IIGCC, it is useful to examine in more detail the 
rationale for USS’s involvement in this area.
USS identified two reasons for addressing climate change as an issue. The first of 
these stems from USS’s perception of itself as universal owner, the second is to meet 
the needs of its members and beneficiaries
13.  The first justification of pension fund 
involvement in climate change issues is reflected in the following extract from the 
report on climate commissioned by USS.
14
‘Climate change is a major emerging risk management challenge for 
institutional investors. Institutional investors, and pension funds in particular, 
aim to provide pensions and other benefits through long term investment. 
They can also be seen as universal investors in that, due to their size, they 
commonly invest across the whole economy. If climate change threatens168
economic development, and especially if there are many or significant impacts, 
it will also therefore be likely to undermine the ability of pension funds and 
other institutional investors to fulfil their aims, so it is in their interests to see 
that risks associated with climate change are minimised. Whilst this 
responsibility is widely shared, institutional investors are uniquely suited to 
take particular actions.’
USS therefore sees climate change as a potential threat to the increase in value of its 
assets, noting in particular the detrimental effects that arise when a company, or sector, 
externalises its climate change management costs to other companies or to society as 
a whole.
The other reason for USS’s involvement in climate change issues has to do with the 
real needs of its members. It recognises that ‘.... if the issue of climate change is not 
addressed, there will be significant changes in the environment which are likely to be 
detrimental to the quality of life of our members when they come to retire’
15. As a 
pension fund, USS believes that it has a legitimate interest in the quality of members’ 
lives when they retire, and so considers it appropriate to invest and engage in activities 
that help to ensure a safe and stable future.
USS was instrumental in establishing the IIGCC as a ‘.. forum for collaboration between 
pension funds and other institutional investors on issues related to climate change’. 
The IIGCC aims: 
• ‘To promote a better understanding of the implications of climate change 
amongst its members and other institutional investors
• ‘To encourage companies and markets in which its members invest to address 
any material risks and opportunities to their businesses associated with climate 
change’.
16
USS’s involvement with other institutional shareholders in the IIGCC, and the overall 
aims of the group, are consistent with the recommendations contained in the USS 
Discussion Paper on climate change. In particular, the writers of the Discussion Paper 
suggested that a multiple institutional shareholder activity would serve both to increase 
effectiveness and reduce costs. At the end of 2003 there were 23 members of the 
IIGCC.
The activities of the IIGCC, which are focussed through four ‘work streams’, are co-
ordinated by a Steering Group, which was until recently chaired by an officer of USS. 
The four work streams, which are each chaired by a co-ordinator, are currently 
focussed on: (i) communications and organisational development; (ii) engagement with 
companies and investors; (iii) property; and (iv) public policy. The communications and 
organisational development work stream, whose coordinator is also a USS officer, is 
mainly concerned with ‘... promoting the growth and development of IIGCC and 
increasing IIGCC’s profile, reach and effectiveness.’ Recently this work stream 
organised a conference on ‘Climate change and institutional investors: Managing the 
risks and profiting from the shift to a lower carbon economy’ in order to raise the 
profile of IIGCC and the issues with which it is concerned, and to develop links with 
policy makers.169
The aim of the work stream on engagement with companies and investors is to 
increase understanding and awareness of the risks posed, and opportunities provided, 
to institutional shareholders by climate change. Its approach has been to engage with 
companies on a sector basis, and has focussed its activities on aviation and power 
generation. Reports on these sectors, highlighting the problems of climate change, 
have been produced for the IIGCC by Shroder Investment Management and BNP 
Paribas Asset Management respectively. In addition, it has written to a number of sell-
side brokers to indicate the need for them to incorporate the possible effects of climate 
change in their assessments of company prospects. The third work stream, that on 
property, aims to ensure that climate change considerations are included in the 
management of property investment portfolios.
The final work stream, which is concerned with public policy, has produced a position 
statement that identifies the need for institutional investors to ensure that the long-
term needs of institutional shareholders are recognised by public policy makers.
‘Climate change is a product of market failure: the absence of appropriate 
incentives has led to individuals and companies externalising the costs 
associated with greenhouse gas emissions, generating significant risks to both 
the global environment and the global economy. As a result, public policy 
innovation is essential not only to minimise the damage caused by climate 
change, but also to maximise the opportunities from the transition to a low 
carbon economy. Without credible public policy frameworks, companies and 
their investors will be handicapped in planning how they respond to the climate 
change challenge. Moreover, a policy framework that fails to take account of 
the strategic nature of climate change could result in discontinuous change in 
the future, a sub-optimal outcome for long-term institutional investors’.
The work stream has entered into dialogues with policy makers and opinion formers so 
as to enable investors and policy makers to come to a better understanding of the 
relationships between climate change and finance. 
The approach taken by USS on climate change is clearly constructed within the 
framework of the universal investor as formulated by Hawley and Williams. Climate 
change is something that affects both the long-term returns on the scheme’s 
investment portfolio, and also has an impact on the quality of life of members of the 
scheme. The strategy adopted by USS has been to develop collaboration with other 
institutional investors, and the scheme has played a major role in the IIGCC. The IIGCC 
has promoted awareness of issues of climate change, especially as they affect 
institutional shareholders, and has acted to promote policy changes both within 
companies and sectors, and at a public policy level.
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion
USS, by being a large fiduciary institutional investor that holds a diversified portfolio, is 
a universal owner. As such it is concerned both about the performance of the individual 
companies in which it invests, and the long-term performance of the economy as a 
whole. Like other institutional investors, USS fund managers routinely analyse 
information concerning those companies in which USS invests, and has meetings with 170
company managers. It also has a policy of voting on resolutions of investee companies, 
irrespective of whether the companies form part of the internally or externally managed 
funds. The institutional arrangements for the holding of shares make the mechanics of 
voting complex
17. USS uses Manifest, a voting proxy service, to manage its voting. In 
particular USS has developed templates to screen resolutions. In these activities USS, 
as a universal owner, is acting in the same way as other responsible institutional 
investors.
As a universal owner, USS has an interest in the long-term returns on its assets, and in 
the risks to those returns. It also has an interest in the performance of the economy as 
a whole. Issues of corporate governance, ethical, social and environment performance 
are therefore key to USS’s investment policies. As a universal owner, USS does not 
screen and filter out companies and sectors which have undesirable characteristics. 
Rather, through its RI policies, USS is engaged in activities to promote acceptable 
standards of corporate governance, and undertakes projects to promote acceptable 
ethical, social and environmental standards. Its approach has largely been to work with 
other institutional investors rather than acting alone. This is clearly seen in its activities 
with pharmaceutical companies and on climate change. USS was instrumental in 
establishing the IIGCC, whose activities demonstrate the complexity of institutional 
involvement in ethical, environmental and social issues. Not only is the group 
concerned about the activities of companies and sectors, it is also involved with policy 
makers. Universal owners, such as USS, are therefore engaged in shaping the 
environment in which businesses operate, as well as trying to influence the conduct of 
the businesses themselves.
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Introduction  Introduction  Introduction  Introduction 
The Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (ISC) was established in the early 1970’s in 
response to the recommendations of a working party set up by the Bank of England to 
examine the way in which institutional investors could help improve the efficiency of 
UK companies. Initially the ISC was sponsored by the Association of Investment Trust 
Companies, the Association of Unit Trust Managers and the National Association of 
Pension Funds, and its membership was drawn from the sponsoring organisations. The 
chairmanship was to rotate at regular intervals. At the time the ISC was established, 
the sponsoring organisations saw it as a structure through which they could coordinate 
their existing investment protection activities. During its early years the ISC operated 
through case committees, whose membership was drawn from members of the 
constituent organisations who were shareholders, to engage with companies that were 
perceived to be in difficulty. 
There have been periods in which the specific objectives of the committee, and its 
method of operation, have been shaped by the ISC chairmen. In the late 1980’s and 
early 1990’s two consecutive chairmen, Donald Brydon and Michael Sandland, had 
different visions of the committee’s role. While recognising that the ISC had a role in 
promoting best practice in corporate governance, Brydon saw the “core responsibility” 
to be dealing with management failure. In this regard he saw the ISC as providing 
support to the various investment protection committees. In particular he wanted the 
ISC to have the capacity to offer alternative strategies to those companies experiencing 
difficulty. Sandland, on the other hand, saw the main function of the ISC as dealing 
with issues of general concern to companies and shareholders. During his period as 
chairman the ISC issued a series of statements of best practice for companies and for 
institutional shareholders in their relationships with investee companies. More recently, 
in response to Government concerns, Lindsay Tomlinson has taken the ISC in a 
different direction in focusing on best practice for institutional shareholders as 
responsible investors. 
The history of the ISC is examined in the first part of this case study. This shows the 
changing concerns about UK companies over the last thirty years, and the way in which 
institutional investors, through the ISC, have responded to these concerns. The second 
part of this case study examines the development of the ISC’s ‘The Responsibilities of 
Institutional Shareholders and Agents – Statement of Principles’
1 , and its impact on 
institutional investors. This part of the case-study shows the development of 
Government policy on the role of institutional investor activism following the 
publication of the Myner’s Report 
2  in 2001, and the response of institutional investors, 
through their trade associations, to the threat of new legislation. It also shows how 
institutional investors are responding to the “Statement of Principles” by making their 
policies and activities more transparent. Conclusions are drawn in the final section. 173
A short history of the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee
The ISC came into being in April 1973 following a report by a working party established 
by the Bank of England ‘... to examine and report upon a possible structure and method 
of operation of a central organisation through which institutional investors, in 
collaboration with those concerned, would stimulate action to improve efficiency in 
industrial and commercial companies where this was judged necessary
3 . The 
membership of the ISC initially comprised the Association of Investment Trust 
Companies, the Association of Unit Trust Managers and the National Association of 
Pension Funds (NAPF), with the British Insurance Association agreeing to co-operate in 
individual cases but not becoming a full member. The ISC was to function through case 
committees, made up of members of the constituent associations and possibly 
assisted by outsiders. There were to be no public statements of the ISC’s activities. 
The way in which the ISC operated is reflected in the following report: ‘The ISC works 
through so-called ‘case’ committees which investigate members' complaints. Any fund 
manager who does not feel happy about the way a particular company is being run 
brings his grumbles to the notice of the relevant case committee. This then 
confidentially circulates all its members to find out the extent of institutional 
shareholdings in the company and to canvass other managers' views. Quiet, behind-
the-scenes pressure is put upon the company to make changes’
4 .  Case committees 
were not new. Their use had for some time been an important mechanism through 
which concerned institutional investors engaged with company managers. The ABI had 
established case committees with representatives of the insurance companies with 
the largest stakes in the company for many years, and the NAPF had later used case 
committees with representatives from pension funds. 
The extent to which the ISC used case committees was somewhat limited. The 
Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions (Wilson Committee) 
reported up to the end of 1979 that the ISC had dealt with 37 cases. Of these: (i) seven 
led to formal case committees; (ii) nineteen were thought more appropriate for 
independent action; and (iii) eleven had either ‘... already gone too far for anything to be 
done or were resolved in some other way, for example by the company concerned 
becoming the subject of a successful take-over bid.’
5  The activities of the ISC increased 
in the early 1980’s at a time when economic pressures forced companies to enter a 
period of restructuring, and ‘... the committee in its hey-day was dealing with four or 
five cases at a time of companies in difficulty’
6 . The activities of the committee, 
however, declined in the mid-1980’s when there were increases in company profits 
and share prices and a decline in the incidence of management failure. 
Commenting generally on the use of case committees, including those of the ISC, the 
Wilson Committee reported that they were effective in some cases, but in others the 
intervention was either too late or inadequate. The report explains such failure as 
follows: 
‘The institutions are still to some extent feeling their way, which may inhibit 
them from intervening at an early enough stage, and a company's troubles may 
be inherently difficult to resolve. The managements of companies in difficulty 
are usually well aware of their problems and are frequently subject to a plethora 
of advice. What they usually lack are solutions, which the institutions are not 
typically well equipped to provide. Nor is the bringing in of outside advice or the 174
replacement of senior management necessarily an answer. Satisfactory 
alternatives are not easy to find, especially if the company is in severe difficulty. 
The institutions may not themselves always agree on the best line of action -
they are not as monolithic as the habit of talking about them in the plural might 
suggest. Finally they might meet management resistance and may be 
handicapped by their desire to operate in private so as to avoid the risk of 
making a bad situation worse through publicity’
7 . 
Some of these concerns were to be addressed nearly a decade later by a new 
Chairman of the ISC. 
Donald Brydon, of Barclays de Zoete Wedd and Chairman of the NAPF’s investment 
committee, was appointed Chairman of the ISC in October 1988. At that time he was 
reported as identifying the main issues as ‘... the remuneration of top executives, 
employee share schemes, accounting methods, disclosure of shareholdings, the 
conduct of takeover bids and pre-emptive rights issues’
8 . Brydon set about a 
programme of reform to the ISC by: (i) widening its membership to include the 
merchant bankers and by making the past, present and future chairmen of the 
investment committees of the constituent respective members of the ISC; and (ii) 
becoming a forum through which institutional investors could become engaged with 
investee companies on issues of corporate governance. The ISC was to retain its ‘core 
responsibility’ of dealing with management failure, but Brydon wanted the committee 
to act to support the activities of the investment protection committees
9 of its 
constituent members
10. There were suggestions that he succeeded in moving the 
responsibility for forming case committees away from the ABI and the NAPF so that 
unified committees were formed
11. In particular, in those cases where there was 
concern about a company’s strategy, he wanted the ISC to develop alternative 
business plans using the expertise of its own members and, where appropriate, 
outside consultants. He said “It is not for shareholders to tell a company how to run 
itself. But it is their role to present a company they are concerned about with 
alternatives and to get its reaction. The response of management would be the best 
clue as to whether it was going to take the company forward successfully or not”
12.  In 
order to develop this enhanced role, the ISC recruited a Secretary General, Maurice 
Epstein. 
The direction of the ISC changed with the appointment of its next Chairman, Michael 
Sandland, in 1991. This change of direction is partly reflected in Epstein’s decision to 
resign as Secretary General because ‘... the committee is taking a less interventionist 
role in corporate affairs than he had expected when recruited during the previous 
Chairmanship of Donald Brydon’
13. Rather, the committee became concerned with 
general issues and not those confined to a particular company
14. The ISC issued a 
series of statements of best practice between 1991 and 1993
15: 
•  ‘Role and Duties of Directors - A statement of best practice’ (April 1991). The 
ISC statement of best practice, which closely follows a discussion paper issued 
by the ABI in June 1990, ‘ .... will enable these shareholders to give a more 
coherent and consistent response when their views and votes are solicited by 
companies’ (ISC 1991). It included recommendations that: (i) a company’s 
articles of association should indicate the maximum number of directors and 
provide that each year a third of the directors are subject to retirement by 175
rotation; (ii) the roles of chairman and chief executive should usually be 
separated; (iii) there should be a sufficient number of independent non-executive 
directors who monitor the performance of executive directors; (iv) service 
contracts should be approved by a remuneration committee whose membership 
includes a majority of non-executive directors; (v) ‘rolling’ contracts should run 
for more than three years; and (vi) details of any performance-linked 
remuneration schemes or share option incentive schemes should be given in 
the company’s annual report. The statement of best practice was amended in 
1993. 
• ‘The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders in the UK’ (December 1991). 
This was based upon an ABI Discussion Paper published earlier in the year. The 
ISC principles of good practice cover five areas; (i) under the heading 
communication, institutional investors were suggested to have an obligation to 
exercise their influence in a responsible manner, in particular, they were 
encouraged to enter a dialogue with investee companies; (ii) it is suggested that 
institutional investors should use their votes positively to support boards ‘unless 
they have good reason for doing otherwise’; (iii) institutional investors were 
suggested to have a legitimate concern about the constitution of the board and 
take action to remedy weaknesses; (iv) it was suggested that while the 
remuneration of directors and senior managers was seen as a matter for the 
board and dealt with by an independent remuneration committee, the ISC 
recommended that there should be adequate disclosure of the principles used in 
determining the level of remuneration; and (v) the ISC made recommendations 
about how institutional investors should deal with takeover bids. 
• ‘Disclosure of Research and Development’ (April 1992). The ISC developed a 
policy on disclosure of research and development expenditure in response to 
concerns that institutional investors were failing to make sufficient allowance for 
the long-term potential of the companies in which they invest. One response of 
investors is that ‘... companies are too secretive about their long-term plans for 
investors to be able to assess that potential’. The policy paper suggested that 
these arguments come into focus over research and development expenditure, 
and noted that companies made few disclosures beyond that required by the 
accounting standard SSAP
13 ‘Accounting for research and development’. It 
acknowledged that there were concerns about giving away too much 
information to competitors, but suggested that the ‘... rule should be to be 
positive and to reveal as much about research and innovation as is consistent 
with competitive prudence’. The policy paper set out: ‘... those facts about R&D 
that it would be useful for institutional investors to know, whether through the 
accounts or through other channels’, and suggests that the responsibility is with 
companies to provide that information. 
The ISC was one of the sponsors of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance, chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury, and Sandland was one of the 
members of the committee. The committee’s recommendations were published in 
November 1992. This was to be the first of a series of reports on corporate governance 
that would eventually be brought together in the ‘Combined Code’. 176
The ISC did not issue any further statements on corporate governance following the 
resignation of Sandland as its Chairman. The ABI and NAPF, however, continued to 
issue statements on corporate governance issues, some of which were in their joint 
names. The next major step for the ISC was to emerge a decade later with a new 
chairman, under a Government wishing to encourage shareholder activism. 
Myners, the Government and the ISC
The ISC published a revised Statement of Principles in October 2002. The focus of this 
revised statement was on institutional investors, rather than on the companies in 
which they invest. The ‘Combined Code’, published by the Financial Reporting Council 
and incorporated into the listing rules of the UK Listing Authority, contained principles 
and best practice on corporate governance. The views on good corporate governance 
developed by institutional investors, including the ISC, in the late 1980’s and first part 
of the 1990’s were now expressed through other channels. Compliance with the 
principles of good corporate governance formed part of the continuing obligations 
under the listing agreement. 
The direction of the ISC in the early years of the new millennium was expressed in the 
following report of an interview with its Chairman, Lindsay Tomlinson, who was also 
Chief Executive of Barclays Global Investors Europe and Chairman of the UK's 
Investment Management Association (IMA). The change of direction is reflected in the 
following report in the press: 
‘Tomlinson cites pressure from the UK Government, in the wake of Paul 
Myners’ 2001 review of institutional investment, as the main cause of fund 
managers’ greater willingness to engage with companies. The Government 
retreated from legislation to prompt greater activism when the investment 
management industry promised self-regulation. A code of practice relating to 
engagement was developed by the Institutional Shareholders' Committee (ISC) 
in October 2002’
16. 
Although institutional investors had been influenced by government during various 
periods in the past, the pressure following the publication of the Myners’ report was 
considerable. Before the publication of the Myners’ Report, however, the Government 
had issued a White Paper ‘Modernising Company Law’ as part of the consultation 
process to implement the recommendations of the Steering Group on Company Law 
Review. 
Compan Compan Compan Company Law Review  y Law Review  y Law Review  y Law Review 
The DTI launched a review of company law in 1998 with the establishment of a 
‘Company Law Review Steering Group’. Its terms of reference included consideration 
of how core company law could be modernised in order to provide a simple, efficient 
and cost-effective framework for carrying out business activity. The final report of the 
Steering Group, ‘Modern Company Law For a Competitive Economy’, was published in 
2001. 
During the course of its review, the Steering Group examined the role of institutional 
shareholders. It noted that: ‘It is not, of course, for such institutions to intervene in the 177
normal management of companies, except as part of the routine annual cycle of 
shareholder resolutions; institutional investors are not qualified to second guess normal 
management decision-making; their powers are best regarded as reserve powers to be 
invoked, most obviously, in times of crisis’
17. Nevertheless, the Steering Group 
recognised that there were times where it was appropriate to intervene, and it 
identified two problems which inhibited intervention. These were conflicts of interest 
and failure to take fiduciary responsibilities seriously. It also noted that there are 
problems in ensuring that votes were properly communicated and executed. 
The Steering Group commented that ‘ .... the exercise of institutional investors’ powers 
may be inhibited or even corrupted by conflicts of interest’
18. These conflicts of interest 
were seen to allow company managers to bring pressure on institutional investors, or 
‘spontaneously’ influence institutional investors. It was reported that the Steering 
Group ‘... have completely convincing evidence that highly reputable funds managers 
have both successfully and unsuccessfully put pressure on institutional investors, and 
that ‘Successful attempts also are highly likely to have occurred, but direct evidence is 
not available and unlikely to become so’
19. 
It was noted in the report that ‘The civil law of trusts already imposes duties on 
fiduciary investors to act in the best interests of their beneficiaries, in theory requiring 
them to intervene in companies where their beneficiaries’ interests are at risk and to 
do so purely on behalf of their beneficiaries and unaffected by their own conflicting 
interests’
20. One problem was the lack of information on which beneficiaries could act. 
The solution to this was greater transparency with the Steering group recommending: 
(i) companies should disclose in annual reports and takeover bid and defence 
documents significant commercial relationships with investors controlling more than 
three per cent of voting rights; (ii) companies should record the votes of holders of 
three per cent or more of voting rights; (iii) institutional investors should disclose how 
voting rights in companies had been exercised; (iv) companies should have the voting 
on certain resolutions independently audited; and (v) fund managers should maintain 
records of the exercise of votes to be open to investors, trustees and the public. 
The Government published a White Paper ‘Modernising Company Law, 
21 in July 2002 
as part of the consultation process for implementing the recommendation of the 
Steering Group. In relation to conflicts of interest between companies institutional 
investors, the White Paper noted ‘The Government shares the concerns expressed by 
the Review about possible conflicts of interest which might inhibit institutional 
investors and fund managers in the performance of their governance role. At the same 
time, it recognises that this is a difficult and controversial area, and that company law 
might not be the right vehicle with which to address commercial relationships between 
parties external to the companies concerned’
22. Although the Government did not 
intend to pursue the recommendations on disclosure, it did believe that in principle it 
would be in the public interest for institutional investors to disclose how they voted 
their shares in UK listed companies. 
The Myners Report The Myners Report The Myners Report The Myners Report
The Government commissioned a review, in 2000, under the Chairmanship of Paul 
Myers, ‘... to consider whether there were factors distorting the investment decision-
making of institutions’. A report, ‘Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A 178
Review’ (the Myners Report) was delivered to the Chancellor in March 2001. The 
report contained a case for shareholder activism. 
The case for shareholder activism was based on the duty of fund managers to their 
clients and beneficiaries, rather than the general public interest. The authors of the 
report noted that a fund manager has two ways of dealing with an under-performing 
company: either sell the shares or intervene. It was recognised that there may be 
cases, such as where the fund has a large holding or it has to hold shares because of 
an index benchmark, where intervention is necessary for the managers to maximise 
investor wealth. However, the report noted that fund managers were reluctant to 
intervene in order to deal with under-performance. The report’s authors found that the 
reasons given for not intervening, for example wishing to avoid conflict and regulatory 
obstacles, were not compelling. This led to the conclusion that: ‘... the review is 
particularly concerned by the value lost to institutional investors through the reluctance 
of fund managers to actively engage with companies in which they have holdings, even 
where they have strong reservations about strategy, personnel or other potential 
causes of corporate under-performance’
23. 
The Myners Report’s authors recommended that UK law incorporate provisions similar 
to those found in the US Department of Labor’s Interpretative Bulletin on the 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 1974. Such a provision would 
impose a duty upon fund managers to intervene in investee companies where there 
was a reasonable expectation that such intervention would increase the value of the 
investment. As summarised by the UK Government, the essence of the interpretation: 
‘... is that although within the corporate structure, the primary responsibility to oversee 
corporate management falls on the corporation’s board of directors, active monitoring 
of and communication with corporate management and the exercise of shareholder 
votes is consistent with a fiduciary’s obligations where the fiduciary concludes that 
there is a reasonable expectation that such activities by a scheme (either by itself or 
with other shareholders), are likely to enhance the value of a scheme’s investment, 
after taking into account the costs involved’
24. It then went on to identify the legitimate 
concern of shareholders as including the independence of non-executive directors, the 
appropriateness of executive compensation, and the company’s long-term business 
plan. 
Government Response to the Myners Report
The Government announced that it intended to legislate to enact the recommendation 
of Myners that the principles of ERISA should be introduced into UK law, and that the 
legislation would affect both fund managers and pension fund trustees. The 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and HM Treasury published a consultation 
document, ‘Encouraging Shareholder Activism’
25, on 4 February 2002. 
The consultation document identified the general public interest as being the effect of 
company management on the country’s economic performance and so: ‘..it is an 
important and legitimate issue for Government to ensure that the legal and regulatory 
framework supports shareholders in scrutinising these issues’
26. As a consequence, ‘... 
the Government is proposing to impose, on all those involved in pension fund 
management, an express statutory duty to use shareholder powers to intervene in 179
investee companies where this is in a pension scheme's best interests’
27. The 
legislation would therefore apply to both pension fund trustees and fund managers. 
The associations representing institutional investors responded to the consultative 
document by accepting the principles of shareholder activism while opposing the use 
of legislation. The IMA responded to the document by indicating that it did not believe: 
‘... new primary legislation is the way to achieve this shareholder activism. A new 
statutory duty would not encourage the positive and creative activism we all want to 
see. Instead the emphasis would be on compliance and playing safe. Moreover the 
form of the duty proposed in the Consultative Document is extremely vague. We 
believe this will be difficult for asset managers and their clients to interpret and would 
encourage litigation as a means of seeking clarification. This in turn would only serve to 
further a ‘box-ticking’ approach designed to play as safe as possible’
28.  Instead the IMA 
proposed that non-statutory means would be consistent with the recommendations of 
Myners. It noted that the IMA already issues guidance on the content of fund 
management mandates, and indicated that it was willing to incorporate appropriate 
provisions in its model terms. The IMA also proposed a review, together with the ABI, 
the NAPF and the AITC, of the ISC’s statement of principles. The ABI, in its submission, 
adopted the same approach by stating: ‘The ABI is currently examining the proposal, in 
conjunction IMA and NAPF, to take matters forward and in due course expects to be 
able to recommend to the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee that the paper on the 
Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders be updated and reissued. This would 
seem to us to be the most useful approach to encapsulating and promulgating 
accepted good practice as regards activist duties’
29.  Self-regulation was therefore 
being proposed as an alternative to legislation. As suggested by the above, at the 
centre of self-regulation was to be contained in a revision to the ISC’s Statement of 
Principles. 
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The ISC Statement of Principles
30, published in October 2002, set out ‘... the best 
practice for institutional shareholders and/or agents in relation to their responsibilities in 
respect of investee companies’
31. The ISC indicated that it would monitor the impact of 
the statement and might amend it in the light of experience. At the time of the 
publication the constituent organisations and the Government expressed their views. 
For the ISC, Tomlinson suggested that the new principles would provide ‘enhanced 
guidance’ to institutional investors, and that the approach taken by the ISC ‘... has 
similar objectives to those of the Government, but we believe it will prove more 
effective than legislation’
32.  Ken Ayers, Chairman of the NAPF Investment Council, said 
that ‘ ... for the first time, there are comprehensive guidelines available, based on best 
practice, and offering practical, tangible help to institutional investors’
33. For the AITC, 
its Director General, Daniel Godfrey, commented that shareholder activism is: “... 
about using the power of ownership to help companies develop and implement 
successful strategies, to maintain high standards of governance and to improve 
productivity thus maximising returns for the ultimate beneficiaries”
34. Finally, Michael 
Deakin, Deputy Chairman of the ABI Investment Committee, said that: “We don’t want 
to micro-manage companies, but we want to ensure that they are managed effectively 
and in the long term generate good returns for shareholders”
35. 180
Ruth Kelly, the then Financial Secretary to the Treasury, responded to the publication of 
the Statement of Principles by reiterating the Governments objective to encourage 
institutional investors to engage with the companies in which they invest, noting that 
such ‘... engagement will build stronger companies and better returns for investors and 
members of pension funds’
36. In a press release, the Government stated that it: ‘... has 
previously consulted on possible legislation to underpin institutions’ obligations to 
promote their beneficiaries’ interests through shareholder activism. However, the 
Government welcomes the Committee’s proposal to seek to drive through an approach 
based on best practice, and to review the impact of the principles after two years’
37. 
The Government indicated that at the end of the two-year period it would determine 
whether the non-legislative approach had been successful in delivering change. It 
indicated that the test would be the impact of the ISC’s statement of principles on the 
behaviour of institutional investors. 
The statement indicated that institutional shareholders will: (i) state their policy on how 
they will discharge their responsibilities; (ii) monitor the performance of investee 
companies and establish a regular dialogue where necessary; (iii) intervene where 
necessary; (iv) evaluate the impact of their activism; and (v) report to clients/beneficial 
owners about their activities. Policy statements by institutional investors should also 
describe how they would deal with possible conflicts of interest. Institutional investors’ 
policies on how they discharge their responsibilities should be contained in a published 
document that identifies: 
• How investee companies will be monitored; including monitoring to determine 
when it is necessary to enter an ‘active dialogue’ with a company’s board and 
senior management. 
• The policy for requiring investee companies to comply with the core standards in 
the Combined Code. 
• The policy for meeting with an investee company’s board and senior 
management. 
• How situations where institutional shareholders and/or agents have a conflict of 
interest will be minimised or dealt with. 
• The strategy on intervention. 
• An indication of the type of circumstances in which further action will be taken 
and details of the types of action that may be taken. 
• The policy on voting. 
The Statement of Principles was therefore encouraging greater transparency by making 
institutions investors’ policies public. 
Commenting on the publication of the Statement to the Select Committee on Trade 
and Industry, Lindsay Tomlinson said: “The core is what we are recommending to our 
members, that they should produce a public policy statement related to the way in 
which they engage with the companies in which they are investing, that is a public 
document. In that document they are going to have to cover things like how they 
monitor the investments they are making; the circumstances in which they choose to 
intervene in those investments if they are investing in an under-performing company; 
how they are going to evaluate the impact of those interventions and how they are 
going to report back then to their ultimate clients. It is actually putting some process 
around the whole shareholder activism debate. We think making that public statement 181
up-front means that it is no longer going to be defensible for somebody to say “I do not 
like the company” and sell the shares. It means that they will have to think hard about 
what their processes should be and I think that will drive significant further 
engagement by institutional investors with the companies in which they are investing. 
It is going to have teeth as well because being endorsed by the Institutional 
Shareholders’ Committee means that pension funds will be putting it into their 
statements of investment principles and it means that it will end up in investment 
management contracts. Once you have a contractual commitment to hold to your 
statement I think you will be obliged to follow through on that. We think it is quite a 
significant development”
38. 
Response of Institutional Investors to the Statement of Principles
There is evidence that institutional investors were becoming more active prior to the 
publication of the statement of principles. For example, Manifest, a proxy voting 
agency, reported that voting by institutional investors had increased in the first seven 
months of 2002. The indications from Government that the test of the effectiveness 
would be assessed on the basis of changes in institutional investor behaviour meant 
that organisations representing their interests were keen to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the statement of principles. 
In March 2004 the IMA published a report: ‘Survey of Fund Managers Engagement 
with Companies: 30 June 2003’
39. The purpose of the survey was to identify the extent 
to which IMA members were complying with the Statement of Principles by engaging 
with investee companies to ‘... meet their needs as investors and to satisfy the 
Government’s objectives’. Thirty-three UK fund managers were surveyed to discover 
how they met their responsibilities to the UK companies in which they invest during 
the three months ended 30 June 2003. The main findings were: 
• Fund managers differed in their approaches to meeting their responsibilities, and 
were at different stages in their compliance with the Statement of Principles.
• All 33 fund managers monitored and interacted with investee companies by 
voting their shares and engaging in other ways when necessary. The main areas 
in which fund managers engaged were strategy and performance; socially 
responsible investment; and in corporate governance issues.
• All firms had policy statements on how they met their responsibilities, although 
five of these were still in draft form.
• Investee companies were monitored on an ongoing basis by all fund managers, 
with all firms undertaking desk research and meeting with the management at 
least once during a year.
• Thirty-one of the thirty-three fund managers had a policy of voting all their shares 
in UK companies. Of those fund managers who completed the detailed part of 
the questionnaire, they had on average invested in 574 UK companies.
• The majority of fund managers sought to influence companies in ways other 
than voting. This was through meetings with directors and senior management 
and/or independent directors to express concerns. More public involvement with 
companies, such as submitting a resolution at a shareholder meeting or calling 
an EGM, were seen as costly and/or potentially damaging to the company and 
thereby to shareholder value. Consequently public involvement was rarely used.182
• The majority of fund managers reported details about their engagement with 
companies to their clients on a regular basis. The results of the survey 
suggested that institutional investors were generally making their policies 
transparent, and were monitoring and engaging with investee companies. The 
main issues of discussion were strategy and performance; socially responsible 
investment; and corporate governance.
Conclusions  Conclusions  Conclusions  Conclusions 
The objectives of the ISC over the past forty years fall into three main categories: (i) 
engagement, through case committees, in the affairs of investee companies; (ii) 
development of codes of best practice for companies, mainly in the area of corporate 
governance; and (iii) development of codes of best practice for institutional investors in 
their relationships with investee companies. The overriding concern has been to 
improve the effectiveness of companies and thereby the UK economy. 
The involvement of the ISC in the affairs of individual companies through case 
committees seems to have been somewhat limited. The Wilson Committee in 1980 
reported a fairly low level of activity throughout the 1970’s, and the ISC seems to have 
been dormant for much of the 1980’s. An attempt by Donald Brydon to enhance the 
role of the ISC by developing ways of intervening in the affairs of companies was 
largely unsuccessful. Although the ISC no longer has a role in intervening in the affairs 
of companies causing concern to institutional shareholders, this type of activity 
continues through the work of the investment protection committees of the ABI and 
the NAPF. The problem for institutional shareholders in intervening in the affairs of the 
companies in which they invest is reflected in one of the conclusions of the Wilson 
Committee: ‘In no case should institutional or other shareholders seek to interfere in 
day-today management decisions, and even on major policy issues they should be slow 
to substitute their own judgement for that of management’
40. Over twenty years later 
the Company Law Review Steering Group came to a similar conclusion, pointing out 
that ‘... institutional investors are not qualified to second guess normal management 
decision-making’
41. There is a view, however, that institutional shareholders should be 
in a position to present possible strategies to companies in difficulty. Brydon, in the 
early 1990’s, sought to implement this approach by suggesting that ISC case 
committees should be able to call upon the expertise of outside consultants. 
The second area of activity was in the development of codes of best practice for 
investee companies. These were mainly confined to issues of corporate governance 
that had been of concern to the ABI and the NAPF. The role of the ISC in promulgating 
codes of best practice on corporate governance was taken over by other organisations 
during the 1990’s. The ISC was a sponsor of the ‘Committee on the Financial Aspects 
of Corporate Governance’ (Cadbury), and its then Chairman served as a member of the 
Committee. The recommendations of the Cadbury Committee and other study groups 
and committees were brought together in the Combined Code in 1998. Responsibility 
for the maintenance of the Combined Code, representing the principles of best practice 
on corporate governance is now with the Financial Reporting Council. The Combined 
Code is incorporated into the Listing Agreement of the Financial Services Authority. 
Companies are required to report on how they have applied the principles of the Code 
in their annual report, and are required to confirm that they have complied with the 
Code’s provisions, or explain where they have not complied. 183
The third area of activity was in the development of a code of best practice for 
institutional shareholders in their relationship with investee companies. This first 
appeared in the Statement of Principles published in 1991. The revised Statement of 
Principles published in 2003, which was a response to Government pressure to 
increase shareholder activism, makes considerable demands on institutional 
shareholders. Evidence of compliance with these new demands was found by the IMA 
in a survey of a sample of member firms. Just as one of the principles underlying best 
practice on corporate governance has been that of greater transparency, the code of 
best practice for institutional shareholders requires them to make public their policies 
and some of their actions, including how they vote their shares. In this way they make 
themselves accountable to investors, members of occupational pension schemes and 
to the public at large.
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Introduction  Introduction  Introduction  Introduction 
J Sainsbury plc, the UK food retailer, came under pressure from institutional 
shareholders in June 2004 when details emerged of the share bonus payments to its 
then Executive Chairman, Sir Peter Davis. In particular, institutional shareholders were 
concerned with what they judged to be the generous payments made to Davis under a 
‘Share Award Plan 2003’. The payments, which were recommended by the Company’s 
Remuneration Committee and approved by its Board, were generally considered by 
shareholders to be excessive. The size of the award under the share bonus scheme 
took into account the company’s performance and effectiveness of its Executive 
Chairman in appointing a new Chief Executive and a Deputy Chairman who was to be 
Chairman Designate. The performance of the company was regarded by institutional 
shareholders as being disappointing and they had opposed the appointment of the 
person selected as Deputy Chairman leading to him not taking up the post. Although 
Davis resigned at the beginning of July, his resignation did not take the pressure off the 
company and institutional investors were advised by the NAPF and PIRC to vote 
against resolution to approve the Directors’ Remuneration Report for the 52 weeks to 
27 March 2004 at the AGM on 12 July 2004. The ABI issued a ‘red top’ warning to its 
members on the resolution. 
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The problem of the payments goes back to March 2003 when Sainsbury announced 
that Sir George Bull, the company’s Chairman, had agreed to remain in office until 28 
March 2004, and that Davis, then the company’s Chief Executive, would remain with 
the company and would become Chairman on 29 March 2004. At that time the 
company announced that it was appropriate to award Davis a package of restricted 
shares in respect of his extended term of office. These would take the form of 
conditional awards of shares to be released on 31 July 2005, subject to ‘... 
achievement of profit targets and business milestones set by the Remuneration 
Committee, and dependent on the successful implementation of the succession plans’’’’
1 . 
Details of the package of restricted shares were provided in the company’s 
remuneration report included in its ‘Annual Report and Financial Statements 2003’. This 
shows two conditional awards being made of one million shares and 500,000 shares 
that would be received by Sir Peter Davis on 31 July 2005 if he stayed on as Chairman 
of the company until that date and certain performance conditions were met. The 
performance conditions for the one million shares related to: (i) up to 300,000 shares if 
targets were met in transforming the business in 2003-04 and if a Deputy Chairman 
and new Chief Executive were appointed by 31 March 2004; and up to 700,000 shares 
depending on the extent to which the 2003-04 profits met the ‘... profit level agreed by 
the Board in the financial, budgeting and corporate planning process’. 
The relationship between the company and its institutional shareholders in relation to 
the share plan began to sour in February 2004 when the company announced the 
appointment of Sir Ian Prosser as Deputy Chairman and Chairman Elect. Institutional 186
investors, unhappy with Prosser’s track record, voiced their criticism and shortly 
afterwards Prosser renounced the job. At that time there were indications of problems 
ahead for Sainsbury and its Chairman as reflected in the following press report: 
‘Resentment over so-called ‘soft targets’ in his service contract, which permit an award 
of 300,000 shares if Davis ‘used his best endeavours’ to procure an acceptable 
replacement Chief Executive and Deputy Chairman, has bubbled over into angry 
condemnation.  “That Davis’s remuneration is linked to this is very regrettable,” said 
one major shareholder. Nevertheless, the effect of this on the remuneration was noted 
at the time: ‘it is clear .... that shareholders would expect the remuneration committee 
to take the debacle into account when it considers whether he (Davis) has met the 
three ‘soft’ performance targets, one of which is the appointment of a Deputy 
Chairman, that would entitle him to a tranche of 300,000 shares if met.’
2
The Remuneration Report in the 2004 Annual Report shows that the Remuneration 
Committee recommended that 864,000 of the one million shares be conditionally 
awarded: (a) 110,000 shares (out of a maximum of 150,000) in respect of business 
transformation targets; (b) 75,000 (out of 150,000) in respect of the appointments of a 
new Chief Executive and Deputy Chairman, and (c) 679,000 (out of 700,000) in respect 
of the group’s underlying pre-tax profit. In addition to the disagreement over the 
appointment of Prosser
3  as Deputy Chairman earlier in the year, the financial 
statements now showed that the company did not perform well in 2003-04. In 
particular there was a fall of 2.9 per cent in underlying pre-tax profit to £675 million. 
The reaction of institutional shareholders to Davis’s remuneration became public at the 
end of June 2004. On 27 June the Business reported that shareholders were 
demanding that the Board hold back most of the award, and that Lord Levene, the 
company’s senior independent Director, was attempting to reach an agreement with 
shareholders. Three days later, on 30 June, there were newspaper reports that Lord 
Levene was still attempting to broker a deal. One institutional investor is reported as 
saying that: “If Lord Levene doesn’t manage a face-saving deal over the next two days, 
most UK institutions are going to vote against (the remuneration report). After the Sir 
Ian Prosser affair, the Sainsbury's Board urgently needs to re-establish some credibility 
with investors.” There were also reports that the ABI and NAPF would shortly 
recommend members to abstain or vote against the remuneration report at the
company’s AGM on 12 July, and that PIRC had already recommending voting against 
the report. 
On 1 July, Martin Dickson wrote in the Financial Times that ‘When Sir Peter's bonus 
scheme was unveiled in March last year, investors were evidently told two things: that 
the undisclosed profit targets that would trigger this award (and another one that may 
be payable in a year's time) were tough; and that the Sainsbury family, which holds 38 
per cent of the equity, had already approved the deal. ‘The former assertion was so 
much rubbish. Sir Peter is getting most of his potential pay out, even though 
Sainsbury's performance relative to its peers was poor last year; even though he 
presided over the Prosser fiasco; and even though the Board had the discretion to vary 
the pay out. 
Investor confidence in Sainsbury declined even further when the company issued a 
Trading Statement on 1 July containing a warning that ‘... underlying profit before tax 
for 2004/05 will be significantly below consensus market forecasts with the majority of 187
the impact expected in the first half’. This was followed by two credit rating agencies, 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s putting the company’s rating under review for a 
possible downgrade, and a third, Fitch, actually downgrading the company’s senior 
unsecured debt from BBB+ to BBB
8  . An announcement that Davis had resigned from 
the company, and that Philip Hampton had been appointed Chairman, did not reduce 
investor hostility towards the company. There had been reports that the ABI had been 
demanding that Davis return a substantial proportion of his bonus to the company, with 
one institutional shareholder saying that: “It will have to be a significant number – 10 
per cent would not even be close. We would be looking for 100 per cent because 
performance targets were not met.”
4
The award of the share bonus to Sir Peter Davis generalised into concern about 
Sainsbury’s remuneration policies. The ABI issued a ‘red-top’ on the remuneration 
report for the AGM, with Peter Montagnon, the head of investment affairs at the ABI, 
being reported as saying that this indicates serious levels of shareholder concern with 
remuneration: “There is a risk of the entire system of remuneration falling into 
disrepute. We cannot afford for that to happen if we are to continue to attract and 
reward talent in running listed companies”
5
He is also reported as indicating that, although shareholders had been advised by the 
company that the performance targets for bonuses would be ‘stretching and 
demanding’, this was far from the case. 
The NAPF is reported as having a meeting with Keith Butler-Wheelhouse, Chairman of 
Sainsbury's Remuneration Committee, on 1 July at which the company suggested that 
the awards to Davis would not be included in the remuneration report on which 
shareholders were due to vote
6 . Such a move was suggested as an attempt to bring 
shareholders ‘back on side’. A spokesman for Sainsbury is reported as saying on 6 July 
that: “It was something that we were considering doing, but decided not to. We shall 
be sticking with the original resolution”
7 . The decision to include the awards to Davis 
led the NAPF to change its position and recommend that its members vote against the 
resolution on the remuneration report at the AGM. 
The position of the Sainsbury management in response to pressure from shareholders, 
and their failure to relieve that pressure, reported by the company in a new release to 
the market on 8 July: ‘The Board of J Sainsbury plc has reconsidered the Remuneration 
Report insofar as it relates to Sir Peter Davis in the light of institutional shareholder 
objections to his remuneration arrangements, the recent trading update and Sir Peter 
Davis stepping down as Chairman and as a Director of the Company. ‘Based on the 
information available at the time, the Remuneration Committee proposed an award of 
864,000 shares for 2003/04 out of a possible total award of 1 million shares in 
accordance with the terms of Sir Peter Davis’ contract. In reaching this decision, the 
Remuneration Committee was advised by Towers Perrin, the professional 
remuneration consultants, and believed at the time, that this award was in the best 
interests of the company and its shareholders. On 30 June 2004, a special Board 
meeting was convened at which the new Chief Executive, Justin King, reported to the 
Board on his early analysis of the condition of the company. Based on this new 
information, the Remuneration Committee can no longer support its original 
recommendation on the proposed share award. ‘The Board has sought legal advice 
regarding the Remuneration Report Resolution, which must be put to shareholders at 188
the forthcoming Annual General Meeting. The Board considered putting an amended 
Resolution to the meeting, which would have excluded matters relating to Sir Peter 
Davis, but this was rejected on advice from the company’s lawyers and due to the 
mixed response from the various shareholder representative bodies. ‘Although the 
Board recognises that some shareholders may vote against the Resolution at the 
Annual General Meeting, the Remuneration Report covers many other matters 
important to the company in addition to the proposed share award to Sir Peter Davis. 
The Board will therefore continue to recommend the Remuneration Report to 
shareholders at the Annual General Meeting, but the Board will not implement these 
recommendations in relation to Sir Peter Davis. These matters have been referred to 
the respective legal representatives of both parties as part of his termination 
arrangements. The company has been advised not to comment further on these 
matters.’
8 
Pressure on the company’s management increased the following day when it emerged 
that Judith Portrait, the trustee of various settlements, would abstain from voting on 
the remuneration report. Her decision is important as she controls the voting rights 
over 23 per cent of the company’s shares. Ms Portrait is reported as recognising that 
the bonus payment to Davis had become a matter of principle and concluded that ‘the 
only mature stance as a major shareholder is to abstain’
9 . The news report also 
suggested that she thought that a vote in favour of the resolution would be interpreted 
as ‘... tacit support for an unpopular payment’. 
Lord Levene, the senior non-executive Director read a statement from the Sainsbury 
family at the AGM which said: “The family shareholders recognise that the Board 
changed its position last week on the remuneration appropriate for Sir Peter 
Davis ....The family shareholders believe that it is in the company's interests that the 
remuneration report now be approved by shareholders, given that it now has no 
implications for payments to Sir Peter Davis; and accordingly they are casting their 
votes in favour of the resolution”
10. At the AGM, the voting on the resolution ‘...approve 
the Directors’ Remuneration Report for the 52 weeks to 27 March 2004’ was 
865,151,050 votes (71.4per cent) for and 346,566,638 votes (28.6per cent) against.
Of the 865million shares voted in favour of the resolution on the remuneration, it is 
thought that about 680million were owned by the family. Without these votes, the 
resolution may have been rejected. Peter Montagnon, head of investments at the 
Association of British Insurers, is reported as saying  “If you strip out the family 
support this is a very substantial protest indeed. There is a clear mandate to the 
incoming Chairman to put the remuneration policies and process right and do whatever 
it takes to put it right. We are relying on him in this regard”
11.   Davis resigned as 
Executive Chairman shortly after it became clear that institutional shareholders were 
unhappy about both the payment and his performance as Executive Chairman. Further, 
the company’s Directors responded to institutional pressures by indicating that it was 
seeking legal advice on whether to make the payment to Davis.
The ABI, NAPF and PIRC The ABI, NAPF and PIRC The ABI, NAPF and PIRC The ABI, NAPF and PIRC
Much of the press coverage of the institutional shareholder concern about Sainsbury 
focuses on the involvement of the ABI, NAPF and PIRC. Reported statements from 
individual institutions generally did not name the institution. The ABI, NAPF and PIRC 189
provide mechanisms for co-ordinated action by institutions. The ABI and NAPF have 
been involved in co-ordinating shareholder action for some time through investor 
protection committees (IPCs). The investor protection committee of the ABI was 
established in the 1930’s and that of the NAPF some thirty years later. Pensions and 
Investment Research Consultants Ltd (PIRC) was established in 1986 by a consortium 
of local authority pension funds. 
The operation of the IPCs of the ABI and the NAPF in the late 1970’s is described in 
the report of the Wilson Committee. The report describes how the IPCs set up case 
committees with a membership drawn from the main institutions with substantial 
shareholdings in the company. Institutions were under no obligation to join or support a 
case committee, and so an institution could take a position different from that of the 
case committee. The existence of a case committee was only known to those 
institutions of the relevant IPCs that had been consulted. Stapledon (1996) suggests 
that the way in which the IPCs operated in the 1970’s continued into the 1990’s. Both 
the ABI and NAPF also have voting services which provide members with 
recommendations on how to vote their shares. The ABI voting service, Institutional 
Voting Information Service (IVIS), reviews information from UK companies for 
compliance with corporate governance best practice, and provides recommendations 
on voting. IVIS provides colour-coded advice for each resolution put before a general 
meeting: 
(i) Blue if the resolution is consistent with ABI guidelines and current corporate 
governance best practise
(ii)A mber indicates that the subject of resolution is does not appear to be in 
compliance with ABI guidelines and there is discussion with the company, 
after which the code may change to red or green depending on the outcome
(iii) Red indicates either there is non-compliance or inconsistency with guidelines, 
or that a decision was taken to abstain or oppose a resolution after 
consulting a significant proportion of ABI members; and 
(iv) Green indicates either a resolution of a matter that a case that was 
previously reported as being inconsistent or non-compliant, or that a decision 
was taken to support the resolution after consultation with ABI members. 
In the case of Sainsbury there was a red coding. 
PIRC offers institutional investors a corporate governance service that provides 
institutional investors with research and advice on corporate governance issues. It 
provides a detailed report on each company within the FTSE All Share Index. This 
provides an analysis of the board structure of each company, the levels and structure 
of directors’ remuneration and service contracts, and indicates the extent to which the 
company has complied with the provisions of the Combined Code. PIRC also provides 
voting recommendations. This may be in terms of the institutional shareholders own 
voting policies or those of PIRC. Finally, PIRC offers a voting proxy service. 190
The Remuneration Report  The Remuneration Report  The Remuneration Report  The Remuneration Report 
The mechanism through which institutional shareholders could exert their influence on 
Sainsbury was through their right to vote on a resolution on the company’s 
Remuneration Report. Current legislation covering the remuneration report, including 
the right of shareholders to vote on the report at a general meeting of shareholders, 
has its roots in the mid-1990’s. At that time there was both public and shareholder 
concern about directors remuneration, particularly that being paid by privatised utility 
companies. This concern was expressed by Gordon Brown, then Shadow Chancellor, 
who noted in January 1995 there was ‘evidence of astronomical pay rises in the 
boardrooms of the privatised utilities unrelated to performance and unjustified by the 
service the companies provide’. One response was an initiative of the CBI to set up a 
committee in January 1995, chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury, with the terms of 
reference: ‘To identify good practice in determining Directors’ remuneration and 
prepare a Code of such practice for use by UK plcs’. The ‘Study Group on Directors’ 
Remuneration’ published a code of best practice later in the year. The code of best 
practice was based upon three principles: accountability, transparency, and linkage to 
performance. The Greenbury Code of best practice was subsequently incorporated in 
the ‘Combined Code’, published in 1998. 
Concern over directors’ remuneration continued into the late 1990’s. In particular there 
were concerns about excessive payments being made to departing executives, 
especially where there had been under performance, and excessive payments being 
made to executives when the company was under-performing compared with the 
market. In 1999 the Government indicated that although it thought the three 
fundamental principles identified by Greenbury were right, it had doubts about the 
extent to which listed companies incorporating these principles into their own practices. 
These concerns were expressed in a consultative document ‘Directors’ Remuneration’ 
published in July 1999 where it was stated that: ‘The Government believes that there 
is a sufficient level of concern about the ability of the current best practice framework 
to deliver the key Greenbury objectives - accountability, transparency, and linkage of 
rewards to performance - to justify consultation on further measures to strengthen the 
independence of the remuneration committee, full disclosure of directors’ 
remuneration, and the board’s accountability to shareholders’. 
Amongst the proposals being made by Government was the requirement that directors 
should be more accountable to shareholders. Alternative ways of achieving greater 
accountability were identified, including the possible introduction of a requirement that 
quoted companies ask shareholders to vote on the board’s remuneration report every 
year. The responses to the consultative document on this proposal were interesting: 82 
per cent of the 49 quoted companies that responded to the document were against the 
proposal, whereas 86 per cent of the 14 institutional shareholders favoured the 
proposal. 
The Government published a second consultative document ‘Directors’ Remuneration’ 
in December 2001 that included draft regulations. The view of the Government was 
that: ‘It is not for the Government to take a view on the appropriate level of 
remuneration for executive directors. That is a matter for companies and their 
shareholders. But it does intend to legislate to ensure that the corporate governance 
framework delivers proper transparency and accountability.’ The proposals contained in 191
the Consultative Document cover transparency and accountability. Issues of 
transparency are covered in the Remuneration report. 
In particular, the Report should
(i) focus on forward-looking disclosures on remuneration policy
(ii)p rovide information linking performance to pay, in particular it should contain 
a performance graph(s) comparing the performance of the company with 
peer companies
(iii) disclose the respective roles of the board and the remuneration committee in 
determining directors’ remuneration; and 
(iv) provide the names of any consultants who advised the remuneration 
committee. 
On accountability the Government proposed that quoted companies should put an 
annual resolution to shareholders on the directors’ remuneration report. Unusually, the 
proposal was that the vote would be advisory. The Government notes that an advisory 
vote is appropriate in the case of the remuneration report as the board should continue 
to have responsibility for remuneration matters. However, the ‘.... Government 
believes that dialogue between the board and investors on remuneration issues is 
more likely to be effective if it is underpinned by a requirement for an annual 
shareholder vote on the remuneration report’. 
The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, which were made in July 2002, 
applied to quoted companies in respect of financial years ending on or after 31 
December 2002. The regulations included a provision requiring shareholders’ approval 
of directors’ remuneration report. The first company to feel the effect of the legislation 
was GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) when there was a vote against the resolution on the 
company’s remuneration report. Despite vigorous lobbying by the company in the 
period leading up to the company’s AGM, a number of leading UK shareholders were 
reported as voting against the resolution. Concern was focused on the severance 
package for the Chief Executive, Jean-Pierre Garnier, if he were to lose his job. Peter 
Montagnon, head of investment affairs at the Association of British Insurers, is 
reported as saying: “This is a new world we have entered here. The severance 
package was tilted so far in terms of payment for failure that had we voted in favour, 
we would have simply looked foolish and lacking in integrity.”
12 Institutional 
shareholders were, however, reported as voting about the principle and not the 
individuals involved, and indicated that neither the Chairman, Sir Christopher Hogg, nor 
Garnier should resign. 
Conclusions  Conclusions  Conclusions  Conclusions 
Institutional shareholders responded negatively to reports about the size of the share 
award granted to Sir Peter David. The plan under which the shares were granted 
followed the Board’s decision to retain Davis’s services as Executive Chairman when 
he stood down from the post of Chief Executive. Although institutional shareholders 192
knew of the existence of the share plan, they were led to believe that the performance 
conditions incorporated into the plan were demanding. 
Institutional shareholders judged the performance conditions to be soft when details of 
the award for 2004 became known with the publication of the annual report, containing 
a remuneration report giving details of Davis’s pay for the period. Institutional 
shareholders were more concerned with linking pay with company performance than 
with the size of the remuneration package. This is one of the main principles identified 
a decade ago by the Greenbury Study Group. The award to Davis was judged 
excessive because the performance of the company during the period Davis’s work to 
ensure appropriate management succession had been judged by institutional 
shareholders to be deficient earlier in the year. The ability of institutional shareholders 
to respond to instances of perceived excessive pay comes about through changes in 
the disclosure rules on directors’ remuneration over the past decade. Increased 
transparency as a result of the recommendations of the Greenbury Study Group, the 
Combined Code and the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 provide 
shareholders information that enables them to assess the appropriateness, or 
otherwise, of awards made to directors. Transparency, another of the principles of the 
Greenbury Study Group, is therefore a key element of shareholder activism. 
The Government, through the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, has 
made companies accountable to their shareholders. Although the vote on the 
resolution to adopt the directors’ remuneration report is only advisory, this seems 
sufficient to ensure the Sainsbury’s Directors responded to the concerns of 
shareholders. However, having approved the share award to Davis, the Board had 
limited ability to resolve the problem over the short period leading up to the AGM in 
July. Accountability, through the right to vote on a resolution at a general meeting of 
shareholders and the third of the Greenbury principles, is also important for shareholder 
activism. 
Much of the reported shareholder activity in relation to Sainsbury is focused on the 
work of two of the trade associations, the ABI and NAPF, and on the work of PIRC. It is 
often suggested that shareholder activism will fail because the costs of monitoring and 
intervention fall on activist shareholders and yet the benefits are received by all 
shareholders. However, with co-ordinated action the costs of monitoring and 
intervening are shared. It is therefore important to understand the institutional 
framework through which shareholder activism can succeed. 
The events at Sainsbury highlight two other problems for institutional shareholder 
activism. The results of the resolution on the remuneration report show that in a poll, 
865 million votes (71.4 per cent) were for and 346 million votes (28.6 per cent) against. 
Many institutional shareholders voted against the remuneration report. Support for the 
directors came most importantly from the Sainsbury family who owned thirty-six 
percent of the company’s ordinary shares. This highlights the problem of shareholder 
activism in companies in which a large proportion of shares are privately owned. It also 
highlights the problem in determining the criteria for successful intervention. On the 
crude measure of the outcome of the vote, the intervention would be judged to have 
been unsuccessful. However, there were a number of changes in the company over 
the period leading up to its AGM. Davis resigned as Executive Chairman shortly after it 
became clear that institutional shareholders were unhappy about both the payment and 193
his performance as Executive Chairman. Further, the company’s Directors responded 
to institutional pressures by indicating that it was seeking legal advice on whether to 
make the payment to Davis.
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 Introduction
The German context
The relationship between investors and companies in Germany is changing 
fundamentally.  As Ronald Dore has argued, traditional German ‘welfare capitalism’ is 
weakening (Dore, 2000:172).  The degree of weakening, and its origins, remain 
controversial, in particular the extent to which changes in Germany are the result of 
international influences, primarily from the US.  The major relevant changes include the 
declining importance of bank share ownership, the diminishing role of bankers on 
company Supervisory Boards, the dissolution of cross shareholding amongst industrial 
groups and increasing emphasis upon shareholder value.  In his study of the 40 largest 
German companies, Martin Hopner traces an increasing shareholder orientation, 
measured by changes in corporate communications, top management remuneration 
and the overall orientation towards the goal of profitability (2001:2).
However, this emphasis on shareholder value is not universally shared.  Vitols (2004) 
concludes that ‘on the whole the German financial system can be characterised as 
bank-based.  In some cases structural change has only been quite gradual, whereas in 
other cases there has been a return to historical norms after a sharp change during the 
bubble years’ (p.11).  At the end of 2002, the banking system accounted for 73 per 
cent of financial liabilities whilst other financial services, including investment funds, 
accounted for only 10 per cent (p.12).  Although stock market capitalisation rose 
sharply between 1995 and 2000, to over 60 per cent of GDP, by the end of 2002 it had 
declined to 31 per cent.  The Neuer Markt was established in 1997, with a substantial 
number of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) going to market between 1997 and 2002, 
mainly in the high technology, Internet and software sectors.  However, the bubble 
burst, there were no IPOs in Germany in 2003, and the Neuer Markt was declared a 
failure by the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and closed the same year.  
The banking orientation of the German financial system may be explained by both 
supply and demand factors.  On the supply side, German savers have a propensity to 
place savings in low risk investments, even if with low returns; economies with 
relatively low levels of income inequality – and therefore large numbers of middle 
income savers – are more likely to favour low risk investments, such as bank savings, 
compared with countries with high levels of income inequality, such as the US and 
Britain, which encourage investment in high risk investments such as securities.  On 
the demand side, companies continue to rely heavily upon credit from banks rather 
than market financing through the issue of shares or bonds; the proportion of company 
financial liabilities represented by stocks declined from 47.6 per cent in 1999 to 24 per 
cent in 2002.  Even in high-risk sectors such as biotechnology successful German 
companies have been those concentrating upon ‘platform technologies’, funded by 
bank loans, rather than focusing on higher risk therapeutics (Casper et al, 1999).
There is thus conflicting evidence about the importance of the capital market for 
German companies, and thus the significance of investment institutions for 
management practice.  This case study illustrates the issues by looking at the Bayer 195
Group. In Hopner’s study Bayer is identified as the most shareholder oriented major 
German company in the late 1990’s, with a strong emphasis on profitability, good 
investor communications and a close linkage between managerial remuneration and 
profitability (2001:39,40).  Bayer is thus among the most market-oriented German 
companies.  This case study outlines the situation at Bayer in 2003/4.
Company profile and recent history
Founded in the late nineteenth century, Bayer was a central player in the German 
chemical industry.  However, the group experienced major financial difficulties in the 
early 21
st century, making the first loss in its history in 2003, when it lost   1.4bn.  The 
shares reached a low of  1 0.28 on 17 March 2003 (having a peak in 2002 of   40.80).  
The company’s difficulties reflected both the overall difficulties of the German 
economy and specific problems in the sectors in which Bayer operated.  Like all 
German companies, Bayer also suffered from sluggish domestic German demand and 
difficult export markets because of the strength of the Euro, especially against the 
dollar.   Intense competition in the chemicals sector, especially the bulk chemicals 
sector, and the imminent patent expiry of its best selling drug in the US, exacerbated 
the overall difficulties.  The company was obliged to undertake major restructuring, 
including divestments and de-mergers, to create a new, more focused structure for the 
group.  This case study focuses on the relations between investors and managers in 
the context of Bayer’s restructuring.  The restructuring processes involved were similar 
to those involved in the earlier restructuring of British manufacturing, including the 
chemical industry, although the institutional arrangements were very different.  The 
experience of Bayer in 2003 indicates how the German system responds to the 
requirements of the restructuring process.
Bayer’s performance declined sharply in 2003.  Net sales fell from  2 9,624m in 2003 to 
 2 8,567m in 2003, a decline of 3.6 per cent, having peaked at   30,971m in 2000.  
Meanwhile, the financial results showed an even steeper deterioration, with the overall 
operating results declining from a surplus of   1,610m in 2002 to a deficit of   1,203m in 
2003.  Further, despite the chairman’s commitment to maintaining the value of 
shareholders’ stock, stockholders’ equity declined from  1 5,335m in 2002 to   12,213m 
in 2003, a decline of 20.4 per cent.  Despite the heavy losses Bayer maintained 
dividend payments, at   0.5 per share, compared with   0.9 per share in 2002, a decline 
of 44.4 per cent.
The Bayer group comprised four divisions: Bayer HealthCare, Bayer CropScience, 
Bayer MaterialScience and Bayer Chemicals.  The major segments of Bayer HealthCare 
are pharmaceuticals, biological products, consumer care, diagnostics and animal health.  
Bayer MaterialScience covers polymers, plastics, rubber, polyurethanes, coatings and 
fibres.  The CropScience and Chemicals divisions comprise only one segment each.  
The four divisions all performed worse in 2003 than in 2002, although the extent of the 
decline varied. The restructuring agreed in 2004 involved the reduction of Bayer Group 
to three divisions and the creation of a new company, Lanxess, through spinning out 
Bayer Chemicals and part of Bayer MaterialScience.  
The Bayer group is heavily export-oriented.  Sales outside Germany amounted to 86.4 
per cent of total sales in 2002 and 85.8 per cent in 2003.  Performance in 2003 was 196
therefore badly affected by the Iraq war’s  initial impact upon business confidence, 
especially in the US, its major market.  In addition, special factors affected the 
performance of all four divisions.  In Bayer HealthCare, the sale of its plasma business 
and the legal costs associated with the US Federal Government’s investigation into 
price fixing in pharmaceutical products, as well as the decline in sales of its two best 
selling drugs, reinforced the effects of unfavourable dollar/euro exchange rate.  The 
withdrawal of Lipobay/Baycol in August 2001 seriously damaged Bayer HealthCare’s 
position in the US.  In CropScience sales increased largely because of the acquisition of 
Aventis CropScience, but were also negatively affected by exchange rate movements.  
The position of Bayer MaterialScience was weakened by increasing energy costs, the 
relocation of major customers to Asia and overcapacity in the industry, as well as by 
negative exchange rate movements.  In the chemicals division overcapacity, increased 
competition from Asian suppliers, consolidation in customer industries and adverse 
exchange rate movements led to sustained pressure on margins.  This resulted in 
impairment losses (impairment loss is when the amount recoverable from disposal of 
an asset is less than the book value) in the division of  4 76m. The long-term 
competitive environment in which Bayer operated was becoming more difficult, even if 
the negative currency movements could be hedged or regarded as transient.
To deal with its problems Bayer undertook a major restructuring and refocusing, the 
largest in Bayer’s history.  Bayer group split into two companies.  The first was the 
restructured Bayer Group, which concentrated on three areas: healthcare (Bayer 
HealthCare), nutrition (Bayer CropScience) and high-technology materials (Bayer 
MaterialScience).  The chemicals business (except for two major companies with 
special potential, H. C. Starck and Wolff Walsrode) were combined with a third of the 
polymers business to form the second (new) company, Lanxess, to be floated on the 
Stock Exchange no later than 2005.  Companies that did not fit into the corporate 
restructuring were divested.  The strategic logic of the restructuring lay in creating two 
focussed businesses, with different business models, in place of the diversified Bayer 
group.  ‘While Bayer’s future core portfolio comprises research-intensive growth 
businesses, the portfolio of Lanxess consists mostly of cost driven businesses 
operating in more mature markets’ (Bayer Annual Report, 2003:1).  The future Bayer 
Group would concentrate on sectors with high growth potential, based on innovation 
and research and development, especially in the healthcare sector.  The company also 
aimed to develop further in Asia, especially in China in materials science, although its 
historic centre of gravity had been in Germany and the US.
Bayer recognised that the restructuring would take time to improve financial 
performance.  It expected that market conditions would be difficult in 2004.  The group 
expected that sales would be lower in 2004 than they had been in 2003 (mainly 
because of a decline in pharmaceutical sales in the US).  In other sectors the group 
expected sales to be restricted by severe competition, especially in the Lanxess 
activities, but that the financial performance would improve through cost containment 
and lower depreciation and amortisation.197
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Bayer’s shareholders are widely dispersed.  The company’s shareholder survey in June 
2001 showed 495,947 shareholders, of whom 11.83 per cent were non-German: 
467,000 were individual shareholders, of whom 12 per cent were former Bayer 
employees.  Although only just under 12 per cent of shareholders were foreign, foreign 
shareholders held 39 per cent of the shares, down from 42 per cent two years earlier.  
The only shareholder with over 5 per cent of shares (the level at which shareholdings 
have to be publicly declared) was Allianz A.G, the insurance company, with slightly over 
6 per cent.  The overall distribution of shareholdings between types of shareholder was: 
banks and insurance companies, 55 per cent; individuals, 24 per cent; investment 
funds, 12 per cent, trade and industrial companies 3 per cent and others 6 per cent.  
The major shareholders outside Germany were in Britain and the US, with 46 per cent 
of foreign shareholdings, with smaller holdings in Switzerland/Lichtenstein and Holland.  
The major changes since the earlier survey in 1999 were a substantial increase in the 
number of individual shareholders and a decline in overseas shareholdings.  Bayer’s 
shareholding structure thus differs from that of the ‘typical’ German company with a 
low level of shareholder concentration, no major block-holder and a comparatively high 
level of foreign ownership.  Bayer’s shareholding structure was thus characterised by a 
wide dispersal of institutional shareholders, many based in Britain and the US.  It was 
thus more likely to follow Anglo-Saxon practices than, for example, Volkswagen.
Bayer faced major difficulties in its relations with investors in 2003.The major source of 
difficulty was the poor Stock Market performance in 2002 and 2003, when Bayer’s 
shares declined more than the overall DAX index in Germany and performed poorly in 
the US.  In January 2003 the Bayer shares were   22.42, before declining to a low point 
of   10.28 on March 17; by the end of December the shares had revived to  2 3.58.  
(However, the shares had reached   40.80 at their highest point in 2002).  The share 
performance reflected the company’s operating difficulties, identified above.  At the 
2003 Annual General Meeting, shareholders were critical of the company’s overall 
performance.  Others queried the reduction in expenditure on Research and 
Development when the company was claiming to refocus its activities on innovation 
and growth.  Shareholders were also apprehensive about the potential costs of on-
going legal proceedings in the US.  (Two related class actions were then underway.  
One concerned the life threatening side effects of Baycol, the company’s best selling 
drug withdrawn in August 2001; the class action status was subsequently rejected but 
it was estimated that 11,000 individual actions would be brought.  The second 
concerned the performance of Bayer AG securities in the US, where it was alleged that 
the company had attempted to maintain its share price by making ‘materially false and 
misleading statements’ in relation to the side effects of Baycol.  Bayer’s shares had 
fallen by 68 per cent from the start of their New York trading in 1997.) The support for 
the restructuring proposals was not unanimous, although hostile resolutions were 
rejected by large majorities.  
Investor communications
The company undertook very active management of its investor relations.  Overall 200 
individual meetings were held with individual investors and analysts, nine investor 
conferences and 17 road shows were organised in Germany and overseas, including 198
the U.K. The company made extensive use of the Internet, with a special investor 
relation’s web site including an interactive analysis tool.  Investor relation’s meetings 
were broadcast live on the web and material published concurrently on the web site.  
The web site won several international prizes, including the award of 'best site' 
amongst the S&P 100 companies' sites in the Canadian 'IR Web Report'.  The major 
issues covered in the first part of the year were the Baycol lawsuit in the US, and 
subsequently the overall re-alignment of the group, and the pharmaceutical strategy 
specifically.  The company claimed to have boosted institutional and private investor 
confidence through its programme of one-on-one meetings and road shows.  This 
confidence was reinforced by the decision to provide a dividend of  0 .50, a yield of 2.2 
per cent on the year-end price, despite the heavy losses.  Bayer’s investment in 
managing shareholder relations was critical for maintaining support in a very difficult 
situation.
Bayer possessed the customary German two-tier structure of Supervisory Board and 
Board of Management.  The company operates according to the German Corporate 
Governance Code, published in 2002, with a small number of explicit marginal 
exceptions.  The Supervisory Board comprised 20 members, including half elected by 
the shareholders and half elected by employees.  The Supervisory Board provides 
linkage across a range of German corporate structures, including representatives from 
major firms and, especially, German banks.  In 2003, the chairman of the Bayer 
Supervisory Board, Dr. Manfred Schneider, was also chairman of the Supervisory Board 
of Linde A.G. and a member of the Supervisory Boards of Allianz A.G, Daimler-Chrysler, 
A.G, Metro A.G, RWE A.G. and TVI A.G.  The Board also included a senior executive 
from the Deutsche Bank, Dr. Josef Ackermann, the chairman of the Supervisory Board 
of Commerzbank A.G, Frankfurt, the chairman of Bankhaus Lazard, Berlin, and a 
member of the Board of Management of Allianz A.G, Munich.  The company was 
therefore closely linked to major German financial institutions (and not closely linked to 
international financial institutions).  The Supervisory Board also included a number of 
prominent trade union officials, as well as current employees of the company.  The 
Supervisory Board was responsible for overseeing the work of the Management Board 
and providing advice.  It was directly involved in decisions of fundamental importance 
for the company, including the development of the new strategy, the restructuring of 
the company and the means for implementing the new strategy.  Bayer was thus 
incorporated into German national capital.
Bayer’s Board of Management is responsible for defining corporate strategy, setting 
the overall budget, allocating corporate resources and developing management 
personnel.  The Board is explicitly committed to ‘serving the interests of the entire 
enterprise and achieving a sustained increase in corporate value’ (Bayer Annual Report, 
2003, Corporate Governance: 4).  The Management Board informs the Supervisory 
Board of its decisions.  The chairman of the Board of Management is the German 
equivalent of the Anglo-American CEO, but the responsibility is defined as ‘co-
ordinating the principles of corporate policy’.199
Investor influence
International investors sought to pressure Bayer into restructuring by separating the 
pharmaceutical operations from the chemicals and crop science operations as early as 
2001.  Tweedy, Browne, a highly regarded US private investment fund, argued for the 
division of the company into three groups at the 2001 Shareholders AGM, as a means 
of removing the diversification discount (the discount on the value of shares in 
diversified companies) and to allow investors to reap the benefits of the high 
performance of pharmaceutical shares (Wall Street Journal, 21 June 2001).  The 
specific proposals were rejected, and the Bayer Board continued to seek to improve 
the performance of its struggling chemicals group within existing structures through 
rationalisation, cost reduction, new management structures and increased flexibility.  
However, the reforms proved unsuccessful.  The Bayer Board  came to accept the 
logic of dividing the company to unlock the shareholder value of the pharmaceutical 
business.  In 2003 the Board decided to restructure the company with the spinning out 
of the Chemicals and part of the Material Science groups to form the new company 
Lanxess.  The specific objective was to increase shareholder value: ‘since the core 
businesses of the Bayer Group are uniformly aligned toward growth and innovation, the 
capital market will now judge them more favourably than if they remained integrated 
with the structurally different Lanxess businesses (Werner Wenning, chairman of the 
Board of Management, 17/11/04).  The new company Lanxess will be wholly owned by 
Bayer shareholders, each holder of Bayer stock receiving Lanxess stock on 1 for 10 
basis.  Bayer decided against an Initial Public Offering because it did not believe that 
the market would support the offer.  The company was also anxious to resolve its 
organisational problems quickly.
The role of investors, especially international investors, in bringing about Bayer’s 
restructuring was central.  The Bayer Board of Management viewed the realignment as 
the necessary means to achieve a ‘sustained increase in value for its stockholders’.  
The Board believed that Bayer suffered from a ‘conglomerate discount’.  According to 
the Board’s explanation to shareholders, the Board ‘expects that future concentration 
in the areas Health Care, Crop Science and Material Science and the associated 
increase in transparency and strategical clarity in the Bayer Group will reduce this 
discount and boost rating factors for Bayer shares…in the future [the restructured 
Group] will be more highly rated than when combined with the structurally diverging 
Lanxess operations having less growth and margin potential’ (Report of the Board of 
Management, AGM Bayer AG, 30 April 2004).  Although Bayer would remain financially 
responsible for Lanxess for five years, the restructuring clearly drew a line under the 
Group’s  financial commitments to its struggling chemicals business.  The market 
responded favourably to the restructuring proposals, with an increase in the share price 
following the initial announcement of the restructuring in November 2003.
Bayer thus faced major strategic pressures after 2000, with strong competition in its 
traditional areas and difficulties in potential growth areas.  The solutions adopted 
echoed those adopted earlier by British companies, for example Courtaulds.  The 
disbursements and re-focusing followed traditional 'Anglo-Saxon' practices.  
International investors actively sought to influence Bayer to take measures to unbundle 
the divisions that comprise the Group and in so doing improve the Group’s share price 
performance and facilitate the development of the pharmaceutical division. The Bayer 200
Management Group’s proposals were endorsed by the Supervisory Board, which 
included representation from German banks and insurance companies as well as 
employees, but not international shareholders. The terms of the restructuring were 
formulated by the Board of Management, not by the Supervisory Board, as required
under German legislation.  There were major institutional differences between the 
German structures and the British.  However, the institutional differences did not 
appear to affect the overall shape of the strategy.  The strategy was a logical 
development from the earlier process of divisionalisation, which had made clear the 
differences in financial performance and prospects between the firm’s businesses.  
However, the institutional differences coloured the details of its implementation.  The 
following paragraphs identify the financial policies followed by Bayer.
Bayer followed explicitly conservative financial policies.  The Group’s financial strategy 
had the stated objective of safeguarding short and medium term liquidity, at minimum 
financial cost.  Financial decisions were centralised at Group level, ‘systematic 
centralisation plays a key role in Bayer AG’s capital procurement and risk management’ 
(Management Report, 2003:41).  The reductions in debt and the carving out of major 
business operations were ‘specifically designed to increase our financial scope to 
support earnings-oriented growth in the future’.  The strategic focus was on earnings 
growth, not on earnings per share, and there was no specific mention of shareholder 
value.
Following US practice, Bayer launched a stock compensation programme in 2000.  The 
programme comprises three strands, targeted at different levels of employee: a Stock 
Option programme for members of the Board of Management and other Group 
executives; a Stock Incentive programme for other senior managers; and a Stock 
Participation programme for other employees.  As at 31 December 2003, no stock 
options were exercisable, although stock options were granted (10,950 to the chairman, 
6,450 to other members of the Board of Management).  Bayer had thus moved in an 
Anglo-American direction regarding share options, but at a modest level and with no 
explicit reference of alignment with shareholder interests.
The composition of the Supervisory Board ensures that employee interests receive 
greater priority than in Anglo-American corporations.  This is reflected in the frequent 
references to multiple stakeholders, not to an exclusive concern with shareholder 
values.  One reflection of this concern is the importance accorded to maintaining 
employment.  Despite the company’s financial performance, employee numbers 
declined slowly (employment grew from 116,900 in 2001 to 122,600 in 2002, before 
declining to 115,400 in 2003).  Although details are not available on employees’ 
earnings, it is noteworthy that senior managers’ salaries and directors’ allowances are 
significantly smaller than similar salaries and fees in UK companies.  The salary of the 
Board of Management chairman was   1,597,000 whilst the salaries of other Board of 
Management members were  9 00,000.  The remuneration of members of the 
Supervisory Board was modest compared with the remuneration of their nearest 
equivalents in British and American companies at non-executive directors level. 
The institutional structures and working relationships of the Bayer group differ 
substantially from those of comparable British companies, as comparison with 
GlaxoSmithKline indicates. However, there are indications of trends towards Anglo-
American practices.  The development of stock option schemes reflects corporate 201
interest in widening senior management incentives, if without the ideological 
commitment to shareholder value. The Anglo-American model’s commitment to 
shareholder value might, in theory, imply a wider role for investor influence on 
management practice.  However, the close representation of banks on the Supervisory 
Board in the German model would imply more opportunity for investor (as well as 
lender) influence than in British companies. The influence of investors on the 
Supervisory Board may be reinforced or weakened by the influence of employee 
representatives.  Employees and investors shared a common interest in increased 
transparency but differed on the priority to be accorded to maintaining employment 
levels.  Investor influence may thus be mitigated because the two-tier Board structure 
leads to the representation of a wide range of stakeholders on the Boards, not only 
banks.  As a company listed on the New York Stock Exchange, as well as the London 
Stock Exchange, Bayer is required to comply with the listing requirements, including 
the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley.  The company has made detailed changes to its 
corporate governance arrangements to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley, the major 
objective being to increase protection for shareholder rights, especially the rights of 
minority shareholders.  However, Bayer, like other German companies, is unhappy 
about the depth of oversight and consequent costs of compliance involved in New York 
Stock Exchange listing.
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion
Bayer experienced major difficulties in its major product markets, with increasing 
competition in bulk chemicals and polymers, high energy prices and patchy 
performance in potentially high growth sectors such as healthcare.  In response to 
major losses and declining share price Bayer undertook major re-structuring, including 
divestments and de-merging, and the acceptance of major financial impairments.  
Bayer became recognised as one of the most shareholder-oriented of German 
companies, which would imply a wider role for shareholder influence on Bayer.  
However, it pursued such policies within the framework of traditional German 
institutional arrangements, including co-determination structures, and traditional 
arrangements with banks.  The Bayer case illustrates the ability of German firms to 
respond to serious market dislocation whilst retaining traditional structures.  Many 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ practices were introduced at Bayer, including stock options and 
increased income inequality, but with specific German touches - little use had been 
made of the Stock Option schemes by 2004 and the level of Directors remuneration 
remained low by British and American standards.  
Changes in the company’s share price had a profound effect on the speed and scope 
of the company’s restructuring.  The restructuring was specifically designed to assist in 
the realisation of increased share price by letting go of the poorly performing Chemicals 
Group and getting rid of the diversification discount.  The specific form of the 
restructuring reflected Anglo-Saxon practice and served to maintain international 
investor support.  The long-term structural problems facing the Group and the heavy 
costs of the Baycol problems in the US - both in financial and in image terms - required 
the Group to undertake extensive measures to manage investor relations.  To date this 
appears to have been successful with a relatively stable share price.202
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Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
There are five major reasons for undertaking a case study of a major British 
pharmaceutical company to illustrate the relationship between financial institutions, 
investor behaviour and management practice.  First, Britain has maintained a major 
position in global pharmaceutical markets, with two of the largest pharmaceutical 
companies in the world, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Astra-Zeneca.  Second, this 
competitive position has been achieved through heavy investment in research to 
secure competitiveness.  The pharmaceutical sector has been the heaviest investor in 
Research and Development (R&D) in Britain, with expenditure on R&D representing up 
to 16 per cent of revenue.  In 2003, 40 per cent of UK expenditure on R&D was in 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.  The UK has the highest level of research intensity 
in pharmaceuticals in Europe (followed by Switzerland); only the USA has a higher level 
of research intensity in pharmaceuticals internationally.  Third, the UK investment in 
pharmaceutical R&D has been internationally competitive.  Against the background of 
an overall decline in British patenting activity in the USA, between 1997 and 2001 
Astra-Zeneca had the largest number of patents secured by a British company by a 
large margin (395), with Smith Kline Beecham (244) and Glaxo Wellcome (83) also 
being in the top 25.  Fourth, companies in the sector need close relationships with their 
investors to maintain financial commitment in a highly competitive environment.  
Pharmaceuticals is a high-risk sector.  Although demographic changes, including the 
ageing population in the industrialised world, and increasing health expectations 
provide a favourable market environment, there is strong competition in major product 
markets, especially in the USA, and major technological and political, as well as 
economic, uncertainties.  Finally, the pharmaceutical sector illustrates the central role 
of institutional factors, especially patent protection and reliable mechanisms for 
appropriating the rents from innovation, in encouraging investment in high- risk sectors 
in ‘liberal market’ economies.
The company chosen to illustrate these issues is GSK.
GSK Backgroun GSK Backgroun GSK Backgroun GSK Background ddd
GSK is the largest British pharmaceutical company and the second largest in the world, 
after the US company Pfizer.  In 2003 it had 6.9 per cent of the world pharmaceuticals 
market (compared with Pfizer’s 10.3 per cent) (GSK Annual Report, 2003:61).  In 2003, 
GSK had world sales of £21.4 billion, of which £18.18 billion was in pharmaceuticals 
and the remainder in health care products.  Its headquarters are in the UK (Brentford) 
and the majority of its shareholders are British (75 per cent in 2004, down from 80 per 
cent in 2000), but its major markets and the operational headquarters are in the USA.  
In 2003, 52 per cent of pharmaceutical turnover was in the USA (£9,410 million), 
compared with 28 per cent in Europe (£5,114 million) and 4 per cent in Japan (£753 
million).  Within Europe, France is the major market, followed by the UK, although the 
existence of parallel trade (purchase of drugs in low-priced European countries for use 
in high-priced European countries) makes precise calculation difficult.  The operational 204
headquarters, including the Chief Executive’s Office, are in Philadelphia, with the major 
research laboratories in Britain and the US and manufacturing plants 
worldwide.  In 2003, GSK had pre-tax profits of £6.7 billion, with adjusted earnings per 
share of 82.1p (compared with 78.3p in 2002); dividends per share were 41.0p 
(compared with 40.0p).  Financial performance deteriorated in 2004, with second 
quarter results, published on 27 July 2004, showing a decline of 6 per cent in overall 
turnover (£5,064 million compared with £5,375 million in the second quarter of 2003).  
However, a significant contribution to the deterioration in financial performance came 
from the depreciation of the dollar against sterling; at the company’s preferred 
‘constant exchange rate’ (the £/$ exchange rate current in the previous comparable 
business period) there was 2 per cent growth in turnover.
The pharmaceutical sector is a high-risk sector.  Reflecting American anxiety about 
litigation, the company’s warning on forward-looking statements (required by the safe 
harbour provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) is very 
cautious: ‘Forward-looking statements give the group’s current expectations or 
forecasts of future events.  An investor can identify these statements by the fact that 
they do not relate strictly to historical or current facts.  They use words such as 
‘anticipate’, ‘estimate’, ‘expect’, ‘intend’, ‘will’, ‘project’, ‘plan’, ‘believe’, and other 
words of similar meaning in connection with any discussion of future operating or 
financial performance.  ‘…Forward-looking statements involve inherent risks and 
uncertainties.  The group cautions investors that a number of important factors 
including those in this document could cause actual results to differ materially from 
those contained in any forward-looking statement.  Such factors include, but are not 
limited to, those discussed under ‘risk factors’ (GSK Report, 2003).  The main risks 
identified by the company were the possible commercial failure of drugs under 
development, risks of infringements of patenting or marketing exclusivity, weakness of 
patent protection in developing countries, possible unfavourable outcome of litigation 
then occurring in the US, increased possibility of price control in the US, possible 
consolidation and attempts at control by drug wholesalers in the US.
The threats to the company were political and institutional as much as economic.  GSK 
operated in a politically sensitive market.  Healthcare is an electoral priority.  
Governments internationally were concerned about increases in the costs of drugs, and 
sought to control drug expenditure.  In the US the Federal Government and individual 
state governments sought to reduce drug costs.  Individual states even encouraged the 
re-import of drugs from Canada into the US to reduce drug costs.  The Federal 
Government sought to tighten control on Medicare budgets.  In France, the French 
Government capped prices on drugs, leading Dr Garnier to accuse the French 
Government of free riding on the company’s R&D investments.  In Germany, the 
Government instituted a cut of 16 per cent in the price of several drugs in 2004.  In 
Britain, the Five-Year Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme was due for renewal in 
October 2004, with the Government offering either a 10 per cent cut over 5 years or a 
6 per cent cut over 2 years.
GSK is not a ‘typical’ pharmaceutical company.  It is distinguished by its short history, 
having been established only in 2000 by the merger between Glaxo Wellcome plc and 
Smith Kline Beecham plc.  The company is therefore in the process of bedding down a 
management team and organisational structure.  GSK is also distinguished by its size –
at the time of its creation in 2000 it claimed to be the largest pharmaceutical company 205
in the world.  The Anglo-American structure and  modus operandi are also unusual, with 
the head office in West London but the Chief Executive Officer based in Philadelphia. 
According to Dr. J-P. Garnier, Chief Operating Officer of Smith Kline Beecham and the 
then CEO designate of GSK, the merger between Glaxo Wellcome and Smith Kline 
Beecham to form GSK in 2000 was justified by bringing five major competitive 
advantages.  First, the merger would enhance R&D productivity.  The two companies 
had complementary research strengths, and the increased financial and technological 
resources made available by the merger would accelerate research performance.  The 
two companies claimed to have 13 compounds and 10 vaccines in Phase 111 
development (close to achieving FDA approval) and leadership in new areas such as 
genomics and bioinformatics.  
Second, the merger would increase marketing power, with a total of 40,000 employees 
in sales and marketing, including 8000 sales representatives in the USA.  
Third, the new company would be able to invest in consumer marketing skills, 
increasingly necessary because of the growth in direct to consumer advertising and 
Internet sales, supplementing sales via physicians.  It was expected that future growth 
would come from over the counter sales, as pressure on public sector budgets 
increased government price sensitivity and thus influence on state funded prescribing.  
Fourth, the merger would reduce operating costs.  It was claimed that rationalisation 
would result in savings of £750 million over 3 years, in addition to the £570 million 
savings that had already been achieved.  Streamlining R&D would save £250 million.  
Savings would be reinvested.  
Finally, the merger would create a talented management team, with experience of 
creating integrated management teams following mergers (source: 
http://www.pjonline.com/Editorial/20000122/business/glaxosmithkline.html).  
GSK and investment institutions GSK and investment institutions GSK and investment institutions GSK and investment institutions
The creation of GSK
Close relations with the investment community are central to GSK.  Institutional 
investors and the banks were a major influence on the creation of the company in 2000.  
The merger in 2000 followed unsuccessful merger discussion between the two 
companies in 1998, which broke down because of disagreements between the two 
senior management teams.  Investors urged the two companies to merge in 2000, 
against the better judgement of Glaxo Wellcome’s Chief Executive, Sir Richard Sykes, 
according to subsequent comments (Money Telegraph, 23 June 2004).  Sykes alleged 
that the merger was “pushed on to us” by the City, against his opposition, and that it 
would take a long time before it became evident that the merger would lead to 
enhanced shareholder value.  (Glaxo Wellcome was itself the result of a recent 
contentious merger and there was still managerial turbulence within the company).  
Bankers and the press felt the merger would be more successful than previous 
mergers in the industry.  Garnier’s five claims (outlined above) represented GSK’s 
prospectus to the investment community, which the new company sought to achieve 206
in the coming years.  Union claims that the merger would result in fewer jobs and the 
weakening of R&D in the UK were discounted by management and the investment 
community.
The productivity of R&D was critical to maintaining the support of the financial 
institutions for the merger that created GSK in 2000, as Sir Richard Sykes emphasised.  
It was believed that R&D productivity in the industry was declining, and that 
rationalisation associated with the merger would lessen the financial penalties of the 
decline.  The R&D budget at the time of the merger was £2.4 billion.  Following the 
merger the R&D process was reorganised, with the formation of seven Centres of 
Excellence for Drug Discovery (CEDDs); two based at Stevenage and one at Harlow in 
the UK, one at Verona and three in the USA.  The overall objectives were to sharpen 
the research focus and to increase the speed with which drugs could be brought to 
market.  Other organisational changes were made to increase the coherence of the 
company’s R&D effort, including the creation of World Development and cross-
functional teams.  A special ‘Gold Pass’ status was created for drugs that were 
regarded as particularly promising for commercial and medical reasons.  As at February 
2004, GSK had 201 pharmaceutical and vaccine projects in development.  Expenditure 
on R&D was lower in 2003 than it had been in 2002, at £2,791 million compared with 
£2,900 million, representing a reduction of 4 per cent; however, the 2003 level was 
higher than the 2001 figure, £2,651 (GSK Annual Report, 2003:60). The company’s 
reorganisation was favourably received by the business press.  Pharmaceutical R&D 
expenditures represented 14.6 per cent of pharmaceutical turnover for the year ending 
31 March 2004 (GSK Quarterly Results Presentation, 1
st Quarter 2004: 
http://www.events.simplywebcast.com/GSK_Q1_2004/Home.Html).
Formal communications arrangements
GSK carries out a ‘dialogue’ with investors on the company’s ‘performance, plans and 
objectives’.  Financial results are published quarterly (April, July, October and February), 
with the usual half-yearly and annual presentations to shareholders.  Regular 
presentations on the results are made to institutional investors, analysts and the media 
in London and New York, and frequent presentations made to specialised conferences.  
As a blue chip company GSK is the subject of substantial media interest.  
Teleconferences are held in connection with quarterly results for institutional investors, 
analysts and the media, and made available on the web site.  In addition, ad hoc 
presentations are arranged on key topics, such as the special presentation on the 
company’s drug pipeline in December 2003. Although presentations to investors on the 
results are made by several members of the Corporate Management Team, 
responsibility for investor relations lay with the office of the Chief Financial Officer, Mr. 
J Coombe.  The Senior Vice President Corporate Communications and Community 
Relations, Jennie Younger, is directly responsible for the formal aspects of investor 
relations.  Extensive promotional material is made available on the web site. As is 
argued below, the company has been largely successful in managing its investor 
relations.
One critical aspect of the company's relations with investors is the structure and 
composition of the Board, as the representative of shareholder interests.  There was a 
major evaluation of the Board in 2003 by the Chairman, Sir Christopher Hogg, with 207
external advice. The Board was substantially changed at the 2004 Annual General 
Meeting, with the retirement of three non-executive Directors (one French, two US) as 
well as the Chairman. The three non-executive Directors were not replaced and Sir 
Christopher Gent became Chairman. The Board now comprises three Executive 
Directors and eight non-executive Directors. Despite the increased US orientation, the 
Board retains substantial links with the UK investment community, the non-executive 
Directors including Sir Ian Prosser (former Chairman of Six Continents) as senior non-
executive Director, Sir Peter Job (formerly Reuters), Sir Robert Wilson (Chairman of 
British Gas, Rio Tinto) and Mr Crispin Davies (Reed-Elsevier, Guinness).  The non-
executive Directors receive an annual external review of shareholder opinion, as well as 
presentations on sector specific developments.
Difficulties in relations: GSK’s drug portfolio, pipeline of future products and executive 
remuneration
Since its creation, GSK’s relations with the investor community have not been easy.  
The first source of difficulty has been the performance of the share price.  The 
company’s share price declined from a peak of £21 in 2000 to £10.40 in 2004, before 
recovering slightly.  The share price at 24 November 2004 was £11.33, having risen 
slightly following a presentation by GSK's Director of Research, Dr.Tachi Yamada, on 
the company's drugs under development (Guardian, 24 November 2004); Merrill Lynch 
recommended 'buy'.  In 2003/4 the price fluctuated between a high of £13.95 and a 
low of £10.42.  According to one commentator, GSK shares “have had a truly awful 
2004”. The weakening of the share price was greater than the short-term financial 
performance warranted, since revenue, earnings and profits increased in 2003, before 
deteriorating in 2004.  The company argued that 2004 represented a 'year of transition', 
with mergers and reorganisation completed in 2003 and the full effects to be realised 
in 2005.  Other problems included the law suit brought by the New York Attorney 
General in June 2004 alleging that GSK had with-held clinical trial data showing that its 
anti-depressant drug Pactil was harmful to children.  GSK agreed in August to pay 
$2.5m. in settlement to avoid further litigation costs and uncertainties, and undertook 
to make its research results available within an agreed timeframe.  GSK shares rose 
27p (from £11.04 to £11.31) on news of the settlement (Financial Times, 27 August, 
2004).
Despite the weak price, GSK remained a stock that institutions retained.  Even after the 
unfavourable second quarter results in 2004, the consensus amongst brokers and 
analysts was ‘hold’, although opinion had deteriorated slightly over the previous three 
months.  GSK remained regarded by fund managers as a quality stock, alongside 
companies such as Vodaphone and BP (e.g. in the Investec Cautious Managers Fund 
and in the Newcastle Building Society Guaranteed Blue Chip Bond).  The company 
managed investors’ expectations.  In early July, analysts were reporting that GSK 
revenues were due to be reported at £162 billion, only for expectations to be exceeded 
(Financial Times 27 July 2004).
Investors were anxious about the quality of GSK’s drugs portfolio. There was anxiety 
about the ending of the patents on best selling drugs in the US, especially Vantac and 
subsequently Pactil IR and  Wellburtin S.R.  Generics made a major impact on GSK’s 208
sales revenue in 2004, with revenue from the sales of Paxil I.R.  and Wellburtin S.R.  in 
the USA showing a decline of £392 million compared with the previous year, as the 
drugs went out of patent.  The company continued to produce generic substitutes 
when the patents expired, but with significantly lower returns.
Investing institutions were even more concerned with the company’s new drugs
pipeline, as the determinant of the company’s future profitability. The company based 
its reputation and future financial prospects on its ability to generate new drugs.  
According to the then chairman, Sir Richard Sykes, the pharmaceutical industry is a 
“research-led industry”.  GSK claimed to be ‘aiming to create the most productive 
discovery pipeline in the industry….  This involves developing a focused portfolio 
strategy to support the pipeline and manage the full life cycle of compounds from 
launch to over-the-counter-products’ (GSK Annual Report, 2003:6).  Drugs had a known 
product life cycle, with the major objective being to maximise sales during the period of 
patent protection.  GSK claimed a broad and diversified portfolio, with a strong stress 
on new product launches.  In 2003, sale of new products launched in the last five years 
accounted for 25 per cent of turnover, and grew by 29 per cent absolutely.  Sales of 
more established franchised products contributed 51 per cent of turnover, but grew by
only 1 per cent.  Sales of older products, no longer actively promoted, represented 21 
per cent of turnover, a decline of 8 per cent (GSK Annual Report, 2003:61).  The 
pipeline for 2004 included six major drugs at the launch stage, with seven major filings 
with the Federal Drug Administration in the US.  (Drug product development involves 
six stages, the whole process lasting on average twelve years, including preclinical 
testing and three phases of clinical trials).  In addition, the company had several fast 
growing franchises, including  seretide (respiratory),  avandia (diabetes), lamactil (central 
nervous system), valtrex (anti-viral) and coreg  (cardiovascular); seretide  alone generated 
£581 million, growing at 22 per cent.  Analysts responded warmly to news of future 
blockbusters, despite weakening short-term performance; “if future blockbusters do 
come through as expected today’s share price will prove to be a bargain”. 
In November 2003, GSK shares reached a high of £13.95 on suggestions that the 
company was working on ‘up to five’ best selling drugs in areas such as cancer and 
cardiovascular treatment.  As the drugs were being developed in-house rather than 
franchised the prospective financial returns were perceived to be greater.  GSK shares 
received a ‘buy’ recommendation, even with no prospects of short-term gain and at 
15.8 times 2004 earnings (30 November 2003).  GSK managed its release of 
information as part of its long-term marketing campaign to the investment community.
Despite GSK’s overall success in managing shareholder expectations and in 
maintaining the confidence of institutional shareholders the Board committed major 
errors in corporate governance issues in 2003/4, severely damaging its short-term 
relations with the investing community.  The Board radically revised its remuneration 
policies for senior executives, with the stated intention of aligning the interests of 
senior managers more closely with those of investors.  There was a major increase in 
the importance of bonus and performance-related elements in remuneration, designed 
to focus on shareholder returns.  However, the scheme backfired, due to the generous 
treatment of the Chief Executive Officer and, to a lesser extent, the Chief Financial 
Officer.  In view of its significance for relations with investing institutions the episode is 
worth outlining in detail.209
The Board proposed major changes in the basic principles underlying senior executive 
remuneration in 2003, bringing the company closer to US practice.  The key principles 
articulated by the Remuneration Committee were comparison with global 
pharmaceutical companies, whilst providing a remuneration system that secured, 
retained and motivated ‘key talent in a very competitive market place’.  ‘UK shareholder 
guidelines would be followed to the maximum extent consistent with the needs of the 
business and the company would maintain a regular dialogue with shareholders’ (GSK 
Annual Report, 2003:45).  The global companies used for comparison comprised 8 US 
companies (including Pfizer), 2 Swiss, 2 French, 1 Japanese, 1 German and 1 British 
(Astra-Zeneca).  Senior executive remuneration comprised three major elements: basic 
pay, bonus pay, and share allocations and options.  The least important element, basic 
pay, was the median salary for the global pharmaceutical comparator group.  The 
annual bonus was based on performance: no bonus is payable if performance is 96 per 
cent of the target performance, with upper limits to bonuses of 100-200 per cent of 
basic salary, 200 per cent being the upper limit for the CEO.  ‘Bonus awards for 2003 
reflected the Committee’s belief that the company produced superior results during 
the year, after taking account of factors outside the control of management, notably 
exchange rate changes and the launch of generic competition to Paxil in the USA’ (GSK 
Annual Report, 2003:46).  In addition, executives received performance share awards 
and share options, based on performance (measured by Total Shareholder Return) 
compared with comparator pharmaceutical companies (not, as previously, with 
comparisons against the FTSE 100).  Performance awards were also based on 
comparisons with 14 pharmaceutical companies (vesting 35 per cent if median TSR, 
100 per cent if in the top two), with the wider share option scheme for senior 
executives based on Earnings Per Share (EPS) (100 per cent if EPS equals RPI plus 5 
per cent).  If performance targets were not met after three years performance would 
be re-measured after four years.  ‘To align the interests of executives with 
shareholders, executives are required to maintain significant holdings of shares in GSK’.  
The number of shares to be held varied according to position: CEO four times base 
salary, other Executive Directors three times base salary; 700 top executives equivalent 
to base salary.  The contractual notice period for the CEO was reduced from two years 
to one year, with entitlement to one year’s annual salary and one year’s on-target 
bonus.
Shareholders regarded the level of remuneration as excessive.  They also believed that 
the level of payments to be made to Garnier in the event of his dismissal were 
unacceptable, being estimated at up to £22 million (Rosie Murray-West and Becky 
Barrow, Money Telegraph, 20 May 2003).  The report of the Remuneration Committee 
was rejected at the 2003 Annual General Meeting by 50.72 per cent of votes to 49.28 
per cent, with both institutional and individual shareholders voting against the report.  
Even before the AGM the Board chairman, Sir Christopher Hogg, had written rather 
defensively to shareholders regarding the report.  The Association of British Insurers 
attacked GSK for ‘significant breaches’ of City best practice on pay, whilst the National 
Association of Pension Funds urged members to abstain on the re-election of Garnier 
and Coombe as Directors.  Although the negative vote on the Remuneration 
Committee report was not binding, the report was withdrawn.  Subsequently, the 
share options for the CEO were re-arranged, but the total remuneration package 
approved in 2004 still provided for annual remuneration of £2.8 million. Investors were 
thus able to have a significant influence on executive remuneration, although they were 
unable to prevent totally the moves towards a more US-style system of remuneration.210
The GSK Board severely mishandled corporate governance issues in 2003/4, doing 
short-term damage to its relations with the investment community.  Press publicity 
focused on the level of CEO remuneration.  The level of remuneration was excessive, 
especially for executives close to retirement age and therefore unlikely to be targets for 
recruitment elsewhere.  The share option schemes justified as aligning the interests of 
executives with those of shareholders could be reinterpreted as further means of 
increasing executive remuneration, since the performance targets were not demanding.  
The chairman claimed that the performance targets were “challenging”.  But this was 
not plausible, especially with the exclusion of factors for which management could not 
be held responsible.  For example, the target of a return of the Retail Price Index (RPI) 
plus 5 per cent was significantly lower than the RPI plus 15 per cent demanded by 
Vodaphone’s target earnings per share (EPS).  However, the committee’s report was 
consistent with GSK’s move to following US practice.  The global companies with 
whom GSK compared itself, both in terms of overall performance and in the specifics 
of remuneration policy, were primarily US companies.  Garnier acted as the charismatic 
American CEO, the dominant influence on the Board.  This reflected the company’s 
increasing focus on its major market, the USA, and the business practices of major US 
corporations.
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion
GSK is the largest British player in pharmaceuticals, with the second largest market 
share globally.  The company's recent history exemplifies trends in pharmaceuticals 
and especially in relations between investors and managers.  The company maintains a 
high level of expenditure on Research and Development, necessary to support the 
lengthy drug development process.  There is a high level of risk, with the possibility of 
drugs falling at one of several regulatory hurdles (pre-clinical trials, Phases 1-3 of clinical 
trials, FDA evaluation, post market testing) before being accepted in the market place: 
only one in 5000 compounds survives the process.  There is a high level of product 
market competition, and legal challenges to patented drugs: in 2004 eight of the 20 
drugs that GSK regarded as significant product were under litigation in the US.  The 
risks are both political and economic.  Despite the risks the prospective returns are 
high: GSK's revenues of £21.4 billion in 2003 were generated by only 103,166 
employees, £207,830 per employee.
GSK continues to be regarded as one of the major blue chip stocks by British investors, 
and remains a constituent in major British funds, especially tracking funds.  The 
company’s relations with the British investment community have been close, and its 
shareholdings remained primarily British.  There is no dominant shareholder, the largest 
shareholder being the Blackrock New York municipal Income Trust, at 9.3 per cent.  
Despite declining share price over the period since its formation in 2000 and the 
controversy surrounding directors’ remuneration in 2003/4 GSK has retained 
shareholder confidence.  This confidence has rested on the conviction that the 
company’s pipeline of future drugs is healthy.  GSK devotes considerable resources 
and attention to maintaining that conviction and to managing shareholder expectations 
and seems to be relatively successful in this regard.  The problem facing institutions 
investing in the pharmaceutical sector is evaluating company claims regarding future 
drug developments, when the information available to investors is even more limited 
than in other sectors, where past performance may provide a more reliable guide to 211
future prospects.  In the absence of verifiable information on future drug developments, 
investors necessarily rely heavily upon reputation, and GSK has hitherto successfully 
managed its reputation.  Although the company retains its legal headquarters in Britain, 
its relations with the British investment community have become looser with the 
expansion of operational headquarters in the US and the increasing importance of US
investors; shareholder presentations are increasingly made in the US.  The significance 
of British shareholder practices is declining, being followed only insofar as they are 
regarded as consistent with the firm’s business needs and US business practices.
Symbolic of the increasing importance of the US financial community is the move to 
following US rather than British accounting practices.  GSK has learned to operate in a 
global market largely governed by US practices, in its relations with shareholders as in 
other areas of activity. However, investors did manage to put a (possible temporary) 
break on moves towards a US-style system of executive remuneration.
The influence of investors upon specific management practices in GSK appears to be 
limited.  Pharmaceuticals is a research intensive business, difficult for outsiders to 
monitor effectively.  In particular, evaluation of the value of the drug pipeline is difficult 
to establish. However, institutional shareholders have influenced major strategic 
decisions.  The most important decision related to the very formation of the company 
through the merger of GlaxoWellcome and SmithKlineBeecham.  Institutional investors 
pressed for the merger between the two companies as a means of creating an 
internationally competitive firm at a time when other international pharmaceutical 
companies were undertaking mergers.  Size was seen as necessary because of the 
high costs and high risks – as well as high returns – in pharmaceuticals.  In particular, 
the costs of research and development were seen as likely to escalate with the 
breakthroughs associated with the human genome project.  Such considerations over-
rode two major concerns, the management turbulence already present in the two 
companies that were themselves the product of recent mergers and the threat to 
research morale caused by organisational uncertainty.
GSK manages its relations with the international investor community with significant 
success.  Despite an anticipated problematic operational performance in the immediate 
future, the bitter arguments associated with ‘fat cat’ salaries in 2003/4 and the negative 
publicity associated with allegations of suppressing unfavourable research results in 
the US, the share price remained stable, if at a lower level than on the firm’s launch. 
This investor confidence rests substantially on assessments of the quality of GSK’s 
drugs pipeline, the drugs under development that comprise its future ethical drugs 
portfolio, the most profitable part of its operations. Investors assessed the company’s 
long-term prospects favourably.  Managing the drugs pipeline and publicity about future 
developments is an integral part of marketing  GSK to investors and to the medical 
community. The knowledge available to the external community to assess the quality 
of the drugs pipeline is limited (and assessment of drug performance even after 
licensing and launching remains controversial). In default of reliable detailed information 
investors inevitably rely upon reputation, a reputation that GSK has successfully 
maintained.